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I. INTRODUCTION
Each year, millions of people in low- and middle-income (LMI) coun-
tries die from preventable and treatable diseases. I AIDS provides one of
the starkest examples: it killed more than three million people in 20042
and has become the world's leading cause of death for adults aged fifteen
to fifty-nine. 3 These deaths continue despite the fact that we have known
for years that antiretroviral combination therapy (ARVs) can substantially
improve the lives of those living with HIV/AIDS, and even reverse the
tide of death associated with the disease.4
But the drugs that we take for granted in the United States have long
been out of reach for most of those living with HIV/AIDS around the
1. See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORG., WORLD HEALTH REpORT 2002, at 186-91.
2. UNAIDS, AIDS EPIDEMIC UPDATE 1 (Dec. 2004) [hereinafter UNAIDS 2004],
http://www.unaids.org/wad2004/EPC I 204_pdCenlEpiUpdate043n.pdf.
3. WORLD HEALTH ORG., KEy FACTS FROM THE WORLD HEALTH REpORT 2004, at
1, http://www.who.int/whr/2004/en/facts_en.pdf.
4. In the United States, in the two years after ARVs were adopted for widespread
use, AIDS-related mortality dropped by more than seventy percent. See Frank J. Palella et
al., Declining Morbidity and Mortality Among Patients with Advanced Human Immuno-
deficiency Virus Infection, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 853 (1998); see also Paulo R. Teixeira
et al., The Brazilian Experience in PrOViding Access to Antiretroviral Therapy, in Eco-
NOMICS OF AIDS AND ACCESS TO HIV/AIDS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 69 (2003) (de-
scribing a similarly dramatic reduction in mortality in Brazil following the introduction of
ARV therapy).
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world. 5 One crucial reason has been their cost. In 2000, the average
worldwide price for patented ARVs was more than $10,000 per patient per
year.6 Today, the same medicine is sold in generic form for as little as
$168 per year.7 This drastic reduction in price has enabled governments
and international agencies to initiate programs designed to bring these
medicines to millions of HIV-positive individuals around the world who
otherwise lack access to them.8 These programs still have a long way to go
before they meet existing need,9 but they would not have begun at all if
prices had not come down so dramatically.
5. Approximately ninety-five percent of AIDS-related deaths occur in the develop-
ing world. See UNAIDS, AIDS EPIDEMIC UPDATE 5 (Dec. 2003), http://www.unaids.
org/html/pub/publications/irc-pub06/jc943-epiupdate2003_en_pdf.pdf. In 200 I, a survey
of seventy low-income countries found that only two percent of those with advanced HIV
infection had access to treatment. INT'L mv TREATMENT ACCESS COALITION, WORLD
HEALTH ORG., A COMMITMENT TO ACTION FOR EXPANDED ACCESS TO HIV/AIDS
TREATMENT 2 (2002). The following year, the World Health Organization (WHO) re-
ported that on average only five percent of all people in need of ARVs worldwide re-
ceived them; within sub-Saharan Africa, just one percent were treated. INT'L HIV
TREATMENT ACCESS COALITION, supra, at l.
6. See MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES, UNTANGLING THE WEB OF PRICE REDUC-
TIONS: A PRICING GUIDE FOR THE PURCHASE OF ARVs FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 9
(7th ed. 2005) [hereinafter MSF, UNTANGLING THE WEB], http://www.accessmed-msf
.orgldocuments/untanglingtheweb%207.pdf. At the same time, in Brazil, generics were
being produced for less than $3000 per patient per year. Id.
7. Id.
8. A number of national ARV programs explicitly rely on generics. See, e.g.,
Charles Wendo, Uganda Begins Distributing Free Antiretrovirals, 363 LANCET 2062
(2004). International agencies have also found generics important to their program objec-
tives. See Asia Russell, The Bush Administration's Global AIDS Promises--and Praxis, 4
YALE 1. HEALTH POL'y L. & ETHICS 133, 138 (2004) (citing GLOBAL FUND To FIGHT
AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS, & MALARIA, GUIDELINES FOR PROPOSALS (2003»; Keith Alcorn
& Theo Smart, Fixed Dose ARV Combinations: Choices and Challenges, HIV & AIDS
TREATMENT IN PRACTICE (NAM, United Kingdom, Mar. 2004) (noting that the WHO's 3
x 5 Initiative favors generics because they are believed to make the program affordable),
at http://www.aidsmap.com/en/docs/3FE6E952-3B09-494A-96EO-200381027DAO.asp;
cf Juan Rovira, Trade Agreements, Intellectual Property, and the Role ofthe World Bank
in Improving Access to Medicines in Developing Countries, 4 YALE J. HEALTH POL'y L.
& ETHICS 401 (2004).
9. The programs are, however, headed in the right direction. The number of people
in developing countries receiving treatment purportedly increased by nearly two-thirds in
the second half of 2004.. Compare Press Release, WHOIUNAIDS/Global FundlU.S. Gov-
ernment, 700,000 People Living with AIDS in Developing Countries Now Receiving
Treatment (Jan. 26, 2005), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releasesI2005/pr07/en/
print.html, with UNAIDS 2004, supra note 2, at 5 (reporting that 440,000 low- and mid-
dle-income country residents were receiving treatment as of June 2004, according to
WHO statistics).
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These recent price reductions have also generated a storm of contro-
versy regarding the contribution that patents and other exclusive rightslO
make to the inequities in global availability of life-saving medicines. The
problem that patents can pose for access to medicines and medical tech-
nologiesll is complex and cannot be understood without a nuanced as-
sessment of the political economy in which the key players operate.
Consider one example: in 2000, only an estimated one percent of the
500,000 South Africans in need of ARV medicines received them.12 The
humanitarian organization Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), better known
in the United States as Doctors Without Borders, wanted to begin a pilot
program in a township outside Cape Town to demonstrate that, contrary to
popular belief (and the claims of South African President Thabo Mbeki13),
AIDS medicines could be used effectively in resource-poor settings if they
could be made affordable. 14 MSF faced a practical problem: a limited
budget and a seemingly unlimited supply of patients. In South Africa, the
price of stavudine, just one of the drugs then used in ARV therapy, was
over $1600 per year. IS An Indian company offered to sell MSF generic
stavudine for approximately three percent of the branded version's price,
10. In the phannaceutical field, patents are increasingly supplemented by other ex-
clusive rights, such as rights in regulatory data. For the sake of clarity, this Article will
refer to the range of patent and patent-like exclusive rights that may apply to medical
technology collectively as "patent rights." Also, when we discuss these exclusive rights
we refer to them as they are usually used-that is, to secure a monopoly and extract su-
pra-marginal returns.
11. We include the range of non-phannaceutical products important to the practice
of medicine, such as vaccines, diagnostics, and monitoring tools, when referring to medi-
cines or medical or biomedical technologies.
12. See Jennifer Barrett, A Major Step, NEWSWEEK (WEB EXCLUSIVE), Nov. 24,
2003, at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/3606125; see also Edwin Cameron, The Deafening
Silence ofAIDS,S HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 7 (2000) (describing the lack of access to treat-
ment in South Africa in 2000).
13. Cf Barrett, supra note 12 (mentioning Mbeki's refusal to accept that anti-
retrovirals worked, as well as his subsequent reversal on the issue).
14. MSF and others have succeeded in establishing this principle. See Paul Fanner
et aI., Community-Based Approaches to HIV Treatment in Resource-Poor Settings, 358
LANCET 404 (2001); Toby Kasper et al., Demystifying Antiretroviral Therapy in Re-
source-Poor Settings, 32 ESSENTIAL DRUGS MONITOR 20 (2003); Donald G. McNeil Jr.,
Africans Outdo U.S. Patients in Following AIDS Therapy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2003, at
AI.
15. Letter from Eric Goemaere, Representative of Medecins Sans Frontieres-South
Africa, to Jon Soderstrom, Managing Director, Office of Cooperative Research, Yale
University (Mar. 9, 2001) [hereinafter Goemaere MSF Letter] (on file with authors).
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but because the drug was subject to a South African patent, MSF could not
legally accept the offer. 16
Though Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS) had an exclusive license to sell
the drug, Yale University was the key patent holder. 17 MSF approached
Yale in February 2001, requesting a license to use generic stavudine. MSF
simultaneously asked BMS for a price reduction that would lower the
price to the generic level. I8 In addition to its immediate, pragmatic objec-
tives regarding its pilot program, MSF likely also had a broad strategic
goal in mind. At that time, patent-based pharmaceutical firms l9 refused to
offer transparent and comprehensive price reductions for AIDS drugs for
developing countries,20 threatened to sue generic companies that supplied
ARVs to developing countries where the firms believed they held pat-
ents,21 and sued the South African government over a statute intended to
allow cheaper medicines into the country.22 MSF no doubt hoped that Yale
would act differently than the drug companies, setting a precedent that
would ultimately demonstrate that, contrary to drug company assertions,
price discounts and patent concessions in countries like South Africa
would not destroy the patent-based pharmaceutical industry.23
16. Id.; see also Melody Petersen, Lifting the Curtain on the Real Costs ofMaking
AIDS Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2001, at Cl (noting that Cipla, an Indian generic com-
pany, had offered to sell generic stavudine to health organizations for $40 per year).
17. Bristol-Myers Squibb brought the drug (also known as d4t) to market in 1994
under the brand name Zerit. See John Curtis, Hunting Down HIV, YALE MED., Summer
1998, http://info.med.yale.edu/extemaVpubs/ym_su98/cover/cov_hunting II.html
18. Goemaere MSF Letter, supra note 15.
19. We use the terms "patent-based," "originator," or "proprietary" to denote phar-
maceutical companies, including biotech firms, that develop, produce, and/or market pat-
ented medicines. The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA)
represents the interests of these companies in the United States, and "PhRMA compa-
nies" is another common synonym. These terms specifically exclude generic companies,
both in the developed and developing worlds.
20. See infra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
21. See infra note 160.
22. See Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act, No. 90 (1997)
(S. Afr.); see also Mark Heywood, Debunking 'Conglomo-Talk': A Case Study of the
Amicus Curiae as an Instrument for Advocacy, Investigation and Mobilization, Paper
Presentation at Health, Law and Human Rights: Exploring the Connections Conference
13 (Sept. 29, 2001), http://www.tac.org.za/Documents/MedicineActCourtCase/Debunk
inR-Conglomo.rtf.
23. Cf Barton Gellman, A Turning Point That Left Millions Behind, WASH. POST,
Dec. 28, 2000, at Al (citing the Chairman of Pfizer, in 2000, who argued in favor of a
donation program in developing countries, instead of differential pricing or generic com-
petition, for its important AIDS drug diflucan because the industry "lives and dies on
intellectual property").
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This approach paid off. Within weeks of receiving MSF's request,
Yale and BMS jointly announced that they would permit the sale of gener-
ics in South Africa and that BMS would lower the price of its brand-name
stavudine to approximately $55 per year throughout sub-Saharan Africa
for governments and nongovernmental organizations (NGOS).24
The Yale/BMS decision garnered significant media attention,25 and
may have helped create a tipping point in the campaign for access to af-
fordable ARVs-shortly after the announcement, pharmaceutical manu-
facturers dropped their lawsuit against the South African government.26
Major price reductions in sub-Saharan Africa followed from other compa-
nies,27 as well as additional concessions on intellectual property rights
(IPRS).28 This in turn enabled activists in countries such as South Africa to
turn the spotlight on their own government's inaction, and eventually ob-
tain commitments to provide ARVs in the public sector.29
24. See Press Release, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Bristol-Myers Squibb Announces Ac-
celerated Program To Fight HIY/AIDS in Africa (Mar. 14, 2001), http://www.pmews
wire.co.uklcgi/news/release?id=64424. While a steep discount, this price was still higher
than the price offered by generic companies. See Goemaere MSF Letter, supra note 15.
Generic fonns of stavudine have been available in South Africa since 2003, and two
companies have been awarded a tender to supply generic d4t to the South African gov-
ernment. See Amy Kapczynski et aI., Editorial, Global Health and University Patents,
300 SCIENCE 1629 (2003); South African Generic Drug Maker To Produce Country's
First Generic Antiretroviral Drug, KAISER DAILY HIV/AIDS REp., Aug. 7, 2003, at
http://kaisernetwork.org/daily_reports/rep_index.cfin?hint=1&DR_ID=19240; Press Re-
lease, South Africa Department of Health, ARV Drug Tender Awarded (Mar. 3, 2005),
http://www.doh.gov.za/docs/pr/pr0303-f.htmi.
25. See, e.g., Karen DeYoung & Bill Brubaker, Another Firm Cuts HIV Drug
Prices, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2001, at AI; Michael Waldholz & Rachel Zimmennan,
Bristol-Myers Offers To Sell Two AIDS Drugs in Africa at Below Cost, WALL ST. J., Mar.
15,2001, at BI.
26. See Rachel L. Swarns, Drug Makers Drop South Africa Suit over AIDS Medi-
cine, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2001, at AI.
27. See, e.g., Drug Company Cuts AIDS Drug Prices in S. Africa, REUTERS NEWS-
MEDIA, Nov. 30, 2001, http://www.emro.who.int/asdlWhatsNew-GlobalEvents-Reuters3
01I.htm; Rachel Zimmennan & Michael Waldholz, Abbott To Cut Prices on AIDS Drugs
Distributed in Sub-Saharan Africa, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2001, at A3
28. See, e.g., Press Release, Aspen Pharmacare Ltd., Aspen Phannacare Receive
Voluntary License from GlaxoSmithKline on Anti-Retroviral Patents in South Africa
(Oct. 8, 2001) [hereinafter Aspen Pharmacare Press Release), http://www.aspenphanna
care.co.za/showarticle.php?id=135.
29. Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), a South African NGO, for example, aligned
with the ruling African National Congress (ANC) party during the drug company lawsuit.
Directly after the victory, the ANC made clear that it had no plans to take advantage of
the potential for lower prices by creating a national treatment program. See Ben
Hirschler, Glaxo Gives Up Rights to AIDS Drugs in South Africa, REUTERS NEwsMEDIA,
HeinOnline -- 20 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1037 2005
2005] OPEN LICENSING FOR UNIVERSITY INNOVATIONS 1037
In renouncing the enforcement of its South African patent, Yale went
further in making intellectual property (IP) concessions on an AIDS medi-
cine than any proprietor had done before, and demonstrated that patent
holders could trigger substantial, immediate price reductions. The
Yale/BMS deal may also have been a watershed event for public sector
institutions (which we define as public and private universities, govern-
mental agencies, and nonprofit organizations). Over the past few years
some such institutions have taken steps to ensure that their patents do not
contribute to what we call the "accessgap"-the systematic inability of
individuals in developing countries to obtain existing medicines.
Public sector institutions have also begun to address a related prob-
lem-one we term the "research and development gap" (R&D gap)-of
massive underinvestment in medicines for diseases that primarily impact
the global poor, known as neglected diseases.3o The scale of the inequality
is immense: "only 10% of the world expenditure on health R&D is spent
on health conditions that represent 90% of the global [disease] burden
.••.,,31 Although the R&D gap has received far less attention than the ac-
cess gap, its implications are no less grim.
Consider one vivid example: the most commonly used drug to treat
African sleeping sickness is arsenic-based and kills up to five percent of
Oct. 6,2001 (describing the government's resistance and TAC's response), http://www.
aegis.com/news/re/2001/REOl1009.html. TAC then shifted its focus to the government,
filing and winning a landmark constitutional case establishing the government's obliga-
tion to create programs to provide medicines to HIV-positive women to prevent the
transmission ofHIV to their children. Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign,
2002 (5) SALR 721 (CC) (S. Afr.). In 2003, the South African government finally
launched a national antiretroviral program, employing generic stavudine as a key compo-
nent of the formulary. See Julian Meldrum, South African HIV Treatment To Depend on
Generic Drugs, AIDSMAP NEWS, Aug. 7,2003, http://www.aidsmap.com/en/news/F5E9
6962-FIB4-40F2-8969-624AC8A7D424.asp. Approximately 27,000 people are report-
edly now receiving treatment from the public sector. See Ben Maclennan, Aids Activists
Are Govt's 'Conscience', MAIL & GUARDIAN (S. Afr.), Feb. 16,2005, http://www.mg.co
.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=197660&area=/breakin!Lnews/breakin!Lnews_national.
While this represents a significant advance, it remains far shy of the government's an-
nounced intention to treat 50,000 people by the end of 2004. See Sharon LaFraniere,
South Africa Approves Plan To Offer Free AIDS Medication, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2003,
atA3.
30. There is no standard definition of "neglected diseases," and other terms such as
tropical diseases or developing-country diseases are often used interchan'geably.
31. United Nations Dev. Programme, Incentives To Reduce the 10/90 Gap (2002),
http://www.undp.org/ods/monterrey-sideevent/incentive.pdf; see GLOBAL FORUM FOR
HEALTH RESEARCH, THE 10/90 REpORT ON HEALTH RESEARCH 2003-2004 (2004).
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those who are treated with it.32 New drugs are desperately needed for this
and many other diseases, but have not been forthcoming. Of the many rea-
sons for this, the most important is that our current drug development sys-
tem primarily depends on patents (and their corresponding market-based
incentives) to draw private companies to fund clinical trials and commer-
cialization activities. Predictably, firms have little interest in developing
products for developing countries because these markets are so small: the
branded pharmaceutical industry in the United States derives only five to
seven percent of its profits from all LMI countries.33 Indeed, Latin Amer-
ica, Africa, Asia (excluding Japan), and Australia combined comprise only
twelve percent of the total worldwide market for pharmaceuticals, includ-
ing generic drugs.34
32. See Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative, Sleeping Sickness (Human African
Trypanosomiasis), at http://www.dndi.org/cms/public_htrnVinsidearticleListing.asp?Cat
egoryId=89&SubCategoryId=147&ArticleId=201&TemplateId=1 (last visited Apr. 8,
2005).
33. These country classifications are made by the World Bank. See World Bank
Group, Data and Statistics: Country Classification, at http://www.worldbank.orgldata/
countryclass/countryclass.htrnl (last visited Apr. 28, 2005); World Bank Group, Data and
Statistics: Country Groups, at http://www.worldbank.orgldatalcountryclass/classgroups.
htrn (last visited Apr. 28, 2005). In 2002, "94.9% of the global sales of the U.S.-based
brand-name pharmaceutical industry came from the U.S., Canada, Europe (including
Eastern Europe and Russia), Japan, Australia and New Zealand." William W. Fisher &
Talha Syed, Patent Law, Drugs and the Health Crisis in the Developing World 76-77
(Feb. 24, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). The most recent report
from the pharmaceutical industry's trade association, PhRMA, offers data that support
the conclusion that LMI markets contribute five to seven percent of sales. See PHARM.
RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY PROFILE 2005-FROM LABO-
RATORY TO PATIENT: PATHWAYS TO BIOPHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 40 (2005) (in-
cluding Latin America, Asia-Pacific-except Japan, India, and Pakistan-eentral and
Eastern Europe, Russia, and the Middle East in the estimation of LMI markets). PhRMA
members represent a very large proportion of the patent-based industry, and of U.S. firms
engaged in R&D. Its data is thus well-tailored for the purposes of this Article, and we are
grateful to Talha Syed for directing us to it.
34. This percentage was steady between 2002 and 2004, according to IMS Health.
See Press Release, IMS Health, IMS Reports 2004 Global Pharmaceutical Sales Grew 7
Percent to $550 Billion (Mar. 9, 2005) (indicating the percent did not change from 2003
to 2004), http://www.imshealth.com/ims/portal/front/articleC/0.2777,6599_3665_71496
463,00.htrnl; Press Release, IMS Health, IMS Reports 8 Percent Constant Dollar Growth
in 2002 Audited Global Pharmaceutical Sales to $400.6 Billion (Feb. 25, 2003),
http://www.imshealth.com/ims/portaVfront/articleC/0.2777,6599_3665_41336931,00.htrn
1. Australia, which is of course not an LMI country, is likely a somewhat significant share
of this percentage, but IMS Health does not publicly provide these percentages disaggre-
gated by country. The main distinction between this and PhRMA data is due to IMS
Health's inclusion of generic sales.
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While patents-and the promise of exclusivity-alone cannot stimu-
late research where there is no attractive market for a medicine, they can
create barriers to such research, and thus play a role in perpetuating the
R&D gap. Public sector institutions are beginning to address both the need
to stimulate research and to ensure patents do not block research, for ex-
ample, by participating in public-private partnerships to develop medi-
cines for neglected diseases and by seeking to reserve rights to use one
another's research tools.
This Article aims to draw upon these examples to demonstrate the po-
tential of public sector institutions, particularly U.S. universities,35 to ad-
dress the access and R&D gaps by changing their licensing practices. It
also aims to propose a strategy that will allow these institutions to settle on
a standard practice that will best use their collective contribution to inno-
vation. We demonstrate that without any changes in the current statutory
or regulatory environment, these institutions can use private, contractual
instruments to foster commons-based remedies for the problems of our
global drug development and distribution system. This Article outlines the
structure and characteristics of two such instruments to: (1) eliminate the
access barriers exclusive rights pose to patients in LMI countries, and (2)
remove patent barriers that might impede research on neglected diseases.
These strategies will only be effective if they are rooted in an under-
standing of the role that IPRs play in the access and R&D gaps. Part II
provides such an analysis and argues that patents and other exclusive
rights regimes are now an essential subject for anyone concerned with
global health disparities. We also review existing proposals to eliminate
the burdens patents can impose on the global poor, and demonstrate the
acute need for new approaches-particularly ones that can route around
the inaction of governments and firms, and have a demonstration effect
that will prompt systemic change.
Part III seeks to defme the space from which such an approach can
emerge. We discuss a class of commons-based initiatives that provide a
model for action that depends neither on top-down governmental action,
nor on private market motives and signals.36 Commons and common-
property regimes in material resources have been the subject of substantial
35. While our proposals could be adopted by nonprofits, universities, and even pri-
vate finns both within and outside of the United States, we concentrate our discussion on
U.S. universities.
36. See Yochai Benk.ler, Commons-Based Strategies and the Problems of Patents,
305 SCIENCE 1110 (2004).
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scholarship over the past two decades.37 The emergence of free and open
source software development has led to increased interest in defming the
conditions for sustainable and successful nonproprietary production
strategies-for software38 and more generally for networked information
production39 and some classes of physical resources.40 These approaches
rely on mechanisms other than proprietary exclusion to motivate and to
organize production, and they frequently rely upon innovative contractual
provisions to create a self-perpetuating commons. In this Part, we discuss
recent, exploratory public-sector projects that implement commons-based
approaches within the biomedical domain, as well as the models and les-
sons these projects can take from other commons-based, contractually
structured initiatives.
In Part IV, we analyze the current structure of university research and
technology commercialization, demonstrating that U.S. research universi-
ties are well-positioned to adopt open licensing policies41 that could mean-
ingfully benefit the global poor. This Part explains the role of universities
in the overall biomedical innovation system and discusses the problems
with their standard approach to patenting and licensing biomedical innova-
tions. We also map the political economy of a move towards open licens-
ing within universities, demonstrating that such licensing is not contrary to
the financial interests of universities, and may in fact provide substantial
gains for universities as well as the global poor. The success of this pro-
37. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Com-
mons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 711
(1986).
38. Open source or free software innovation has attracted significant academic at-
tention, as has peer production of other types of information, knowledge, and culture
more generally. See STEVEN WEBER, THE SUCCESS OF OPEN SOURCE (2004); Josh Lerner
& Jean Tirole, The Scope of Open Source Licensing, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 20 (2005);
Eric von Hippel & Georg von Krogh, Open Source Software and the Private-Collective
Innovation Model: Issuesfor Organization Science, 14 ORG. SCI. 209 (2003).
39. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the
Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002).
40. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emer-
gence ofSharing as a Modality ofEconomic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273 (2004).
41. We define an "open" licensing provision as one that is available to everyone on
the same terms. In this sense open licensing is not the same as dedication to the public
domain. A self-reinforcing licensing approach that employs patent and other rights-
rather than simply dedicating innovations to the public domain-may be necessary to
sustain a commons where key institutional players, including national governments and
private-sector firms, are intent on promoting the expansion and utilization of exclusive
rights.
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posal will depend on its adoption by a critical mass of research universi-
ties.
In Part V, we propose two open licensing models that universities (and
other institutions) can adopt to improve access to biomedical innovations
in LMI countries. We call the first approach Equitable Access ("EA") Li-
censing. The approach relies on including EA clauses in the technology
transfer licenses universities negotiate with drug companies engaged in
commercializing the universities' academic discoveries. The EA provi-
sions we propose give third parties-for example, manufacturers of ge-
neric medicines-freedom to operate in LMI countries with regard to the
licensed technology or any derivative products, by adapting the so-called
"copyleft" characteristics of some open source licenses.42 EA clauses also
establish a self-enforcing open licensing regime that minimizes transaction
costs and is insulated from the vicissitudes of internal university politics
and market relationships.
We refer to the second open licensing approach as Neglected Disease
("ND") Licensing. Like EA licensing, ND licensing is a commons-based
strategy. ND clauses are designed to provide those engaged in neglected
disease research the freedom to experiment on and with proprietary uni-
versity technologies. Furthermore, ND- clauses allow researchers to freely
market, in LMI countries, any innovations without hindrance from exclu-
sive rights held by the university.
One of the lessons of our analysis of various licensing provisions is
that there is no one-size-fits-all commons-based strategy. Different strate-
gies to create and sustain commons-based production in different contexts
may be required by: different economic characteristics of research areas;
different industrial structures and relative roles of market-based, govern-
mental, and nonprofit enterprises; and different types of exclusive rights
regImes.
Our proposal is deliberately modest. We suggest an intervention in the
existing industrial structure of the research, development, manufacture,
and distribution of curative and preventive treatments. But the intervention
we advocate is not aimed at fundamentally restructuring these fields. In-
stead, we suggest taking advantage of the existing distribution of firms and
42. EA licensing is not truly an "open source" strategy-a term that describes soft-
ware for which source code is made freely available to independent software developers.
Nonetheless, it mimics open source software's approach to IPRs by ensuring that the li-
censed technology and subsequent developments remain freely available to all potential
users under an EA license. While other open licensing models typically offer the freedom
to operate in all markets, including high income markets, our proposal is restricted to
low- and middle-income settings.
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business models, the relatively large role of public sector institutions, and
the distribution of needs, wealth, and markets. Our proposal is intended to
complement, rather than displace, current proposals to reorganize the mar-
ket for drug development through top-down legislative change. The shift
we describe provides a way for organizations and firms to take immediate
steps to positively affect the lives of patients in LMI countries, and per-
haps to catalyze broader action to promote global health.
II. HOW PATENTS AND OTHER EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS
AFFECT THE GLOBAL ACCESS AND R&D GAPS
A. Innovation Theory and the Second Enclosure Movement
The past two decades have witnessed a steady, global trend toward
ever more restrictive patent and related exclusive rights regimes, dubbed
the "second enclosure movement.,,43 In the United States, for example, the
scope of patentability has expanded to include bioengineered organisms
and purified genetic material,44 and "early 'upstream' inventions that ex-
plain disease pathways and mechanisms and identify potential drug targets
are increasingly likely to be patented.,,45 Patents have also been increas-
ingly supplemented with exclusivity offered at the drug regulatory inter-
face. 46 Over the same period, the United States, the European Union, and
Japan have used trade agreements to impose high levels of substantive and
procedural protection for IP on countries around the world. The World
43. See James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the
Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33,39 (2003).
44. In 1980, the Supreme Court held that genetically engineered microorganisms
could be patented. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). In 1988, the Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) granted its first patent on a four-legged animal, Harvard Uni-
versity's OncoMouse. See U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (issued Apr. 12, 1988). Currently,
the PTO regularly grants patents on isolated and purified versions of naturally occurring
DNA fragments and other biological compounds. See Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier
Fellmeth, Reinventing the Double Helix: A Novel and Nonobvious Reconceptualization of
the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L. REv. 303,304 (2002).
45. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents, Product Exclusivity, and Information Dissemina-
tion: How Law Directs Biopharmaceutical Research and Development, 72 FORDHAM L.
REv. 477, 481 (2003).
46. Scholars have referred to such rights as a second line of patent protection. See,
e.g., id. at 482-83. In the United States, for example, data associated with new drugs re-
ceive five years of exclusive protection, while data associated with a new indication of an
existing drug receive three years of exclusive protection. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii)-(iii)
(2000). This trend has been exported through provisions in trade agreements that require
strict protection of pharmaceutical test data. See Susan Scafidi, The "Good Old Days" of
TRIPS: The u.s. Trade Agenda and the Extension ofPharmaceutical Test Data Protec-
tion, 4 YALE 1. HEALTH POL'y L. & ETHICS 341 (2004).
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Trade Organization's (WTO) Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty (TRIPS) Agreement is the foundation of this treaty architecture,47 but
regional and bilateral agreements increasingly impose even higher protec-
tions upon countries.48 This shift towards stronger IP protection-driven
by the lobbying power of Hollywood, the recording industry, prepacka~ed
software companies, book publishers, and pharmaceutical companies4 -
represents a massive and unprecedented experiment in innovation policy.
This is particularly true in the area of medicine: at the time the Uruguay
47. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex lC
art. 27.1, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-REsULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M.
81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. Least-developed countries have until January
1, 2006, to comply with TRIPS and have the right to defer patents and data exclusivity
rights on pharmaceuticals until 2016. World Trade Org., Doha WTO Ministerial 2001,
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2,,-r 7 (Nov.
20, 2001) [hereinafter Doha Declaration] (amending the timeline for implementation);
Press Release, World Trade Org., Council Approves LDC Decision with Additional
Waiver (June 28, 2002), http://www.wto.org/english/news3/pres023/pr30Le.htm. For
a discussion of the TRIPS Agreement and the actors behind it, see PETER DRAHOS WITH
JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY
(2002), and SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF IN-
TELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2003). For a guide to the provisions of TRIPS, see MI-
CHAEL BLAKENEY, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A
CONCISE GUIDE TO THE TRIPS AGREEMENT (1996). For a consideration of the particular
implications of the TRIPS Agreement for developing countries, see CARLOS CORREA,
THE TRIPs AGREEMENT: A GUIDE FOR THE SOUTH (1997).
48. See, e.g., CARSTEN FINK & PATRICK REICHENMILLER, TIGHTENING TRIPS: THE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROVISIONS OF RECENT US FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS (World
Bank Group, Int'l Trade Dep't, Trade Note 20, 2005). The European Union has also used
free trade agreements to impose TRIPS-plus requirements upon countries. See PRADEEP
S. MEHTA ET AL., "TRIPS-PLUS": ENHANCING RIGHT HOLDERS' PROTECTION, ERODING
TRIPs' FLEXIBILITIES (CUTS Centre for Int'l Trade, Econ., and Env't., Briefing Paper
No.2, 2004). Regional agreements also sometimes impose standards higher than those in
the TRIPS Agreement, as is the case for the Bangui Agreement among the African Intel-
lectual Property Organization (OAPI) countries of West Africa. See [GR. BRIT.] COMM'N
ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
DEVELOPMENT POLICY 8 (2002) [hereinafter COMM'N ON IPR], http://www.ipr
commission.org/papers/pdfs/finaLreport/CIPRfullfinal.pdf; Ellen 't Hoen, TRIPS, Phar-
maceutical Patents, and Access to Essential Medicines: A Long Way from Seattle to
Doha, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 27,45 (2002).
49. See DRAHOS WITH BRAITHWAITE, supra note 47, at 85-149 (discussing the his-
tory of TRIPS); SELL, supra note 47, at 96 (noting that through TRIPS, "[i]n effect,
twelve corporations made public law for the world").
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Round of trade negotiations was launched, more than fifty countries did
not provide patent protection on medicines.50
Proponents of this IP expansion contend that it will spur innovation
and therefore increase aggregate social welfare. This reflects the dominant
justification for patents and other forms of IP. In wealthy economies (even
where the copyright tradition is premised upon moral rights), these rights
are consistently cast in utilitarian terms: the rights are considered first and
foremost a tool to encourage private investment in information goodS.51
Economists, however, are ambivalent about the effect of strong exclu-
sive rights on innovation and welfare.52 This stems from the fact that in-
formation is both nonrival and a critical input for further innovation. Once
produced, information-such as a scientific formula-is most efficiently
accessible at its marginal cost of zero. If priced at zero, however, firms
will not invest in research. Patents are one solution to this; they incentivize
innovation by granting firms a temporary monopoly period in which to
reap supra-marginal profits. But they also create deadweight loss by rais-
ing the marginal cost of consumption above zero. Such exclusive rights
also have the potential to stymie innovation because information is a com-
ponent in its own production. Patents thus raise the costs of innovation,
even as they increase its potential value. As a result, even in a dynamic
analysis, an overly expansive set of rights leads to too little innovation.53
Strong patents-particularly in the aggregate-have been shown, both
theoretically and empirically, to reduce both innovation and welfare.54
50. See CARLOS CORREA, INTEGRATING PUBLIC HEALTH CONCERNS INTO PATENT
LEGISLATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 11 (2000) (citing UNITED NATIONS CONFER-
ENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, THE TRIPs AGREEMENT AND DEVELOPING COUN-
TRIES, NEW YORK AND GENEVA (1996)), http://www.southcentre.org/publications/pub1ic
health/publichealth-04.htm.
51. See, e.g., Rovira, supra note 8, at 401 n.3; see also John H. Barton, TRIPS and
the Global Pharmaceutical Market, 23 HEALTH AFF. 146, 148-49 (2004) ("[T]he logic of
the patent system is to permit an elevated price to allow recovery of research and devel-
opment (R&D) costs.").
52. For a brief review of some of the relevant views in economics, see FREDERICK
M. ABBOTT, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT, ACCESS TO MEDICINES AND THE WTO DOHA MIN-
ISTERIAL CONFERENCE 6 (Quaker U.N. Office, Occasional Paper 7, 2001).
53. Kenneth Arrow articulated this basic tradeoff between rights, innovation, and
welfare Over forty years ago. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Alloca-
tion ofResources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY:
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 614-15 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research ed.,
1962).
54. See, e.g., JOSH LERNER, PATENT PROTECTION AND INNOVATION OVfR 150
YEARS (Nat'! Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8977,2002); see also ADAM
B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: How OUR BROKEN PAT-
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Many who accept these premises nonetheless consider the pharmaceu-
tical sector an exception.55 They argue that the industry is distinguished by
its relatively high cost of R&D and relatively low cost of reverse engineer-
ing, and they point to survey data that suggest that patents are central to
pharmaceutical firms' appropriation strategies.56 But all that these facts
show, respectively, is that some mechanism is necessary to promote inno-
vation in this sector, and that those firms that dominate under the current
system are dependent upon the tools that brought them to dominance.
Economists have long debated whether direct government funding or prize
systems would have better welfare effects than patents.57 Calls for alterna-
tive strategies to incentivize pharmaceutical development have grown
more marked recently, supported by claims that the current pharmaceutical
market misdirects innovation and marketing resources, leads to ineffi-
ciently high prices, and promotes both counterfeiting and price controls.58
Importantly, all of these general conclusions are premised (if only im-
plicitly) on the experiences of wealthy countries and on a one-country
model of the market for innovation. When we consider the particular con-
ENT SYSTEM Is ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT To Do ABOUT IT
16-18 (2004); Arrow, supra note 53, at 616-17.
55. See, e.g., Joshua D. Sarnoff, Abolishing the Doctrine ofEquivalents and Claim-
ing the Future After Festo, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157, 1209 (2004) (noting that al-
though "[s]ubstantial evidence points to the increasingly weak incentives that patents
provide relative to other mechanisms for protecting innovations and investments, ... pat-
ent protection may be important to particular technology sectors (such as the pharmaceu-
tical and software industries)").
56. See, e.g., Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Re-
search and Development, 1987 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783, 796.
57. See, e.g., Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It
the Best Incentive System?, in 2 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 51 (Adam B.
Jaffe et al. eds., 2001); Brian D. Wright, The Economics ofInvention Incentives: Patents,
Prizes, and Research Contracts, 73 AM. ECON. REv. 691 (1983).
58. See, e.g., Aidan Hollis, An Efficient Reward System for Pharmaceutical Innova-
tion 4-9 (Jan. 17, 2005), http://econ.ucalgary.ca/fac-files/ah/drugprizes.pdf. Hollis sum-
marizes the problem with the traditional consensus in support of patent-driven pharma-
ceutical R&D this way: "Because pharmaceutical markets function poorly, the patent
system does not effectively stimulate drug research and development. Instead, it induces
large amounts of research into drugs with relatively little incremental therapeutic value,
while providing inadequate incentives to innovate in some areas of great therapeutic
value." Id. at 1. He proposes, instead, a prize-based system that would reward inventors
according to the incremental therapeutic benefit offered by their inventions. Id.; see also
Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2005, H.R. 417, 109th Congo (2005) (proposing, with
regard to medical products, to replace the patent system with a prize fund); Michael
Kremer, Pharmaceuticals and the Developing World, 1. ECON. PERSPS., Fall 2002, at 67,
82 (advocating, with regard to "products needed primarily by developing countries," ad-
vance purchase commitments to reward research outputs).
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text of developing countries, we find that patents will cost them signifi-
cantly more, and benefit them significantly less. In the Section that fol-
lows, we make this case and relate it to the existing global crises around
access to medicines and R&D for neglected diseases. We demonstrate that
exclusive rights can be an important cause of unaffordable pricing of ex-
isting medicines in LMI countries and can also create impediments to
R&D for neglected diseases.
B. The Access Gap and Exclusive Rights
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), roughly ten mil-
lion lives around the world could be saved every year by improving access
to essential medicines and vaccines that already exist.59 Approximately
thirty percent of people around the world do not have regular access to
essential medicines, and "in the poorest parts of Africa and Asia this fig-
ure rises to over 50%.,,60 This is what we term the "access gap," and it has
many determinants.61
59. WORLD HEALTH ORG., EQUITABLE ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES: A
FRAMEWORK FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 1 (2004) [hereinafter WHO, FRAMEWORK FOR
ACTION]. The WHO defines essential medicines as "those that satisfy the priority health
care needs of the population." World Health Org., Essential Drugs and Medicines Policy,
at http://www.who.int/medicines (last updated Mar. 3,2005). The WHO's essential drugs
list (EDL) is compiled by an Expert Committee, on the basis of a variety of factors in-
cluding "the disease burden and sound and adequate data on the efficacy, safety and
comparative cost-effectiveness of available treatments." World Health Org., Procedure to
Update and Disseminate the WHO Model List of Essential Medicines, Document
EBI09/8 (Annex), Dec. 7,2001, http://www.who.int/medicines/organization/par/edllpro
cedures.shtml (last updated July 28, 2004). While the EDL is useful for many purposes, it
is important to note that it is not a list of all life-saving medicines, much less all medi-
cines that would provide medical benefit to individuals in developing countries.
60. See WHO, FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION, supra note 59, at 1.
61. Jonathan Quick of the WHO's Essential Medicines Division identifies four: "(1)
irrational use of medicines, (2) unfair financing for healthcare, including medicines, (3)
unreliable delivery systems and (4) high medicines prices." Jonathan D. Quick, Editorial,
Essential Medicines Twenty-Five Years On: Closing the Access Gap, 18 HEALTH POL'y
& PLAN. I, 1 (2003); see HANNAH E. KETTLER & CHRlS COLLINS, USING INNOVATIVE
ACTION To MEET GLOBAL HEALTH NEEDS THROUGH EXISTING INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY REGIMES 40 (Comrn'n on Intellectual Prop. Rights, Study Paper 2b, 2004) (identi-
fying "[t]inancial resources, health care infrastructure, and political will" as some of the
pivotal factors), http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfslstudy_papers/sp2b_kettler_
study.pdf.
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One important determinant is price.62 Unsurprisingly, there is "consid-
erable evidence that consumption of medicines is sensitive to price.,,63 In
particular, price has disproportionately severe effects on patients in LMI
countries.6 Not only are consumers in these countries poorer on average,
62. Many existing drugs are unaffordable for patients around the world. See, e.g.,
MSF, UNTANGLING THE WEB, supra note 6, at 4 (noting that "[t]he high price of
HIV/AIDS medicines continue[s] to represent one of the main barriers to their availabil-
ity in developing countries," citing in particular the high cost of second-line therapies for
drug resistant HIV). Price is not just a problem for people living with HIV/AIDS. The
high cost of interferon/ribavrin combination therapy for Hepatitis C is "unquestionably
beyond the reach of developing countries." MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES, DOHA DE-
RAILED: A PROGRESS REpORT ON TRIPS AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 6 (2003), http://
www.accessmed-msf.orgldocuments/cancunbriefing.pdf. Access to other drugs, from
certain classes of antibiotics to anti-cancer drugs, has also been limited by price. See, e.g.,
id.; Nadia Ait-Khaled et a1., Chronic Respiratory Diseases in Developing Countries: The
Burden and Strategies for Prevention and Management, 79 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG.
971 (2001) (describing need for low-cost generic alternatives to treat asthma in develop-
ing countries); Mogha Kamal Smith, Why Developing Countries Need Access to Cheap
Treatments for Diabetes, DIABETES VOICE, July 2003, at 31, 32 (noting that only three
percent of people with diabetes in developing countries get treatment "partly because the
majority of these people have to pay for their drugs out of their own pockets"); Thou-
sands Denied Anti-Cancer Drugs, BBC NEWS, Feb 14,2003 (citing price as a major bar-
rier to access to cancer drugs in developing countries), at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
health/2761277.stm. High prices also constitute a barrier to the drugs that do exist for
neglected diseases. See Rachel Cohen, An Epidemic ofNeglect, MULTINATIONAL MONI-
TOR, June 2002, http://multinationalmonitor.orglmm2002/02june/june02corp l.html;
Medecins Sans Frontieres, The Campaign: Target Diseases, Leishmaniasis, at http://
www.accessmed-msf.org/campaign/lsh01.shtm (last visited Mar. 9, 2005) (describing
lack of access to treatment in countries where there is no generic available); Medecins
Sans Frontieres, The Campaign: Target Diseases, Sleeping Sickness,at http://www.
accessmed-msf.org/campaignlslpOl.shtm (last visited Mar. 9, 2004) (describing severe
lack ofaccess to diagnostics and treatment for African sleeping sickness).
63. COMM'N ON IPR, supra note 48, at 37 (citing several studies about the specific
and very positive effects that price cuts on ARVs would have upon consumption in coun-
tries like Uganda). This is especially the case for the poor. See ADAM WAGSTAFF &
MARIAM CLAESON, WORLD BANK, THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS FOR
HEALTH: RISING TO THE CHALLENGES 9 (2004) ("Higher money prices tend to reduce
demand--especially among the poor-unless accompanied by improvements in service
quality."); WAGSTAFF & CLAESON, supra, at 75 ("Affordability-the price paid relative
to discretionary income-is undoubtedly one important barrier preventing the use of
health services.").
64. See Quick, supra note 61, at 2-3 ("[G]ovemments, other health care providers,
and households in developing countries are each highly sensitive to medicines prices.").
In LMI countries, high drug prices have been shown to have devastating results for the
poor. For example, in Vietnam in 1993, just one visit by an individual in a household in
the poorest fifth of the population to a local health center "resulted in a bill for drugs
equal to 11 percent of the household's annual nonfood consumption." WAGSTAFF &
CLAESON, supra note 63, at 119 box 7.9. As many as three million Vietnamese have been
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but they also tend to pay a greater proportion of their own medical costs
than consumers in wealthy countries. While patients in wealthy countries
are often insulated from the high cost of medicines by third party payers
(for example, insurance companies or government funded programs), in
LMI countries, "public medicine expenditure does not cover the basic
medicine needs of the majority of the population,,65 and private health in-
surance is rare.66 In both low- and middle-income countries, the public
sector pays less than thirty percent of drug costS.67
Price, in tum, is affected by patent status. Empirical studies focused on
developing countries predict, for example, that "the introduction of patent
regimes ... has, or is predicted to have, the effect of raising prices. The
estimates range widely depending on the drugs and countries being con-
sidered-from 12% to over 200%, but even the lower estimates imply
very substantial costs for consumers.,,68 Development and aid agencies
working in the field confirm these theoretical predictions. MSF has con-
cluded that "[t]he most significant factor in lowering prices [is] the intro-
duction of generic sources in a country,,,69 and Oxfam International has
"pushed into poverty as a result of high out-of-pocket payments for healthcare, much of it
attributable to high drug costs." WAGSTAFF & CLAESON, supra note 63, at 119 box 7.9.
Households also "appear to have been deterred from using health services because of
high drug costs." WAGSTAFF & CLAESON, supra note 63, at 119 box 7.9.
65. WHO, FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION, supra note 59, at 1; see Jonathan D. Quick,
Ensuring Access to Essential Medicines in the Developing Countries: A Frameworkfor
Action, 73 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 279, 282 (2003) ("Private out-
of-pocket spending on medicines is the largest household health expenditure in many
[developing] countries ...."). By comparison, "in many high income countries, over
70% of pharmaceuticals are publicly funded." WHO, FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION, supra
note 59, at 1.
66. WHO, FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION, supra note 59, at 5 (noting that median insur-
ance coverage "is 35% in Latin America, 10% in Asia, and less than 8% in Africa" and
that "the inclusion of medicine reimbursement in health insurance varies greatly").
67. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE WORLD MEDICINES SITUATION 46 tb1.5.3 (2004)
[hereinafter WHO, WORLD MEDICINES SITUATION].
68. COMM'N ON IPR, supra note 48, at 37. Developing countries newly introducing
patents also are disadvantaged by the fact that the resulting profits are likely to accrue
mostly to companies outside the country. See JEAN 0. LANJOUW, THE INTRODUCTION OF
PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCT PATENTS IN INDIA: "HEARTLESS EXPLOITATION OF THE
POOR AND SUFFERING?" 5-6 (Nat'! Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6366,
1998).
69. MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES ET AL., SURMOUNTING CHALLENGES: PROCURE-
MENT OF ANTIRETROVIRAL MEDICINES IN Low- AND MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES 46
(2003), http://www.accessmed-msf.orgldocurnents/procurementreport.pdf.
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called generic competition the single most important tool to remedy the
access gap.70
Some have argued that pharmaceutical companies are unlikely to pat-
ent in LMI countries, and therefore that we ought not focus on patents as a
barrier to access.71 This position has been widely discredited based on evi-
dence of patenting, particularly in key supplier markets. 72 Pharmaceutical
companies have been willing to patent widely, and cling to the exclusivity
that their patents provide, even where the public health implications are
dire.73 And although, as we might expect, gross national income, market
size, and relative income inequality are generally important determinants
of patenting strategy,74 patenting still occurs in low-income countries.75
Furthermore, the absence of patents in a given country is not the sine
qua non of effective access to generics. A supply of medicines must also
exist, but "[d]eveloping countries differ substantially in terms of their ex-
isting pharmaceutical production capacity.,,76 In the poorest countries,
70. See MOHGA K. SMITH, GENERIC COMPETITION, PRICE, AND ACCESS TO MEDI-
CINES: THE CASE OF ANTIRETROVIRALS IN UGANDA 2 (Oxfam Briefing Paper No. 26,
2002).
71. See Arnir Attaran, How Do Patents and Economic Policies Affect Access to Es-
sential Medicines in Developing Countries?, 23 HEALTH AFF. 155 (2004); see also Arnir
Attaran & Lee Gillespie-White, Do Patents for Antiretroviral Drugs Constrain Access to
AIDS Treatment in Africa?, 286 JAMA 1886, 1888 tbl.1 (2001).
72. See, e.g., COMM'N ON IPR, supra note 48, at 20-26, 29-51; Kevin Outterson,
Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation in International Prescrip-
tion Drug Markets, 5 YALE 1. HEALTH POL'y L. & ETHICS 193, 255-58 (2005).
73. Many of the most important ARVs, for example, are widely patented in Africa.
See Marleen Boelaert et al., Letter to the Editor, Do Patents Prevent Access to Drugs for
HIV in Developing Countries?, 287 JAMA840 (2002); Consumer Project on Technology
et al., Comment on the Attaran/Gillespie-White and PhRMA Surveys of Patents on Anti-
retroviral Drugs in Africa (Oct. 16, 2001), at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/africa/do
patentsmatterinafrica.htrnl; see also infra note 160 (noting GlaxoSmithKline's attempt to
prevent generic companies from selling cheaper versions of their ARV products in Ghana
and Uganda).
74. See Attaran, supra note 71, at 158.
75. See id. at Supplemental Exhibit, available' at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/
content/fulV23/3/155/DCl. One example is Malawi, which has a per capita gross national
income of less than $200 per year. Id.
76. Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO Medicines Decision: The Political Economy of
World Pharmaceutical Trade and the Protection of Public Health, 99 AM. J. INT'L L.
(forthcoming 2005) (manuscript of Mar. 31, 2005 at 28, on file with authors). Few devel-
oping countries can produce the essential active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs), al-
though if they are able to acquire APIs cheaply, many can formulate finished products.
Id. (manuscript at 28 n.147) (noting that the APIs that make up ARV medicines are com-
plex, and made only by a few companies in the world); see also WHO, WORLD MEDI-
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even when medicines are locally formulated, they may be unaffordable
because of inefficiencies in production and limited market size.77 As a re-
sult, patents in a variety of countries can matter a great deal to the shape of
the supply curve. Patents may obstruct production and export from certain
countries, namely middle-income supplier countries-such as India-
which playa critical role in the global market for generics. They may also
limit the available markets to those that are too small to justify the costs of
reverse engineering specific medicines, retooling production facilities to
make them, or establishing distribution networks. For example, while
many poor and low-prevalence countries in Africa have few or no patents
on ARV medicines, it was not until late 2003 that the first African com-
pany began to locally produce ARVS.78 As one would expect, that com-
pany is based in South Africa (where, not incidentally, patents first had to
be overcome).79
While patents are not the only factor blocking access to medicines, ex-
clusive rights in one LMI country can create serious, preliminary obstacles
to access in that country and prevent the emergence of a competitive mar-
ket to supply medicines to another country that has no such barriers. Fi-
nally, the aspects of this problem that are visible today are only the tip of
the iceberg. It is easy, but shortsi~hted, to ignore th~ value of medicines
that have not yet been developed.8 Obviously we expect-and need-new
medicines. As they come into being, as TRIPS takes hold in supplier coun-
CINES SITUATION, supra note 67, at 6 (reporting that only thirteen countries in the world
make both formulations and APIs).
77. See, e.g., ROBERT LEWIS-LETTINGTON & CHIKOSA BANDA, A SURVEY OF POL-
ICY AND PRACTICE ON THE USE OF ACCESS TO MEDICINES-RELATED TRIPs FLEXIBILITIES
IN MALAWI 14 (2004) (noting that although Malawi has some capacity to make finished
products, it imports APIs from India or China, and that "generic pharmaceutical products
manufactured in Malawi are generally more expensive than those imported from else-
where, for example, from India" because, inter alia, of high transportation costs, high
communications costs, and limited markets), http://www.dfidhealthrc.org/Shared/
publications/Issues_papers/ATM/Lettington.pdf; see also ROBERT LEWIS-LETTINGTON &
PETER MUNYI, WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY To USE TRIPs FLEXIBILITIES: KENYA CASE
STUDY 12-13 (2004) (reporting the same dynamics in Kenya), available at http://www.
dfidgov.ukIpubs/files/dfidkenyareport.pdf.
78. See S. Africa's Aspen To Launch First Local AIDS Drug, REUTERS NEWsME-
DIA, Aug. 5, 2003, http://www.aegis.com/news/re/2003/RE030806.html; see also Outter-
son, supra note 72, at 257.
79. See S. Africa's Aspen To Launch First Local AIDS Drug, supra note 78.
80. Some argue that patents are not a significant concern in developing countries
because the WHO's EDL is mostly comprised of drugs that are off patent. See Attaran,
supra note 71, 159-60. This argument ignores medicines not yet invented and the fact that
medicines only appear on the EDL after an assessment that includes their "cost-
effectiveness." See supra note 59.
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tries such as India, and as TRIPS-plus provisions take effect in more and
more countries, the role of exclusive rights in the access crisis will grow
more important. Though sobering, this is only half of the problem.
C. The R&D Gap and Exclusive Rights
1. The 10/90 Gap
Significant morbidity and mortality in developing countries result from
diseases for which there are currently no effective, easy-to-use medi-
cines.81 Unfortunately, our patent-based R&D system does not adequately
address this problem. A mere ten percent of the world's expenditure on
R&D is devoted to conditions that cause ninety percent of the ?lobal dis-
ease burden-a situation that has been termed the "10/90 gap.,,8 Only one
percent of medications introduced between 1975 and 1999-thirteen out
of an estimated 1393-targeted tuberculosis and tropical diseases (includ-
ing malaria and infectious diarrhoeal diseases) which cause 11.4% of the
global disease burden, including a substantial proportion of the disease
burden in developing countries.83
Beyond the gap in development, the current system fails to optimize
existing medicines and medical technologies for use in developing coun-
tries. For instance, heat stable formulations--essential in countries with
warm climates and little refrigeration--do not exist for several essential
medicines, such as insulin and oxytocin.84 Many desirable fixed-dose
81. See generally MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES & DRUGS FOR NEGLECTED DISEASES
WORKING GROUP, FATAL IMBALANCE-THE CRISIS IN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
FOR DRUGS FOR NEGLECTED DISEASES (2002); Carlos M. Morel, Neglected Diseases:
Under-funded Research and Inadequate Health Interventions, 4 EMBO REp. S35 (2004);
Ellen F.M. 't Hoen, The Responsibility ofResearch Universities To Promote Access to
Essential Medicines, 3 YALE 1. HEALTH POL'y L. & ETHICS 293 (2003); Patrice Trouiller
et aI., Drug Development for Neglected Diseases: A Deficient Market and a Public-
Health Policy Failure, 359 LANCET 2188 (2002).
82. See GLOBAL FORUM FOR HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 31.
83. Trouiller et aI., supra note 81, at 2189-90; see Press Release, Medecins Sans
Frontieres, Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative: Teaming Up To Address Neglect
(Mar. 12, 2003), http://www.accessmed-msf.org/prodlpublications.asp?scntid=12320031
354463&contenttype=PARA&. Public-sector-based research, particularly R&D spon-
sored by the military, has been an important source of drugs for diseases that have pri-
mary incidence in LMI countries. See, e.g., Donald G. McNeil Jr., Herbal Drug Widely
Embraced in Treating Resistant Malaria, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2004, at Al (discussing
artemisinin, a treatment for malaria first isolated by Chinese military researchers, as well
as mefloquine, an antimalarial drug developed at the Walter Reed Army Institute of Re-
search in the 1960s).
84. WARREN KAPLAN & RiCHARD LAING, WORLD HEALTH ORG., PRIOR-
ITY MEDICINES FOR EUROPE AND THE WORLD 62 (2004), http://mednet3.who.int/priority
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combinations, which combine several medicines into a single pill and
make prescribing and adhering to complex medical regimens much sim-
pler, do not exist.85 Diagnostic and monitoring tools developed for high-
income markets are often inappropriate for use in developing countries
and may cost more to use than the medicines involved in treating the un-
derlying illness.86 We also lack formulations for small patient populations
with special needs, such as children, particularly where most patients live
in developing countries.87
As Juan Rovira, a former Senior Health Economist at the World Bank,
has observed, "the patent system leads R&D toward profitable diseases
and conditions, rather than toward diseases that cause the most morbidity
and mortality.,,88 Thus, just as the static costs imposed by patents cannot
be understood in a hypothetical one-country model, neither can the poten-
tial dynamic effects of patents. The dynamic benefits of patents for poor
countries are likely to be much smaller than the one-country model pre-
dicts, because their markets are small compared to those markets that al-
ready offer patent protection.89 Under the circumstances, it is not surpris-
ing that pharmaceutical companies do not direct their research towards
these markets.9o
meds/reportJindex.htm. Oxytocin is used to treat post~partum hemorrhage in women,
which is a major cause ofdisability and death in developing countries. Id. at 47.
85. These would be especially useful for second-line ARVs and multidrug resistant
tuberculosis.Id. at 124.
86. See, e.g., Renuka Rayasam, Austin-Based Company Will Build Device To Im-
prove Treatment in Developing Countries, AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN, July 9, 2004.
87. Few drug companies have tailored treatments to suit children with AIDS, in part
because there are declining numbers of children born with HIV/AIDS in wealthy coun-
tries. See Editorial, Children and AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2005, at A16. The market is
apparently too small to attract even the modest investment needed to create low-dose,
breakable, or chewable tablets. See Medecins Sans Frontieres, Children and AIDS: Ne-
glected Patients (July 15, 2004), http://www.msf.org/content/page.cfin?articleid=C35A2
DA2-D4E3-425A-879860086416E313.
88. Rovira, supra note 8, at 405; see also Jean O. Lanjouw, Intellectual Property,
and the Availability ofPharmaceuticals in Poor Countries, in 3 INNOVATION POLICY AND
THE ECONOMY 91,100 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2003).
89. See, e.g., LANJOUW, supra note 68, at 7-8 (presenting this argument but also
offering reasons that it may "paint[] too gloomy a picture").
90. This cannot reasonably be attributed to a lack of patent protection or enforce-
ment. See generally Lanjouw, supra note 88. Moreover, when research is oriented toward
conditions affecting LMI populations, it tends to target those affecting the upper classes.
See Emmanuel Combe et aI., Pharmaceutical Patents, Developing Countries, and
HIVIAIDS Research, in ECONOMICS OF AIDS AND ACCESS TO HIV/AIDS CARE IN DEVEL-
OPING COUNTRIES 151, 160 (2003).
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2. Patents As Barriers to R&D, Particularly for Low-
Commercial- Value Research
The R&D gap is perhaps the most obvious manifestation of the dy-
namic failures of patents for people living in LMI countries. Simply put,
patents do not help the poorest of the poor because a monopoly in such a
market is worth very little. But as noted above, patents can also create a
drag on the innovation process itself; this can be particularly problematic
where the research in question has low commercial value.
As the number of patents and patent holders associated with a given
biomedical innovation increases,91 so do the transaction costs associated
with conducting research. These costs are at the center of recent concerns
about the growth of an "anticommons,,92 or "patent thickets.,,93 The need
to negotiate permission to use or litigate disagreements about research
tools slows research and increases its COSt.94 While transaction costs only
rarely completely prohibit commercially valuable research,95 they may
hinder research at universities or nonprofit institutions concerned with de-
velo~ing world diseases where commercial pay-offs are at best uncer-
tain. 6 Indeed, several of the concrete examples we have of patent thickets
91. See John P. Walsh et aI., Research Tool Patenting and Licensing and Biomedi-
cal Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 285,331 (Wesley M.
Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003) (confirming that such patenting is increasing).
92. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998).
93. Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross-Licenses, Patent Pools, and
Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119 (Adam B. Jaffe et aI.
eds., 2000). Shapiro describes a patent thicket as the "overlapping set of patent rights
requiring that those seeking to commercialize new technology obtain licenses from mul-
tiple patentees." !d. at 119.
94. See Walsh et aI., supra note 91, at 314 (rioting that more than one-third ofre-
spondents in the authors' survey of scientists, IP attorneys, and business managers re-
ported that patents on research tools caused delays and added to the costs of research);
see also John P. Walsh et aI., Working Through the Patent Problem, 299 SCIENCE 1021,
1021 (2003) (noting that assertions ofIP rights may hinder science and that policy mak-
ers should take steps to ensure continued protection of science intended for the public
domain). But see David E. Adelman, A Fallacy ofthe Commons in Biotech Patent Policy,
20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 985 (2005) (arguing that the potential adverse effects of biotech
patenting are less significant than many have predicted).
95. See Walsh et aI., supra note 91, at 286.
96. Arti K. Rai, Proprietary Rights and Collective Action: The Case ofBiotechnol-
ogy Research with Low Commercial Value, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME
288,289 (Keith E. Maskus & J.H. Reichman eds., forthcoming 2005); see also Walsh et
aI., supra note 91, at 304 (noting that transaction costs were only relevant when projects
had questionable commercial viability).
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that have caused lengthy delays, or of broad and exclusively licensed re-
search tool patents that have obstructed research initiatives, relate to prod-
ucts intended for developing countries.97
There is also evidence that patents cause scientists to redirect their re-
search efforts towards "areas with more intellectual property freedom.,,98
Such redirected research may be less efficient or successful, particularly if
the areas most crowded with patents are also those that scientists deem
most promising. Patenting practices may also dampen scientific exchange.
Recent data suggest that university-based geneticists who engage in com-
mercial research are more likely than their peers to withhold data from fel-
low academic scientists.99
More broadly, patents give their owners the right to block research
outright.1oo A few patents on an important gene target, for example, have
97. See Rai, supra note 96, at 295-96 & nn.38-44 (discussing these problems in the
context of a malaria vaccine and transgenic agricultural products relevant to developing
countries). We might hope that companies would be more amenable to granting research
licenses to low-commercial-value projects since these do not threaten the product markets
that the company cares about. Cf id. at 299-300 (suggesting that collective rights man-
agement has a better chance of success with low-commercial-value research). However,
direct competition is only one of the concerns that such research may pose to the profits
of a patent-holding finn. Another concern is the potential for follow-on research that
might raise safety questions about a therapeutic compound. See infra note 103 and ac-
companying text.
98. See Walsh et al., supra note 91, at 286. Patents on compounds seem to trigger
this response more often than do patents on research tools, but this is little comfort for
those concerned with R&D for new medicines. Id. at 303 (reporting that "[o]fthe 11 in-
dustry respondents who did mention IP as a cause for redirecting their research, seven ...
were primarily concerned with IP on compounds, not on research tools").
99. See Eric G. Campbell et al., Data Withholding in Academic Genetics: Evidence
from a National Survey, 287 JAMA 473,479 (2002) (concluding that "[t]he commercial
applications of genetics research, along with increasing dependence on industry funding
and the rise of commercial nonns in the academy may be partially responsible" for this
withholding). Campbell et al.'s survey showed that over a three-year period, about half of
geneticists polled had been unable to obtain infonnation or materials from another uni-
versity-based geneticist, and twenty-one percent had therefore abandoned a promising
line of research. Id. at 478. In about twenty percent of the cases, one important reason
cited for refusing to grant access to others was the need to abide by an agreement with an
industrial sponsor or preserve confidentiality for patenting purposes. Although the most
common reason given for such refusals was the "effort required," this category "probably
also includes costs associated with difficulties in concluding complex negotiations over
[Material Transfer Agreements]." Rai, supra note 96, at 294 (discussing Campbell et al. ' s
results).
100. See 35 U.S.c. § 271 (2000).
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the potential to slow research for a generation. 101 A firm may want to
block other researchers for a variety of reasons, including preventing
competitors from gaining an advantage and retaining all of the potential
value of improvements for itself. I02 Pharmaceutical firms are particularly
reluctant to allow research on therapeutic compounds, citing two concerns:
(l) the possibility of being excluded from future developments of their
products, and (2) the possibility that the researcher will "generat[e] and
disclos[e] data that could create problems for the firm in seeking FDA ap-
proval.,,103
Unlike companies, universities may be willing to license the research
tools they develop freely to other public sector institutions. In practice,
though, they sometimes grant exclusive licenses to companies that then
refuse to sublicense any rights or that impose onerous terms on sublicen-
sees. I04 Recent research suggests that public institutions may issue such
exclusive licenses with alanning frequency, even where the tools are use-
ful primarily for diseases prevalent in developing countries. For example,
a recent map of patents relevant to the development of a malaria vaccine
found that only eight of the twenty-seven "moderate to high priority" pat-
101. Myriad Genetics has used its patents on genes that appear to trigger breast can-
cer to force medical schools to abandon research programs. See JAFFE & LERNER, supra
note 54, at 16-17. Walsh and colleagues report "widespread complaints" about patent
holders asserting exclusive rights over potential drug targets. Walsh et aI., supra note 91,
at 310, 312-14 (discussing several important targets that firms have sought to exclude
others from using, including targets related to mv, cancer, and hepatitis C).
102. See, e.g., Rebecca Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive
Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1017, 1079-84 (1989) (discussing a
case where a patent holder sued a competitor to prevent it from making a preferable, syn-
thetic version of the blood clotting compound Factor VIII); see also David P. Hamilton,
Silent Treatment How Genentech, Novartis Stifled a Promising Drug, WALL ST. J., Apr.
5,2005, at AI.
103. NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, REpORT OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH
(NIH) WORKING GROUP ON RESEARCH TOOLS (1998), http://www.nih.gov/news/
researchtools. NIH reports that firms may seek to either block such research outright, or
permit it only if accompanied by a grant-back of a nonexclusive, royalty-free license to
any improvements or new uses. Id.
104. Harvard's exclusive license of the transgenic OncoMouse to DuPont is a well-
known example. See Sasha Blaug et al., Managing Innovation: University-Industry Part-
nerships and the Licensing ofthe Harvard Mouse, 22 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 761, 762
(2004); Walsh et aI., supra note 91, at 307-08; Victoria Slind-Flor, Can These Mice Be
Saved?; Fenwick Lawyers Say That DuPont's Licensing Terms Are Preventing Research-
ers from Using the Harvard Mouse, IP L. & BUS., Sept. 30, 2004, at 11.
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ent families that were originally filed by public entities remain available
for licensing from that entity. I 05
In response to these types of concerns, researchers have developed
strategies to avoid these barriers. Academic scientists report regularly ig-
noring patents, and companies have rarely sought to prosecute them for
infringement. 106 A recent ruling from the Federal Circuit has, however,
made it clear that the experimental use exemption that many academics
invoke does not protect them. 107 Infringement actions against universities,
though rare, are not unprecedented,108 and a few high-profile actions could
quickly shift the tentative balance. 109 Moreover, there is still cause for
concern if individuals are altering their research agendas or expending
significant time and money trying to negotiate rights before deciding to
infringe.
As we discuss in Part III, some universities have adopted the new
strategy of negotiating formal research exemptions for themselves and
other academic institutions. However, these exemptions may not extend to
commercially-sponsored or -oriented research, limiting their efficacy.
Outsourcing of research to jurisdictions where there are fewer patents II0 or
105. See Malaria Vaccine Initiative at PATH, Malaria Antigen Patent Access Project
Background Information 2 (Mar. 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
106. See Walsh et aI., supra note 91, at 324-26.
107. Id. at 235. The Federal Circuit in Madey v. Duke University reiterated that the
common law research exemption applies only to research conducted "for amusement, to
satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry," and further held that the ex-
emption "does not immunize use that is in any way commercial in nature," even if that
research occurs at a nonprofit institution. 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. de-
nied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003). Congress has created a statutory exemption for research "rea-
sonably related to the development and submission of information" under federal drug
regulations. 35 U.S.c. § 271(e)(1) (2000). This exemption has been used to aid compa-
nies preparing, just prior to patent expiration, to launch generic products. The limits of
this exception are currently under review at the Supreme Court. Merck KGaA v. Integra
Lifesciences I, Ltd., 331 F.3d 860 (2003), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 823 (2005).
108. See Jon F. Merz et aI., Diagnostic Testing Fails the Test, 415 NATURE 577
(2002) (discussing a series of actions brought by companies to stop academic labs from
using patented diagnostic tests).
109. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patent Swords and Shields, 299 SCIENCE 1018 (2003)
("With their large endowments and habits of documenting their activities in scientific
publications, universities would make easy targets."); see also Rai, supra note 96, at 295.
110. Little is known about how widespread research tool patenting has become out-
side the United States and other wealthy countries. In the agricultural context, some have
argued that concerns about IPRs impeding "research oriented toward food crops for the
developing world" are overblown because there are few patent barriers in developing
countries. See. e.g., Eran Binenbaum et aI., South-North Trade, Intellectual Property Ju-
risdictions, and Freedom To Operate in Agricultural Research on Staple Crops, 51 Eco.
DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 309,310,317 (2003). Others have contended that patents on
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where robust research exemptions exist is another possible strategy,t 11 but
scientific research facilities and expertise will not always be mobile and
transferring facilities abroad may entail significant costs.
Finally, neither formal nor informal research exemptions, nor out:.
sourcing, will overcome the problem of blocking patents. 112 The right to
research without the ability to commercialize an end product is of little
value if we are concerned with improving worldwide health. Indeed, the
anticipation of this problem may well be a more important research barrier
than the costs and uncertainty associated with anticommons effects for
public sector scientists.
D. .Recent Proposals and Initiatives To Address the Access and
R&D Gaps
The global access and R&D gaps have attracted substantial attention
from scholars,113 NGOs,114 international bodies,115 and various national
research tools in developing countries may, in fact, have posed barriers to the develop-
ment and commercialization of GoldenRice™. See Golden Rice and Trojan Trade Reps:
A Case Study in the Public's Mismanagement of Intellectual Property, RAFI COMMU-
NIQUE, Sept/Oct. 2000, at I (finding a significant number of patents in developing coun-
tries but concluding that these patents should not have been considered "insurmountable
obstacles"), http://www.etcgroup.org!documents/com~oldenrice.pdf.
Ill. See Walsh et al., supra note 91, at 328.
112. Blocking patents arise when a subsequent inventor patents something novel but
still within the scope of the original patent. As a result, each party can block the other
from making, using, or distributing the follow-on invention. See DONALD S. CHISUM, 1
CHISUM ON PATENTS Glossary (2004). Bargaining breakdowns may be likely in such
situations. See Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown:
The Case ofBlocking Patents, 62. TENN. L. REv. 75, 75 (1994). Many countries provide
for compulsory licensing of blocking patents, with no demonstrably negative effects on
investment in research. Merges, supra, at 103-05.
113. See, e.g., MICHAEL KREMER & RACHEL GLENNERSTER, STRONG MEDICINE:
CREATING INCENTIVES FOR PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH ON NEGLECTED DISEASES
(2004); Carlos M. Correa, Public Health and Patent Legislation in Developing Countries,
3 TuL. 1. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. I (2001); Patricia M. Danzon & Adrian Towse, Differ-
ential Prices for Pharmaceuticals: Reconciling Access, R&D and Patents, 3 INT'L J.
HEALTH CARE FIN. & ECON. 183 (2003); Lanjouw, supra note 88; Susan K. Sell, TRIPS
and the Access to Medicines Campaign, 20 WIS. INT'L LJ. 481 (2002).
114. See, e.g., Editorial, The Plagues ofPoverty, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19,2002, at A22
(mentioning the work of the Gates Foundation and Medecins Sans Frontieres); Drugs for
Neglected Diseases Initiative, at http://www.dndi.org (last visited Mar. 30, 2005);
HealthGAP, Health Global Access Project (GAP), at http://www.hea1thgap.org (last vis-
ited Mar. 30, 2005).
115. Beginning in 200 I, the WTO's attention turned to the issue of access leading to
the adoption of the Doha Declaration. Doha Declaration, supra note 47; see also World
Trade Org., TRIPS and Public Health, at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/
pharrnpatenCe.htm (last visited Mar. II, 2005). In 2000, the WHO and UNAIDS devel-
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governments. 116 The increasing attention has generated a number of pro-
posals and initiatives to ameliorate these problems. We focus on those
proposals that address the static costs that patents can cause in developing
<iountries, and that seek to stimulate R&D for neglected diseases, and/or
target the problems of thickets and other barriers that patents pose to re-
search. These solutions fall into two categories: top-down solutions, which
require increased government funding and/or interventions in domestic or
intemationallegal regimes, and private sector action that relies on the vol-
untary initiative of firms.
1. Top-Down Change To Address the Access Gap
Proposals to reduce the difference between patent-based fricing and
marginal cost pricing such as compulsory licensing schemes, II price con-
trols,118 changes to the TRIPS Agreement,119 and alterations in national
oped the Accelerating Access Initiative, see UNAIDS & WORLD HEALTH ORG., ACCEL-
ERATING ACCESS INITIATIVE 1 (2002), http://www.who.int/hiv/pub/prev3are/enlisbn924
12I0125.pdf, and in late 2003 launched the 3 x 5 Initiative, see World Health Org., Fact
Sheet 274: The 3 x 5 Initiative (Dec. 2003), at http://www.who.int/mediacentre/fact
sheets/2003/fs274/en.
116. Over one hundred countries have developed national drug policies. Quick, supra
note 61, at 1.
117. The Consumer Project on Technology has advocated compulsory licensing and
recently created a new nonprofit, Essential Inventions, that plans to request compulsory
licenses for AIDS drugs in LMI countries. See Essential Inventions, at http://www.essent
ialinventions.org (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
118. See, e.g., Sanjay Kumar, India To Extend Price Controls on Drugs, 329 BMJ
368 (2004); Andrew Quinn, S. Africa Rules Aim To Cut Drug Prices up to 70 Pet,
REUTERS NEWsMEDIA, Jan. 15, 2004 (discussing price controls in South Africa),
http://www.aegis.com/news/reI2004/RE040113.html. Numerous countries have imple-
mented mechanisms to control or influence pharmaceutical prices. See, e.g., Austl. Gov't
Dep't of Health & Ageing, About the PBS, at http://www.health.gov.aulpbs/general/
aboutus.htm (last modified Dec. 24, 2003) (describing the Australian Pharmaceutical
Benefits Scheme); Can., Patented Med. Prices Review Bd., http://www.pmprb-cepmb.
gc.ca (last visited May 6, 2005). However, for a variety of reasons, price controls are an
"unsatisfactory policy instrument," particularly for developing countries. Robert Weiss-
man, A Long, Strange TRIPS: The Pharmaceutical Industry Drive To Harmonize Global
Intellectual Property Rules, and the Remaining WTO Legal Alternatives Available to
Third World Countries, 17 U. PA. 1. INT'L ECON. L. 1069, 1115 (1996) (noting that price
controls are difficult for governments to administer and may produce sub-optimal reduc-
tions in price due to uncertain data); see Outterson, supra note 72, at 239-40 (explaining
that price controls fail to take a number of important considerations into account); Jean
O. Lanjouw, Patents, Price Controls, and Access to New Drugs: How Policy Affects
Global Market Entry 2 (Apr. 19,2005) (unpublished manuscript prepared for the WHO
Comm'n on Intellectual Prop. Rights, on file with authors) (finding that price controls
may delay market entry of new drugs in poor countries).
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patent laws in either richl20 or poor countries l21 rely on concerted govern-
mental action. Among these proposals, attempts to encourage developing
countries to utilize the flexibilities available to them under international
agreements has received the most sustained attention. The TRIPS Agree-
ment, for example, affords member countries complete freedom to deter-
'mine the grounds for compulsory licenses,122 although it imposes restric-
tions on the process for granting them. 123 The recent Doha Declaration on
TRIPS and Public Health has also given least-developed countries (LDCs)
the right to refuse to offer product patents on pharmaceuticals until
2016. 124
Unfortunately, such strategies are under attack. The United States is
currently using free trade agreements to impose TRIPS-plus standards on
dozens of countries around the world. 125 Several of these agreements limit
compulsory licensing to situations of emergency, public noncommercial
use or to remedies for antitrust violations. 126 Almost all of the agreements
119. See, e.g., T.N. Srinivasan, The TRIPS Agreement, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 343 (Daniel L.M. Kennedy & James D. Southwick eds.,
2002).
120. See, e.g., Jean O. Lanjouw, A New Global Patent Regimefor Diseases: u.s. and
International Legal Issues, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85 (2002) (discussing Lanjouw's For-
eign Filing License proposal).
121. See, e.g., CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RiGHTS, THE WIO
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS (2000)
(describing ways in which developing countries can implement TRIPS while still main-
taining maximal flexibility and public health benefits).
122. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 47, art. 31; Doha Declaration, supra note 47,
~ 5(b) ("Each Member has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to de-
termine the grounds upon which such licenses are granted.").
123. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 47, art. 31.
124. Doha Declaration, supra note 47, ~ 7. Despite this flexibility, patent protection
for pharmaceuticals has already been established in all but a few African LDCs. See
CARLOS M. CORREA, IMPLICATIONS OF THE DOHA DECLARATION ON THE TRIPS AGREE-
MENT AND PUBLIC HEALTH 38 (World Health Org., EDM Series No. 12, 2002); PHIL
THORPE, STUDY ON THE IMPLEMENTATlON OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT BY DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 1 (Comm'n on Intellectual Prop. Rights, Study Paper 7,2004).
125. See FINK & REICHENMILLER, supra note 48, at 1 tbl.l. The majority of these are
developing countries. Congress has approved agreements with Vietnam, Jordan, Singa-
pore, Chile, Morocco, and Australia. The CAFTA Agreement, which includes the Do-
minican Republic, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, and
the agreement with Bahrain have been signed but not yet approved by Congress. Agree-
ments are currently under negotiation with three Andean countries (Columbia, Ecuador,
and 'Peru), Thailand, Panama, the countries of the Southern African Customs Union
(South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland), and the group of countries
involved in the Free Trade Area of the Americas. /d.
126. Id. at 2.
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have data exclusivity provisions that may sharply limit or even eliminate
the signatories' abilities to use the flexibilities provided in TRIPS and re-
affirmed by the Doha Declaration. 127
These trade agreements are subject to divergent interpretations, and
countries could insist that the agreements be interpreted in ways that are
consistent with the Doha Declaration. Furthermore, many countries have
not yet signed such agreements and need only meet the minimum stan-
dards established by TRIPS. Nevertheless, the trend is clear. The most
powerful governments on the international stage remain committed to an
expansionist IP policy. In recent years, the United States initiated a dispute
resolution aimed at Brazil's patent law,128 threatened the South African
government with trade sanctions because it sought to authorize the impor-
tation of cheaper medicines,129 and repeatedly put countries such as Brazil,
Thailand, India, and Argentina on the Special 301 watch list130 because
their patent laws did not meet with the approval of the U.S. pharmaceuti-
cal industry.l3l The access campaign has certainly drawn attention to this
issue and achieved some victories in the short term. 132 However, both the
United States and Europe have made it clear-through their positions in
127. [d. Note that the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) is arguably exceeding its
mandate in these negotiations, which requires it to "respect the Declaration of the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health adopted at Doha." Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority
Act of2002 § 2l02(b)(4)(C), 19 U.S.C.A. § 3802(b)(4)(C) (West 2004).
128. See Outterson, supra note 72, at 225. The United States withdrew its request for
a WTO panel only after substantial international pressure. [d.
129. See Ravi Nessman, South Africa Fights over AIDS Drugs, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Mar. 5, 2001 (recalling threats by the United States following the passage in 1997 of an
amendment to permit compulsory licensing in South Africa), http://www.aegis.com/
news/ap1200 IIAPO10302.html.
130. The Special 301 watch list identifies countries that, in the judgment of the
USTR, do not provide adequate protection for U.S. intellectual property. See 19 U.S.C.
§ 2241 (2000). Section 301 of the Trade Act authorizes the executive to impose trade
sanctions against such states. See id. §§ 2411, 2414.
131. E.g., OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2004 SPECIAL 301 REpORT
(2004), http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/200412004_
SpeciaL30l/assecupload_file16_5995.pdf; OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
2003 SPECIAL 301 REpORT (2003), http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Repor
ts]ublications/2003/2003_SpeciaL30 I_Report/asseeupload_file665_6124.pdf; OFFICE
OF U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2002 SPECIAL 301 REpORT (2002), http://www.ustr.
gov/assets/DocumenCLibrary/Reports_Publications/2002/2002_SpeciaL30l_Report/ass
ecupload_file567_6367.pdf; see DRAHOS WITH BRAITHWAITE, supra note 47, at 93-95
(discussing the role intellectual-property-based industries play in the 301 process). .
132. See, e.g., Zita Lazzarini, Making Access to Pharmaceuticals A Reality: Legal
Options Under TRIPS and the Case ofBrazil, 6 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 103, 132
(2003); Nessman, supra note 129.
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bilateral and regional free trade negotiations and at the WT0133-that their
policies are fundamentally unchanged and still aggressively favor strong
IPRs.
The formal and informal pressures exerted by such nations circum-
scribes the willingness and ability of LMI country governments to use the
flexibilities technically open to them. Until last year, Brazil was the only
developing country that had successfully used the threat of compulsory
licensing to obtain lower-price ARVS. 134 (Brazil, as one of the world's ten
largest economies,135 is in an unusually strong position for a developing
country, and has substantial indigenous capacity to reverse engineer and
produce medicines.) Only recently, and quietly, have other LMI countries
b . 1 l' . ARV 136egan to Issue compu sory Icenses covermg s.
Failures in accountability and leadership also contribute to the problem
in some countries. Many governments are not committed to addressing the
needs of the destitute sick within their borders. 137 For example, over the
last decade, South Africa, India, and China have come under fire for deny-
ing the scope, or even existence, of the HIV/AIDS problem in their coun-
tries. 138 Finally, even LMI countries that have some will to address the ac-
133. See Duncan Matthews, WTO Decision on Implementation ofParagraph 6 ofthe
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: A Solution to the Access
to Essential Medicines Problem?, 7 1. INT'L EeoN. L. 73, 86-89, 93 (2004) (describing
the United States and European Union positions during recent WTO negotiations over
countries' ability to export under a compulsory license).
134. Brazil has repeatedly used the credible threat of compulsory licensing to effec-
tively obtain discounts. See Brazil's National STD/AIDS Programme Announces Largest
Drug Price Reduction Deals in Five Years, KAISER DAILY HIV/AIDS REp., Jan. 20,
2004, http://www.kaisernetwork.org/daily_reports/rep_index.ctrn?hint=l&DR_ID=2175
1.
135. See World Bank, PPP GDP 2003, at http://www.worldbank.orgldata/databytop
ic/GDP_PPP.pdf; World Facts Index, History of Brazil, at http://worldfacts.us/Brazil-
history.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2005).
136. See, e.g., Cipla Gets Malaysian Nod for AIDS Drugs, Bus. STANDARD (India),
Feb. 25,2004 (reporting Malaysia's recent compulsory license); Martin Khor, Patents vs.
Access to Medicines at AIDS Conference, DAILY NEWS (Sri Lanka), Aug. 10, 2004 (re-
porting Mozambique's recent compulsory license), http://dailynews.lk/2004/08/IO/feall
.html.
137. This may be particularly true where such individuals are ill with a disease as
stigmatized as HIV/AIDS.
138. See, e.g., Sara Davis, Opinion, Hold Beijing To Account for Its AIDS Coverup
Before the 2008 Olympics, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 25, 2004, at 8; Diddier Fassin &
Helen Schneider, The Politics ofAIDS in South Africa: Beyond the Controversies, 326
BMJ 495 (2003); Michael Specter, India's Plague, NEW YORKER, Dec. 17, 2001, at 74.
There has been some progress on this front for HIV/AIDS. See, e.g., Lawrence K.
Altman, South Africa Says It Will Fight AIDS with a Drug Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9,
2003, at AI.
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cess problem may be derailed by the inauspicious state of their intellectual
property laws 139 and lack of expertise in applying these laws, as well as by
the burdensome administrative conditions that TRIPS imposes. Because
TRIPS requires a case-by-case determination of any compulsory license,
developing country governments must establish administrative capacity to
take consistent, rapid action wherever patents pose pricing barriers. 140
Similarly, TRIPS may create particular obstacles for countries without
their own manufacturing capacity.141 Some of these administrative costs
can be lowered if countries gain experience using' these channels. But
given the likelihood that rich and poor countries alike will prioritize the
wishes of corporate interest groups over the needs of the poor, no strategy
involving top-down change alone is likely to remedy the static costs of the
global IP regime.
2. Top-Down Change To Address the R&D Gap
Some of the most creative and promising proposals for addressing the
R&D gap also follow a top-down model. Several academics have pro-
posed prize systems to compete with or displace the patent system by re-
warding inventors according to the therapeutic value their product ulti-
139. See SISULE F. MUSUNGU ET AL., UTILIZING TRIPS FLEXIBILITIES FOR PUBLIC
HEALTH PROTECTION THROUGH SOUTH-SOUTH REGIONAL FRAMEWORKS 24-25 (2004).
140. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 47, art. 31(a) (requiring licenses to be de-
cided on the basis of their individual merits). The requirement that in most instances the
applicant first make "reasonable" efforts to obtain a license, see id. art. 31(b), can also
genemte substantial delay if strict parameters for reasonableness are not imposed. Finally,
countries must afford right holders "adequate remuneration," id. art. 31 (h), and a form of
"judicial review or other independent review." Id. art. 31(i). Establishing procedures to
meet these requirements can be burdensome for countries with limited resources.
. 141. That is because TRIPS requires that any use without the authorization of the
patent holder "be authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the
Member authorizing such use." Id. art. 31(t). This provision has been the subject of in-
tense focus recently, because it could prevent countries without the ability to produce
medicines domestically from being able to purchase generics from a country that can. At
Doha, the Ministerial agreed to address the issue, and after several years of negotiation, a
temporary solution was adopted just prior to the CancUn meeting in 2003. See World
Trade Org., General Council, Implementation ofParagraph 6 ofthe Doha Declaration on
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 (Sept. I, 2003) [hereinafter WTO,
Paragraph 6]. The decision provides that, under limited circumstances, and subject to
strict and potentially onerous reporting requirements, countries are free to export generic
products for the sole benefits of countries lacking manufacturing capacity. The fix has
been heavily criticized, see Elizabeth Becker, Cheaper Medicines for the World's Poor;
Trade Rules Altered on Patented Drugs, INT'L HERALD TRlB., Sept. 2, 2003, at I, but
there is little indication that countries are willing to reopen their acrimonious negotia-
tions. For an in-depth discussion of these issues, see Abbott, supra note 76.
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mately offers. 142 Internationally, advocates have recently proposed an
R&D treaty or convention that would set minimum levels of contribution
to R&D and weigh national contributions to facilitate investment into ne-
glected public goodS. 143
Most of the scholarly solutions proposed to address anticommons and
thicket problems in the United States involve top-down change as well.
For example, Richard Epstein has suggested that patent doctrine be inter-
preted to preclude the patenting of genome fragments (known as expressed
sequence tags or ESTs) that have more blocking value than use value. l44
The Federal Circuit's decision in Madey has spurred new interest in a
statutory research exemption. 145 Professors Arti Rai and Rebecca
Eisenberg have suggested that the Bayh-Dole Act, which allows recipients
of federal funds to patent and exclusively license federally-funded re-
search,146 should be revised to give federal agencies more power to require
142. See Hollis, supra note 58, at 18 (proposing a prize system that sets awards ac-
cording to the number of "disability adjusted life-years"-a common measurement of
morbidity and mortality-that a product avoids).
143. See Tim Hubbard & James Love, A New Trade Frameworkfor Global Health-
care R&D, 2 PLoS BIOLOGY 147, 148 (2004), available at http://biology.plosjoumals
.orgiarchive/1545-7885/212/pdf/1O.137l.joumal.pbio.0020052-S.pdf; Letter from James
Love et al. to the WHO Executive Board and the WHO Commission on Intellectual
Property, Innovation, and Health (CIPIH) (Feb. 24, 2005) (copy on file with authors)
(requesting that the WHO evaluate a proposal for a new global medical R&D treaty).
Alternatively, others have suggested that countries (or international agencies or founda-
tion) should fund such research through "pull programs," such as advanced purchase
commitments. See, e.g., Kremer, supra note 58, at 82.
144. Richard A. Epstein, Steady the Course: Property Rights in Genetic Material, in
PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 153, 188-193 (F. Scott
Kieff ed., 2003), available at http://www.wulaw.wustl.edu/Academics/FacultylBios/
Kieff/HGPIP/Final/GEN_50_CH8.pdf.
145. For example, the American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) re-
cently endorsed legislation to establish a statutory research exemption for efforts to un-
derstand and evaluate the validity of the patent, to find other methods of making or using
the patented subject matter, or to find substitutes for the patented subject matter. AM.
INTELLECTUAL PRoP. LAW ASS'N, AIPLA RESPONSE TO THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES RE-
PORT ENTITLED "A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY" 25-26 (2004),
http://www.aipla.orgiContent/ContentGroups/Issues_and_Advocacy/Comments2/Patenc
and_Trademark_Office/2004/NAS092304.pdf. The American Academy of Arts and Sci-
ences has also convened a working group to consider options for a domestic and interna-
tional research exemption. See Science & Intellectual Prop. in the Public Interest, Re-
search Exemption Working Group, at http://sippi.aaas.org/rschexemption.shtml (last vis-
ited Mar. 5, 2005).
146. Bayh-Dole University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act, Pub. L. No.
96-517 § 6(a), 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. (94 Stat.) 3015, 3018-29 (1980) (codified at 35 U.S.c.
§§ 200-212 (2000». The goals of the Act are to, inter alia, "promote the utilization of
inventions arising from federally supported research," "promote the commercialization
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grantees to dedicate their research outputs· to the public domain. 147 But, so
far, all of these proposals have fallen on deaf ears.
The fact that the trend on the domestic and international stage has been
towards stronger, rather than weaker, IPRs l48 bodes ill for the most ambi-
tious of these top-down proposals. This suggests such strategies will need
to be supplemented or catalyzed by solutions from another arena that can
circumvent blockages within international and national political systems.
3. Private Sector Voluntary Concessions Regarding Access and
R&D
S~stemic change could also be initiated by the private, for-profit sec-
tor. 14 Unfortunately, history suggests that although the private sector can
be pushed, it will not lead. Patent-based drug companies agreed to major
price reductions for first-line AIDS therapies, but only after prolonged
public outcry. ISO The experience of the Accelerating Access Initiative, a
joint effort between U.N. agencies and five major pharmaceutical compa-
nies to achieve discounts for AIDS medicines for developing countries, is
instructive here. A reporter for The Washington Post who interviewed
most of those involved in creating the program has detailed its many fail-
ings and concluded that:
and public availability of inventions," and "ensure that the Government obtains sufficient
rights in federally supported inventions to meet the needs of the Government and protect
the public against nonuse or unreasonable use of inventions." Id. § 200.
147. Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of
Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289,291 (2003).
148. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat.
2827 (1998) (describing lengthening of the copyright term codified at 17 U.S.c. §§ 108,
203,301-304); supra note 44 (describing expansion of patentable subject matter); supra
note 46 (describing regulatory exclusivity in the United States and internationally).
149. Some have proposed, for example, that the market- and patent-based pharma-
ceutical sector proactively change its licensing practices or establish discounts and dona-
tion programs to address access concerns. See Attaran, supra note 71, at 163. But cf Mi-
chael A. Friedman, Henk den Besten & Amir Attaran, Out-Licensing: A Practical Ap-
proach for Improvement ofAccess to Medicines in Poor Countries, 361 LANCET 341, 341
(2003) (admitting that "donations or discounts offer only limited, often imperfect, solu-
tions").
150. See, e.g., 't Hoen, supra note 81, at 294 ("[U]ntil January 2003, ... one pharma-
ceutical company was charging $2000 a year more in Guatemala than in Switzerland for
its AIDS drug. Only after months of public pressure did the price of the drug come down
in Guatemala." (citing Roche Cuts Price ofAIDS Drug to Nations, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Feb. 13,2003); Drug Company Cuts AIDS Drug Prices in S. Africa, supra note 27. But
cf Boelaert et aI., supra note 73, at 840 ("This impressive discount ... was not merely
due to public outcry, but mostly as a response to competition by generic drugs.").
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The drug finns sought to maintain prices in most markets by of-
fering selective discounts that would remain under their control
... [, i]n the long tenn, ... building demand while limiting the
duration and scope of the discounts. Most of all, the drug com-
panies wanted to squelch an increasingly damaging debate on
prices and patents that the U.N. agencies had helped touch off. 15 !
Even today, voluntary discounts have resulted in prices that typically re-
main above the lowest price for generic versions. 152 They are also often
limited by territory or sector in ways that sharply undermine their im-
pact. 153 In sum, they have been applied as grease to squeaky wheels-
sporadically and no more liberally than is required to quiet the noise. As a
result, voluntary discounts have proven neither efficient nor sufficient. 154
151. Gellman, supra note 23. For example, Pfizer refused to join at the inception of
the program, insisting that the U.S. prices of Pfizer's medicines were "good value" and
worrying that any discussion of differential pricing would threaten its '"core markets. '"
Id. (recounting an anonymous source's account of statements made by Pfizer's Senior
Vice President Ian C. Read). Some participating companies wanted beneficiary countries
to explicitly renounce any use of compulsory licensing or parallel importing in exchange
for the price concessions. Eight months after the'initiative was announced with great fan-
fare, four of the five companies still refused to reveal the discounts being offered. Dis-
counts were offered on a country-by-country basis and were only made available to the
public sector, which in most countries was not providing treatment. A U.N. official who
attempted to obtain the same discounted prices for large private sector firms that wanted
to provide ARVs to their employees-a plan which could have financed treatment for
one million patients in five years-recounts the pharmaceutical companies' response:
'''They laughed at us.''' Id.
152. For example, although BMS asserted it was selling stavudine below cost in Af-
rica, generic companies have been able to undercut its prices by almost seventy percent.
See Meldrum, supra note 29. Similarly, the latest summary of best available worldwide
prices for ARVs shows that generics are cheaper than proprietary products for seventeen
out of the twenty formulations for which there are both generic and proprietary suppliers.
MSF, UNTANGLING THE WEB, supra note 6, at 9-11 tbl.l a.
153. MSF, UNTANGLING THE WEB, supra note 6, at 15-19 tbl.2 (reporting diverse
restrictions according to geography and the purchasing entity). Note also that discounts
on some second-line therapies are still far from adequate, threatening a looming fiscal
crisis in developing country ARV programs as first-line drugs fail and need replacement.
See Medecins Sans Frontieres, A Guide to the Post·2005 World: TRIPS, R&D, and Ac-
cess to Medicines (Feb. 25, 2005) (showing that second-line therapies currently cost
twenty-six times the amount that first-line therapies cost), at http://www.msf.org/
countries/page.cfm?articleid=88694E5B-OFED-434A-A21EDAI006002653.
154. See OXFAM INT'L, SAVE THE CHILDREN & VSO, BEYOND PHILANTHROPY: THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE DEVELOP-
ING WORLD (2002); SMITH, supra note 70 (finding price discounts less effective than
generic competition); 't Hoen, supra note 81, at 294 (complaining that ad hoc execution
of differential pricing schemes and donation programs has resulted in "efforts [that] have
been neither systematic nor sufficient"); Letter from Eugene Schiff, Caribbean Coordina-
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The same holds true for voluntary licensing agreements. Until a few
years ago, pharmaceutical companies routinely rebuffed requests for vol-
untary licenses on ARVs. 155 Following the YalelBMS concession, several
major firms offered licenses to South African generic companies, but lim-
ited them to the public sector. 156 Unfortunately, these licenses have re-
mained few and far between.157 Still today, MSF is unable to obtain volun-
tary licenses from patent-holding companies to use fixed-dose combina-
tions of ARVs in South Africa and China. 158
Additionally, while companies currently may look the other way when
their AIDS drug patents are infringed in poor, heavily affected coun-
tries,159 it is not clear that such forbearance will persist. It was not the
tor, Agua Buena Human Rights Association et al., to Mr. Andy Schmeltz & Ms. Konji
Sebati, mv Program, Pfizer (Sept. 17, 2004) (on file with authors) (enumerating the
flaws with Pfizer's fluconazole donation program in the Dominican Republic).
155. See, e.g., Letter from Cipla to the South African Registrar of Patents (Mar. 7,
2001) (requesting a compulsory license on several AIDS medicines for the South African
market and noting that their requests for voluntary licenses had been rebuffed), available
at http://www.cptech.org/iplhealthisa/ciplanetsh03072001.html.
156. See, e.g., Aspen Pharmacare Press Release, supra note 28.
157. GlaxoSmithKline and Boehrenger Ingelheim refused to extend their licenses to
the private sector until 2003, when they were faced with an impending judgment by the
South African Competition Commission in a suit charging them with unfair trade prac-
tices, including excess pricing of their antiretroviral medicines, and seeking a compulsory
license to produce the drugs. Reducing the Price of Antiretroviral Medicines, TAC
NEWSLETTER (Treatment Action Campaign, S. Afr.), Oct. 27, 2003, http://www.tac.org.
zalnewsletter/2003/ns28_10_2003.htm. To avoid setting this precedent and becoming
subject to compulsory licenses, the companies settled, and as a result have since entered
into additional licenses that permit private sector sales. See, e.g., GlaxoSmithKline Issues
Voluntary License for Lamivudine, Zidovudine to South African Generic Drug Company,
KAISER DAILY HIV/AIDS REp., July 1, 2004, at http://www.kaisernetwork.org/daily_
reports/rep_index.cfrn?hint=I&DR_ID=24507. Merck followed suit by granting a volun-
tary license to its AIDS drug to the main South African generic manufacturer. See Press
Release, Merck & Co., Inc., Grants License for HIV/AIDS Drug Efavirenz to South Afri-
can Company, Thembalami Pharmaceuticals (July 13, 2004), http://www.pressmethod.
com/releasestorage/5003645.htm. There has also been one such license in Kenya. See
Press Release, GlaxoSmithKline, GlaxoSmithKline Grants a Fourth Voluntary License
for the Manufacture and Sale ofmV/AIDS Medicines in Africa (Sept. 22, 2004), http://
www.gsk.com//press_archive/press2004/press_09222004.pdf..
158. E-mail from Ellen 't Hoen, Acting Director, Campaign for Access to Essential
Medicines, Medecins Sans Frontieres, to Amy Kapczynski (Jan. 20, 2005).
159. For example, a search of the Tanzanian Food and Drugs Authority website,
http://www.tfda.or.tz. reveals that several generic forms of AZT (zidovudine) are regis-
tered in the country, despite the fact that AZT is patented there, see Tanzanian Patent No.
2429 (issued Sept. 30, 1991). The Clinton Foundation HIV/AIDS Initiative has also pub-
licly stated that it intended to supply generics, including AZT, to the Tanzanian market,
see Lawrence K. Altman, Clinton Group Gets Discount for AIDS Drugs, N.Y. TIMES,
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norm with regard to ARVs before the political tide tumed,160 and it will
likely not extend to diseases that gamer less political attention. Indications
are that patent-based companies are still quite willing to use exclusive
rights to extract rents in even the poorest countries. 161 Having advocated
vigorously for maximum IP protections around the world, proprietary
companies will presumably exploit the protections when they perceive it
to be in their interests. It is fair to conclude, therefore, that the for-profit
drug sector will not take positive action to address the static costs of IPRs
in LMI countries unless others take the initiative and raise the costs of in-
action for the for-profit drug sector. Furthermore, experience suggests that
any such initiative must be carefully crafted to make commitments easy to
enforce and to minimize withdrawal opportunities for companies.
There are only slightly more encouraging signs from the private sector
in the R&D domain. Companies have done little on their own to develop
drugs for neglected diseases, but some have been persuaded to contribute
to the public-private partnerships we describe below. There are more
promising signs that the private sector-or at least some parts of it-will
help address the barriers that upstream patents can pose for researchers.
Just as information technology companies are beginning to see the busi-
ness sense in free and open source software, some companies that invest
heavily in biomedical research are beginning to see the logic of investing
in the public domain. Merck recently invested millions of dollars in a pub-
lic genomics database because it "sees gene sequences as inputs, rather
Oct. 24, 2003, at A8, but has not announced an intention to obtain a license there. Despite
this, there have been no reports of infringement actions.
160. In 2000, GlaxoSmithKJine sent cease-and-desist letters to Cipla regarding the
generic company's activities in Uganda and in Ghana. See Gellman, supra note 23 (not-
ing that Glaxo sent Cipla a cease-and-desist letter in Uganda in November 2000); Mark
Schoofs, Glaxo Enters Fight in Ghana on AIDS Drug, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1,2000, at A3
(reporting that Glaxo had issued a cease-and-desist letter to Cipla, causing it to stop im-
porting ARVs, and, remarkably, that Glaxo appeared not to hold the cited patents in
Ghana).
161. Recently, for example, the Swiss pharmaceutical company Novartis obtained
exclusive marketing rights (EMR) in India for its drug Gleevec, which treats chronic
myeloid leukemia and has no therapeutic equivalents. Most of the generic companies
producing Gleevec before the EMR issued left the market, and Novartis brought suit to
enjoin the others from selling the drug. The company charges more than ten times the
generic price. See Prati Jatania, In Search of the Sugar-Coating: The New Product Pat-
ents Regime Will Decide the Future ofHundreds ofLeukemia Patients, INDIAN EXPRESS,
Dec. 19, 2004. As a result, the Indian government is apparently considering withdrawing
the EMR. See Priya Ranjan Dash, Govt Puts Novartis Cancer Drug on Notice, TIMES
INDIA, Feb. 15, 2005, ht1p://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/l022035.cms.
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than end products.,,162 But, of course, companies that operate at the other
end of the research spectrum have different incentives and are using their
influence to prevent changes that would create more freedom for research-
ers. 163 Because firms have different interests in this area, and because it is
unclear which side, if either, will prevail in a contest between them, we
cannot rely entirely on the private sector to solve the problems that patents
cause for research.
In conclusion, both theory and experience give us reason to believe
that neither governments nor firms will act spontaneously and systemi-
cally to close the R&D gap, or to eliminate static costs created by the con-
temporary global IPR regime. l64 Given the stakes, there is an acute need
for new models of IPR management.
III. MODELS AND LESSONS OF COMMONS-BASED
PRODUCTION
In this Article, we propose two models that avoid roadblocks set up by
governments and industry and that have the potential to catalyze wider
change. These approaches draw on recent literature and experience with
commons-based production modalities. We use the term "commons-
based" to signify forms of production and coordination that rely on a
mechanism other than proprietary exclusion and that treat all actors sym-
metrically vis-a-vis the resource in question. Commons-based initiatives
offer a model by which a network of independent but interconnected par-
ticipants can choose to act-not to change the legal system, but to change
their practices within it. In so doing, they can circumvent barriers posed by
standard applications of exclusive rights, such as patents and copyrights,
and by rent-seeking lobbying that blocks statutory and regulatory change.
These efforts do not rely on government action or private-sector, price-
162. See Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L.
REv. 183,188 (2004).
163. Several companies that supply reagents and research equipment are organizing
against the AIPLA-proposed statutory research exemption discussed supra note 145. See
Memorandum from Janet Lynch Lambert of Invitrogen & Paul Grossman of Applied
BioSystems to Interested Members of the Life Science Community (Mar. 8, 2005) (on
file with authors).
164. Commentators anticipate that the access gap will grow wider in years to come,
citing factors including the continued growth and influence of multinational pharmaceuti-
cal companies and the strengthening of IP protections through international agreements.
See, e.g., OXFAM INT'L, UNDERMINING ACCESS TO MEDICINES: COMPARISON OF FIVE US
FTAs (2004), http://www.oxfamamerica.org/pdfs/fta_comparison.pdf; Mary Crewe,
Spectacular Failure-A View from the Epicenter, 4 YALE J. HEALTH POL'y L. & ETHICS
157, 160 (2004).
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driven, market-mediated solutions, but on collaborative practices but-
tressed by contractual tools that apply property-like rights to ensure access
and distribution rather than control and exclusion.
This Part describes the commons-based projects that have proliferated
in recent years in the area of the production and distribution of infonna-
tion. It also discusses the innovative contractual fonns that sustain many
of these initiatives. Finally, this Part shows that universities and other pub-
lic sector institutions are already beginning, in fragmentary and prelimi-
nary ways, to adapt some of these models to the biomedical domain.
A. Commons-Based Production Models
The wide range of open source and free software created by program-
mers who freely contribute their time and talent to collaborative efforts
confounds the historic presumptions of property law. These presumptions
say that property rights, price signals, and managers are necessary to or-
ganize and incentivize efficient production. 165 Free and open source pro-
jects, ranging in size from projects with merely two or three programmers
to large-scale projects like the Linux kernel, use none of these presump-
tions and yet produce high-quality software that has come to occupy an
increasingly prominent place in the infonnation technology economy. 166
Free and open source software could not have flourished in this way
without the legal innovation embodied in the GNU General Public License
(GPL).167 The GPL was developed in the 1980s by Richard Stallman, a
programmer from MIT who sought a way to protect the historically col-
laborative mode of software development168 from the encroachment of
. 169finns that wanted to make software proprietary. The GPL has two key
components. First, it gives users the right to copy, alter, and distribute the
software source code, as modified or in its original fonn. Second, it in-
cludes a "copyleft" requirement, obliging those who create derivative code
to grant the same rights to those who receive the derivative software. 170
Thus, the GPL not only shares but also requires others who benefit from
the license to share their own contributions. The GPL turns copyright on
its head, by guaranteeing rights to use, learn, freely distribute, and modify,
165. See Benkler, supra note 39, at 372.
166. See WEBER, supra note 38, at 5-6.
167. See The GNU General Public License (GPL), at http://www.opensource.org/
licenses/gpl-license.php (last visited Mar. 9, 2005). Although there are now many kinds
of open source software licenses, the GPL is by far the most commonly used. See Lerner
& Tirole, supra note 38, at 23 tbl.l.
168. Lerner & Tirole, supra note 38, at 4.
169. WEBER, supra note 38, at 46-47.
170. [d. at 182.
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but not the right to exclude. This legal jiu-jitsu is well-suited to the coop-
erative nature of peer-~roduced software and its reliance on reciprocal
sharing of innovation. I I It has also been a model for other commons-
based initiatives seeking to arm themselves against the rapid expansion of
exclusive rights to information and culture over the past few decades.
Creative Commons is one of the most rapidly growing of these initia-
tives. It offers authors and artists a series of simple licenses that allow
them to contract around the default in copyright law that reserves for them
"all rights" in their creative works. 172 Using the Creative Commons web-
site, individuals can choose between a menu of eleven licenses. The Attri-
bution License, for example, permits content to be freely shared, modified,
and commercially used, as long as the original author is given credit.173
The Noncommercial License allows the same activities, but only for non-
commercial purposes.1 74 There is also a Share Alike license, which re-
quires that any derivative works be distributed under the same terms as the
original work. 175
In the academy, commons-based production has become an important
model for scientific publishing. The recently-created Public Library of
Science (PLoS) offers peer-reviewed Internet-based content free to read-
ers. 176 It covers the production costs of its journals with philanthropic do-
nations and per-page-fees paid by authors and ensures the free distribution
of articles by applying the Creative Commons Attribution License to
them. 177 The National Institutes of Health (NIH) has recently adopted a
policy intended to improve the public's access to publications resulting
from NIH-funded research. 178 The policy calls upon scientists to submit
the final-version-accepted-for-publication manuscripts to the NIH, arid
provides that the manuscripts will be made freely available on the Internet
through the NIH's digital archive, PubMed Central, within twelve months
of their [mal publication. 179
171. See Benk1er, supra note 39, at 379-80.
172. Creative Commons, About Us, at http://creativecommons.org/about/history (last
visited Apr. 28, 2005).
173. Creative Commons, Licenses Explained, at http://creativecommons.org/about/
licenses (last visited Apr. 28, 2005).
174. ld.
175. ld.
176. Pub. Library of Sci., About PLoS, at http://www.pub1iclibraryofscience.org/
about/index.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2005).
177. ld.
178. See Policy on Enhancing Public Access to Archived Publications Resulting from
NIH-Funded Research, 70 Fed. Reg. 6891,6899-900 (Feb. 9, 2005).
179. ld.
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Genomics research has been another major area for commons-based
initiatives. The most prominent of such efforts is the Human Genome Pro-
ject (HGP), a publicly funded, international research project that commit-
ted itself to releasing its data and not claiming patent rights in the mapped
genome. 180 Many of the follow-on projects which seek to functionally
specify genomic sequences and create maps useful for applied research
have also adopted commons-based structures. The Ensembl Genome
Browser uses open source software to create free, annotated maps of pri-
marily mammalian genomes. 181 The HapMap project, which seeks to iden-
tify haplotypes (shared genetic variations) to help researchers better un-
derstand and address diseases with a genetic component, is also commons-
based. 182 Like the HGP, HapMap makes its data available for free on the
Web. Unlike the HGP, it took the additional step of creating a click-wrap
license to prevent those accessing its data from combining it with their
own data and patenting the results. 183
The recently-launched Biological Innovation for Open Society (BIOS)
project is perhaps the most self-conscious inheritor of both the lessons and
tools of the free software movement. 184 A nonprofit created by the Austra-
lian organization CAMBIA, BIOS seeks to catalyze the creation of a new,
180. See John Sulston, Intellectual Property and the Human Genome, in GLOBAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND DEVELOPMENT 61, 64 (Pe-
ter Drahos & Ruth Mayne eds., 2002).
181. See Ewan Birney et a1., An Overview of Ensembl, 14 GENOME REs. 925, 925
(2004); Ensembl Genome Browser, at http://www.ensembl.org (last visited Apr. 20,
2005).
182. See Int'l HapMap Project, at http://www.hapmap.org (last updated Mar. 3,
2005).
183. See Int'l HapMap Project, Registration for Access to the HapMap Project Geno-
type Database, at http://www.hapmap.orglcgi-perllregistration (last updated Mar. 3,
2005). The license was "not intended to block the ability of users to file for intellectual
property protection on specific haplotypes for which they have identified associated phe-
notypes, such as disease susceptibility, drug responsiveness, or other biological utility,"
but merely to preserve public access to HapMap data. Id. This requirement likely stems
from the conflict between the HGP and Celera, a private company that made use of HGP
data but kept its own secret, and sought to patent resulting gene sequences. See Sulston,
supra note 180, at 64. This restriction on so-called "parasitic patenting" has since been
dropped, for two reasons. The HapMap consortium felt that the map and surrounding
science has advanced to the stage where any haplotypes derived from their released data
would be obvious and thus unpatentable. In addition, the leadership was concerned that
the license prevented their data from being included in other public genome databases.
See Press Release, National Institutes of Health, International HapMap Consortium Wid-
ens Data Access (Dec. 10,2004), http://www.nih.gov/news/pr/dec2004/nhgri-lO.htm.
184. See Biological Innovation for Open Society (BIOS), at http://www.bios.net (last
updated Apr. 17, 2005).
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self-sustainin~ commons for researchers in the field of agricultural bio-
technology.18 It aims to do this by creating portfolios of essential biotech
research tools and licensing them under a GPL-style license. The scientist
behind the initiative, Richard Jefferson, has already created two technolo-
gies that engineer around proprietary tools critical for biotechnology-based
crop improvement. 186 Licensees who want access to these technologies
must accept the terms of the BIOS license, which requires them to share
and make available to other participants in the initiative any improvements
they make to the core licensed technology.I87 Licensees are permitted to
patent and license any products they develop-as distinguished from im-
provements on the tools licensed by BIOS-in whatever way they wish,
and uses of the licensed technology are not limited by territory or field.
BIOS, like the HGP and HapMap Projects, is betting that certain research
tools are shareable, even in wealthy markets and under current IP regimes,
because the tools' research value is greatest if they are freely accessible.
B. Lessons from Commons-Based Production Models
The initiatives described in the preceding Section represent a class of
solutions to information production problems. They demonstrate that, in
response to the new enclosure movement, collective action can success-
fully coordinate cooperative, open-access initiatives to produce and dis-
tribute innovations to target groups of users and researchers. The first les-
son, then, is that commons-based modalities can play an important role in
information production, including in the biomedical sector. The second
lesson is that new contractual regimes are essential to the success of some
of these initiatives. Only one of the projects mentioned above-the Hu-
man Genome Project-adhered to the classic public domain model and
dedicated its outputs to the public without further restriction. Free soft-
ware projects, the HapMap project (initially) and the BIOS initiative; all
operate by conditioning access to their benefits on reciprocal sharing of
appropriately defined improvements. They create a self-binding commons
rather than an unrestricted public domain.
185. CAMBIA CEO Richard Jefferson describes the motivation behind the effort:
'''So much of what we want to do is all tied up in somebody's intellectual property ....
It's a complete sclerotic mess, where nobody has any freedom of movement. Everything
that open source has been fighting in software is exactly where we find ourselves now
with biotechnology.'" Thomas Goetz, Open Source Everywhere, WIRED, Nov. 2003,
http://www.wired.com/wirediarchive/ll.ll/opensource_pr.html.
186. See Andrew Pollack, Open-Source Practices for Biotechnology, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 10,2005, at C8 (quoting Gary Toenniessen ofthe Rockefeller Foundation). .
187. The CAMBIA BIOS License Agreement Version 1.1, at http://www.bios.net!
daisy/license/2l0 (last updated Feb. 8, 2005).
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Because information is nonrivalrous, its sharing and use in a commons
raises none of the allocation concerns characteristic of a physical com-
mons. The only economic concerns raised by an information commons are
ones of provisioning-that is, how the innovation will be paid for ex
ante. ISS As we demonstrated in the preceding Part, where the information
goods in question are specific to diseases affecting developing countries,
innovation will likely have to be paid for by public or philanthropic
sources because of the small size of associated markets. The right to pro-
duce drugs solely for use in LMI countries, or sharing rights to do research
into diseases that disproportionately affect the poor, will therefore have
little effect on incentives to invest more generally in commercial R&D.
It therefore comes as little surprise that biomedical research institu-
tions, particularly in the public sector, are increasingly adopting com-
mons-based strategies to promote production and access to information.
Some have begun to utilize sharing principles to address the access gap,
relying upon the fact that supra-marginal returns in developing countries
are not necessary to the development of many health-related products.
These initiatives piggyback on research funded by public or philanthropic
institutions or by private investors seeking returns in rich country markets,
and adopt contractual terms to ensure that resulting products will be avail-
able at low cost in developing countries. The Yale/BMS agreement not to
enforce Yale's stavudine patent in South Africa is perhaps the most
prominent example of this approach, but several others have recently
emerged. For example, for technologies with a worldwide market, the NIH
has begun to adopt licensing terms requiring North American and Euro-
pean companies to "provide a marketing plan for making products avail-
able to developing countries."IS9 The University of California at Berkeley
recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the government of
Samoa for rights to an antiviral compound, which the University hopes to
develop into an AIDS drug. In the Memorandum, the parties agree that
Berkeley will pay royalties to the government and local communities on
sales of any eventual end product, and both parties agree "to license their
respective intellectual property rights so that prostratin (if it is approved as
188. In the context of universities, the answer is largely a combination of government
grants, tuition, and philanthropic giving. See infra notes 212-13 and accompanying text.
Strategies that abstain from enforcing IPR exclusivity therefore have little effect on pro-
visioning by the academic sector.
189. Luis A. Salicrup et aI., An Innovative Program To Move Biomedical Health
Technologies from the Laboratory to Worldwide Application, 12 IP STRATEGY TODAY 1,
7 (2005). Because these provisions are new, none have been enforced yet. Id.
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an anti HIV-AIDS therapy) is made available to developing nations at
minimal COSt.,,190
Public sector institutions have also begun to adopt commons-based,
open licensing approaches to address the R&D gap. In September 2004,
the Office of Technology Transfer at the NIH announced its intention to
develop u.S.-owned technology for a rotavirus vaccine by offering par-
tially-exclusive, regional licenses to companies in developing countries. 191
This model suggests that by working with a diverse array of partners in
LMI countries, innovators can find ways, even under current market con-
ditions and without the injection of additional public or philanthropic
funds, to develop technologies for neglected diseases and simultaneously
minimize the costs to patients that result from exclusivity.
In recent years, a number of nonprofit initiatives have also been
launched to address the R&D gap. Some of them seek to develop medi-
cines or vaccines for global diseases that cause high morbidity in develop-
ing countries. Prominent examples include the Global Alliance for TB
Drug Development (TB Alliance), the International AIDS· Vaccine Initia-
tive (IAVI), and the Medicines for Malaria Venture. Others focus on a
broader range of diseases, such as the Institute for OneWorld Health and
the Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative.
The exact mode of operation of each initiative differs, in part because
of the different characteristics of the diseases they target,192 but they gen-
190. Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Samoa and the
Regents of the University of California, Berkeley for Disposition of Future Revenue from
Licensing of Prostratin Gene Sequences, an Anti-Viral Molecule § VI (Aug. 13, 2004)
(on file with authors); see also Press Release, University of California, Berkeley, Land-
mark Agreement Between Samoa and UC Berkeley Could Help Search for AIDS Cure
(Sept. 29, 2004), http://www.berkeley.edulnews/medialreleasesI2004/09/29_samoa.shtrni.
191. See Prospective Grant of Partially-Exclusive Licenses: Human-Bovine Reassor-
tant Rotavirus Vaccine, 69 Fed. Reg. 57,335 (Sept. 24, 2004). Two Indian companies
were offered co-exclusive licenses, a Brazilian company was offered an exclusive li-
cense, and Chinese companies were offered nonexclusive licenses. Id.; see also Salicrup
et aI., supra note 189, at 9 (noting that "[t]he degree of exclusivity was determined by the
needs of prospective licensees in each country"). Note also that the licensed territories
exclude the United States, Canada, and Europe. See Prospective Grant of Partially-
Exclusive Licenses: Human-Bovine Reassortant Rotavirus Vaccine, 69 Fed. Reg. at
57,335.
192. For example, those working on global diseases that are found in rich countries
are likely to be able to attract more interest from private industry partners. See Drugs for
Neglected Diseases Initiative, Questions and Answers, http://www.dndi.orglcms/public_
htrnllinsidearticleListing.asp?CategoryId=160&ArticleId=309&TemplateId=2#mostnegdi
seases (last visited Apr. 28, 2005) (noting that initiatives targeting HIVIAIDS, malaria,
and TB "have relied heavily on market-based incentive mechanisms, including public-
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erally SUpport their operations through some combination of public and
philanthropic funds and collaborations with private industry.193 Those that
have made their patenting and licensing policies public have indicated that
they will either address access concerns by requiring their licensees to
make subsequent inventions available, affordable, and accessible in target
countries,194 or by granting only nonexclusive licenses for sales to interna-
tional agencies such as the WHO. 195 The TB Alliance also seeks to mini-
mize patent barriers to research, and states that it will generally not seek
patent protection on research tools "where the sole benefit of such protec-
tion is financial returns."I96 It also tries to ensure that licensees will con-
tinue to make technologies developed in partnership with the TB Alliance
available to other entities conducting tuberculosis (TB) research. 197
Universities have been active partners in such initiatives. In 2003, Yale
University and the University of Washington granted OneWorld Health, a
nonprofit drug company, an exclusive license to a novel class of high po-
tency compounds, potentially effective against parasitic diseases common
in the developing world. 198 The license allows OneWorld Health to de-
velop the compounds for use against neglected diseases, while Yale and
the University of Washington are free to pursue "a pharmaceutical partner
to develop the same compounds for fungal infections in industrialized
countries.,,199 Early in 2004, the University of California at Santa Barbara
donated to OneWorld Health "the patent rights to [a] class of cardiovascu-
private partnerships," and that these mechanisms are less likely to be effective for the
most neglected diseases).
193. See Barton, supra note 51, at 151 ("These efforts involve public or donor funds
and often work in cooperation with the private sector.").
194. This approach is taken by the TB Alliance and IAVI. See CTR. FOR MGMT. OF IP
IN HEALTH R&D, MIHR: HANDBOOK OF BEST PRACTICES FOR MANAGEMENT OF INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY IN HEALTH RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT app.D, at 193-94, 198
(Richard Mahoney ed., 2003). The TB Alliance gives no details about the precise condi-
tions it negotiates. IAVI's policy is to negotiate reasonable pricing requirements for sales
to the public sector in LMI countries as defined by the World Bank. !d. at 198.
195. This is the approach taken by the International Vaccine Institute. See id. at 194-
95.
196. [d. at 193.
197. [d. at 194.
198. Press Release, Yale University, Institute for OneWorld Health Licenses Potent
Therapy from Yale and University of Washington To Treat Chagas, One of the Largest
Paristic Diseases in the World (July 8, 2003), http://www.yale.edu/opa/newsr/03-07-08-
ol.all.html.
199. !d.
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lar medicines [for] their novel use as a potential treatment for schistosomi-
asis, a parasitic scourge that kills more than 200,000 people a year.,,200
Universities have also become more proactive about reserving rights in
licensed technologies for their own research purposes and sometimes also
for other academic institutions.201 The NIH has strongly encouraged them
. h' d' . 202 Th h bIn t IS lrectlOn. e most common approac appears to e to reserve
rights only for the licensed technology or materials, and only for non-
commercial research.203 However, two more ambitious examples exist.
Stanford University's model exclusive licensing agreement reserves rights
for commercial as well as noncommercial research for both itself and
other universities.204 The Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation
(WARF), the holder of the University of Wisconsin's stem cell patents,
reserves rights only for noncommercial research, but it captures improve-
ments into the scheme and also retains the right to sublicense to govern-
mental agencies and nonprofit research institutions.205
Such individualized initiatives are limited and must each bear the cost
of negotiating around barriers to research on their own. Collaborative re-
sponses hold more promise because they can pool resources and further
200. Associated Press, UC Santa Barbara Patent Gift To Aid Parasite Fight, SAN
JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Feb. 24, 2004, at http://www.mercurynews.com/mldlmercury
news/news/locaV8031289.htm (free subscription site).
201. See, e.g., University of Chicago, Guidelines for Grant and Contract Manage-
ment, at http://researchadmin.uchicago.edu/guidelines/300/312.shtml (last visited Apr.
10,2005) (noting that the university will "make every effort to reserve rights to the [ex-
clusively] licensed material to the University and other non-profit institutions").
202. See, e.g., Best Practices for the Licensing of Genomic Inventions, 69 Fed. Reg.
67,747,67,748 (proposed Nov. 19,2004) (noting that the Public Health Service "believes
that it is important for funding recipients and the intramural technology transfer commu-
nity to reserve in their license agreements the right to use the licensed technologies for
their own research and educational uses, and to allow other non-profit institutions to do
the same"); see also NIH Office of Technology Transfer, Model PHS Patent License
Agreement-Exclusive, at http://ott.od.nih.gov/pdfslExclusiv.pdf (last visited May 5,
2005).
203. See, e.g., Baylor ColI. of Med., Exclusive License Agreement (Therapeutic)
§ 2.2, at http://research.bcm.tmc.edulBLG/bcmt-models.html (last visited Apr. 10,2005);
Univ. of Iowa, Model License Agreement § 2.3(b), at http://research.uiowa.
edu/techtransfer/forms/model.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2005).
204. Stanford Univ., Exclusive Agreement 2, § 3.4, http://otl.stanford.edu/industry
/resources/exclusive.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2005) ("Stanford retains the right, on be-
half of itself and all other nonprofit academic research institutions, to practice the Li-
censed Patent and use Technology for any purpose, including sponsored research and
collaborations.").
205. See Wisconsin Alumni Research Found., Standard Non-Exclusive License
Agreement 1, § 2B(i), at http://www.warf.ws/uploads/media/20031002132027680_Std_
non_exclusive_license_agrmt.pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 2005).
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reduce transaction costs. The recently-created Public Intellectual Property
Resource for Agriculture (PIPRA) illustrates the promise of this ap-
proach.2°6 Faced with substantial fragmentation as well as exclusive pub-
lic-to-private licensing of IP rights, several public sector agricultural re-
search institutions founded PIPRA to improve management of IP re-
sources.207 PIPRA's members include more than twenty major academic
research institutions who have committed themselves to collaboratively
facilitate the development and dissemination of crops for developing
countries. These institutions are exploring several possible approaches,
including a standard research exemption that would preserve their rights to
issue licenses for research and distribution of products in developing coun-
tries,208 and a public-sector database that would assist scientists in obtain-
ing information about patent landscapes.209
These initiatives are first steps along the path of commons-based pro-
duction, and as such, many of them only partly protect the interests of pa-
tients and researchers. But they show that public sector institutions are
willing to explore such initiatives, even though the institutions have yet to
agree on a strategy that maximizes their collective potential. Public sector
institutions-universities chief among them--ean implement the solutions
outlined here, if these implementations are informed by a careful assess-
ment of the barriers that IPRs can pose for access to medicines and re-
search. The remainder of this Article applies these lessons to create a col-
lective, standardized strategy that universities and other public sector insti-
tutions can adopt to govern innovations that have public health applica-
tions in LMI countries.
206. One additional example that bears mention is a call for an open source, sharing-
based model to promote the development of medicines for neglected diseases. See
Stephen M. Maurer et al., Finding Cures for Tropical Diseases: Is Open Source an An-
swer?, I PLoS MED. 183, 183 (2004). Called the "Tropical Diseases Initiative," it aims to
capitalize on the convergence between computation and computational biology by creat-
ing a "decentralized, Web-based, community-wide effort" where public and private sec-
tor scientists would work together to enhance the research, base for specific neglected
diseases (for example, by searching for protein targets or molecules that would work
against known targets). Id. at 183-84. Central to the initative's efforts would be a com-
mitment to some type of open licensing scheme. !d. at 183.
207. Pub. Intellectual Prop. Res. for Agric., Background, at http://www.pipra.orgl
background.htm (last visited Mar. 12,2005).
208. Pub. Intellectual Prop. Res. for Agric., Draft Definition of Humanitarian Use
(2005) (on file with authors).
209. See Pub. Intellectual Prop. Res. for Agric., Activities, at http://www.pipra.orgl
activities.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2005).
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IV. THE CASE FOR UNIVERSITY ACTION
Although universities played a significant role in the various com-
mons-based initiatives discussed in Part III, they have yet to consolidate
their efforts in the biomedical domain. This may be poised to change.
First, universities play an important role in the biomedical R&D system in
the United States. This gives them the power to act to improve the lives of
patients and also to collectively persuade private sector partners of the
need for an open licensing approach. Second, key members of university
communities, from researchers dedicated to open science to students and
faculty committed to social justice, will likely support and even demand
such a change. Third, there is no significant economic risk associated with
the shift-to the contrary, it has the potential to increase the resources
available to universities.
A. The Role of Universities in Biomedical Research
Universities are responsible for more than half of the basic research in
the United States.2lO Their relative importance to the R&D system is sig-
nificant and growing: they conducted 14.5% of all R&D activity (both ba-
sic and applied) in 1997, nearly double the proportion they conducted in
1960.211 The majority of all academic research is still funded by the fed-
eral government,212 and although the importance of private sector funding
is growing, it does not provide even as much financial support as aca-
demic institutions themselves.213
Although universities specialize in basic, upstream research intended
to advance scientific understanding and to develop the tools of the re-
search field,214 "it is a fallacy to think of U.S. university research as tradi-
210. E.g., NAT'L SCI. BD., SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS 2004, at 5-5,5-8;
cf Francis Narin et aI., The Increasing Linkage Between u.s. Technology and Public
Science, 26 REs. POL'y 317, 328 (1997) (showing that 73.3% of all the papers cited in
U.S. industry patents from 1993-94 were from public science).
211. David C. Mowery et aI., The Growth ofPatenting and Licensing by u.s. Univer-
sities: An Assessment of the Effects ofthe Bayh-Dole Act of1980,30 REs. POL'y 99, 101
(2001).
212. In 2001, the federal government provided fifty-nine percent of all academic re-
search funds. See NAT'L SCI. BD., supra note 210, at 5-5.
213. Industry funded 6.8% of such research in 2001, up from only 2.8% in 1972. /d.
Academic institutions themselves accounted for another 20% in 2001, nearly doubling
their share of total R&D support since the early 1970s.1d.
214. See, e.g., Wesley M. Cohen et aI., Links and Impacts: The Influence ofPublic
Research on Industrial R&D, 48 MGMT. SCI. 1 (2002) (describing the traditional view of
public research); Jerry G. Thursby et aI., Objectives, Characteristics and Outcomes of
University Licensing: A Survey of Major u.s. Universities, 26 J. TECH. TRANSFER 59
(2001).
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tionally 'basic' and conducted with no attention to practical objectives.,,215
In fact, university researchers frequently create new advances in areas as
diverse as medical devices, computer software, and scientific instrumenta-
tion.216
A host of economic studies have confirmed that public sector research,
including research done at universities, is a central contributor to R&D in
some industries, and particularly in pharmaceuticals?17 In a survey pub-
lished in 1991, companies in the drug industry reported that seventeen
percent of their products and eight percent of their processes were very
substantially influenced by academic research, and that in the absence of
academic research, twenty-seven percent of their new products and
twenty-nine percent of new processes would have been substantially de-
layed.2ls Similar results have been confirmed by other studies.219
Universities have long engaged in commercialization and patenting,
but the scope and nature of these activities has changed profoundly over
215. See Mowery et al., supra note 211, at 10l.
216. Id.; see also Cohen et al., supra note 214, at 1-2 (rejecting the "linear model"
that casts universities mainly as incubators of basic research and concluding from a sur-
vey of R&D managers from many industries, including the pharmaceutical industry, that
government and university research is "used at least as frequently to address existing
problems and needs as to suggest new research efforts").
217. See, e.g., Cohen et al., supra note 214, at 1,8-10 (concluding that university and
government research labs have a "substantial impact on industrial R&D in a few indus-
tries, particularly pharmaceuticals"); Alvin K. Klevorick et al., On the Sources and Sig-
nificance of Interindustry Differences in Technological Opportunities, 24 REs. POL'y
185, 197 (1995) (noting that "almost all the industries that value the contribution of the
biological sciences generically ... also value university-based contributions in that
field"); see also Adam B. Jaffe, Real Effects ofAcademic Research, 79 AM. ECON. REv.
957, 967 (1989) (discussing geographic spillover effects from universities to industry,
which are "statistically strongest in [d]rugs").
218. See Edwin Mansfield, Academic Research and Industrial Innovation, 20 REs.
POL'Y 1,2-3 & tbl.1 (1991).
219. See lAIN COCKBURN & REBECCA HENDERSON, PUBLIC-PRIVATE INTERACTION
AND THE PRODUCTIVITY OF PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH 5 (Nat'! Bureau Econ. Re-
search, Working Paper No. 6018, 1997) (noting that without the contribution of universi-
ties and other public sector research institutions approximately sixty percent of thirty-two
innovative medicines studied "'would not have been discovered or would have had their
discoveries markedly delayed'" (quoting ROBERT A. MAXWELL & SHOHREH B. ECK-
HARDT, DRUG DISCOVERY: A CASE BOOK AND ANALYSIS (1990»); see also SENATE JOINT
ECONOMIC COMM., THE BENEFITS OF MEDICAL RESEARCH AND THE ROLE OF THE NIH 27
(2000) (reporting that public research funding was instrumental in developing fifteen of
the twenty-one drugs considered by experts to have had the highest therapeutic impact on
society).
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the last twenty-five years.220 The number of U.S. patents granted annually
to U.S. academic institutions grew more than ten-fold between 1970 and
2001.221 In fact, from 1993 to 2003, the number of patents issued to re-
spondents of a survey of leading research universities more than dou-
bled.222 Licenses have increased concomitantly: American universities,
hospitals, and other nonprofit research centers concluded more than 4,500
license and option agreements in 2003, more than double the license and
option agreements executed in 1993.223 A major share of these university
patents are in the biomedical field?24
Accompanying this growth in patenting and licensing, the number of
university technology transfer offices (TTOs) has increased dramati-
cally?25 TTOs identify, protect, market, and license university IP for
220. See Daniel J. Kevles, Principles, Property Rights, and Profits: Historical Reflec-
tions on University/Industry Tensions, 8 ACCOUNTABILITY REs. 293, 293 (2001).
221. NAT'L SCI. Bo., supra note 210, at 5-6; see Mowrey et aI., supra note 211, at
104 tbI.l. The rate of increase in the number of utility patents issued to universities is
much faster than the overall rate of growth of patenting during the period; during the
same time period the number of utility patents issued to U.S. applicants by the PTO did
not even double. Compare Mowery et aI., supra note 211, at 104 tbl.1 (citing number of
utility patents issued to universities from 1969-97), with U.S. Patent & Trademark Office,
U.S. Patent Statistics, Calendar Years 1963-2003, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/
Fid%eip/taf/us_stat.pdf. Moreover, this growth in university patenting far outpaced the
growth in university R&D spending. From 1975 to 1990, "universities increased their
patenting per R&D dollar during a period in which overall patenting per R&D dollar was
declining." Mowery et aI., supra note 211, at 104.
222. Compare ASS'N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, AUTM LICENSING SURVEY: FY
2002, SURVEY SUMMARY, at 1 tb1.S-6 (2003) [hereinafter 2002 AUTM SURVEY] (show-
ing 1603 patents issued to responding universities in 1993), with ASS'N OF UNIV. TECH.
MANAGERS, AUTM LICENSING SURVEY: FY 2003, INTERIM REpORT, at 1 (2004) [herein-
after 2003 AUTM INTERIM REpORT] (showing 3450 patents issued to responding univer-
sities in 2003). Note that AUTM surveys only report data from their membership, which
does not include all U.S. universities, and that the membership and number of respon-
dents have grown over time, meaning that responses between years are not strictly com-
parable. 2002 AUTM SURVEY, supra, at 6 tbls.S-I, S-2. The 1993 data included re-
sponses from eighty-five percent of the top U.S. research universities by research fund"
ing, and the 2002 data included responses from ninety-four percent of the same group. /d.
at 6 tb1.S-I.
223. Compare 2002 AUTM SURVEY, supra note 222 (showing 2227 licenses and
options executed in 1993), with 2003 AUTM INTERIM REpORT, supra note 222 (showing
4955 licenses and options executed in 2003).
224. Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 147, at 292.
225. Although the number of institutions starting TTOs increased throughout the
1970s, that number grew dramatically in the 1980s in the wake of Bayh-Dole. See 2002
AUTM SURVEY, supra note 222, at 7 figs. 1 & 2.
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commercial use. Thus, TTOs are the key institutional player in universi-
ties' increasingly focused and proactive approach to securing IPRs.226
Turning to current practices, universities frequently patent the research
tools they develop, and have been criticized for licensing some very im-
portant tools exclusively.227 Universities have also come under fire for
what many perceive as overly aggressive terms in research tools licenses.
Typically, when licensing to private firms, universities seek fees or reach-
through royalties on resulting products.228 Furthermore, "[e]ven when they
do not seek patents, universities often seek to' preserve their expectations
for profitable payoffs by imposing restrictions on the dissemination of re-
search materials and reagents that might generate commercial value in
subsequent research.,,229 A review conducted by the NIH concluded that
universities have sought just about every kind of clause in research tool
licenses to which they themselves have objected, including publication
restrictions, rights in or the option to license future discoveries, and prohi-
bition on transfer to other institutions or scientists.23o As noted above, it
appears that universities are beginning to reserve research rights for them-
selves and other academic institutions when they issue exclusive licenses,
but the reach of these clauses is often limited to noncommercial re-
search.231
Where an invention has potential to be developed into a pharmaceuti-
cal product, universities will typically patent it in the United States,
226. Typically, university scientists are required to report any potentially important
innovation-for example, a new molecular entity with pharmacological significance-to
their TTO, which then evaluates the invention to determine whether it has commercial
potential. See, e.g., Office ofIntellectual Prop., Mich. State Univ., Handling Your Inven-
tion (2001) ("Researchers are obligated to report any inventions to the [TTO] ...."),
http://www.msu.edu/unit/oip/handling.html; see also Lawrence Berkeley Nat'l Lab., How
the Tech Transfer Process Works, http://www.lbl.gov/Tech-Transfer/researchers/how-tt-
works.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2005) (describing the invention evaluation process and
encouraging researchers to contact the TTO to discuss any research that may have pro-
duced an invention).
227. See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 147, at 293,301, 309 (discussing the patenting
and exclusive licensing of the University of Wisconsin's stem cell patents); id. at 302
(discussing the patenting and exclusive licensing -of an important cell signaling pathway
by Harvard, MIT, and the Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research); supra text ac-
companying notes 104-05. Professor Rai and Professor Eisenberg note that many univer-
sity patents cover research tools and that "one recent study of Columbia University's pat-
ent portfolio indicates that more than 50% of its licensed patents represent research
tools." See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 147, at 292.
228. See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 147, at 294.
229. Id. at 291.
230. See NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, supra note 103.
231. See supra text accompanying note 203.
HeinOnline -- 20 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1082 2005
1082 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [V01. 20:1031
Europe, Canada, Australia, and Japan.232 There is no comprehensive data
on the overall ownership position of universities in current pharmaceutical
technologies, but the aforementioned trends in R&D and patenting suggest
their ownership share is both substantial and increasing. In recent years
universities have obtained U.S. patent rights in a number of key pharma-
ceutical products, including: the cancer drugs cisplatin and carboplatin,233
pemetrexed (Alimta),234 and cetuximab (Erbitux);235 the anemia treatment
epoetin alfa (Epogen);236 the AIDS drugs stavudine (Zerit),237 3TC
(Epivir),238 abacavir (Ziagen),239 and T20 (Fuzeon)/40 and the best-selling
glaucoma medicine latanoprost (Xalatan).241 Universities also hold patents
on essential manufacturing processes.242
A TTO will also decide in which foreign countries it wishes to pat-
ent.243 This decision appears to be based on a narrow economic calcula-
232. See YALE UNIV. CTR. FOR INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH ON AIDS, ACCESS TO
ESSENTIAL MEDICINES AND UNIVERSITY RESEARCH: BUILDING BEST PRACTICES 4 (2003)
[hereinafter WORKSHOP REpORT].
233. Michigan State University held the IPR. See Eyal Press & Jennifer Washburn,
The Kept University, ATL. MONTHLY, Mar. 2000, at 39.
234. Princeton University holds the IPR. U.S. Patent No. 5,344,932 (issued Sept. 6,
1994).
235. University of California at San Diego holds the IPR. U.S. Patent No. 4,943,533
(issued July 24, 1990).
236. Columbia University holds the IPR. See DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, A PLAN To ENSURE TAXPAYERS' INTERESTS ARE PROTECTED
(200 I) [hereinafter DHHSINIH], http://www.nih.gov/news/07010Iwyden.htm.
237. Yale University holds the IPR. U.S. Patent No. 4,978,655 (issued Dec. 18,
1990).
238. Emory University holds the IPR. See EMORY UNIV., OFFICE OF TECH. TRANS-
FER, PRODUCT PIPELINE 5 (2004), http://www.ott.emory.edu/shared_web/technologies/
Emory_Pipeline.pdf.
239. University of Minnesota holds the IPR. See Univ. of Minnesota, Fact Sheet on
Glaxo-Wellcome AIDS Discovery Settlement (Oct. 5, 1999), http://www.umn.edu/urel
ate/newsservice/newsreleases/99_lOglaxofacts.html.
240. Duke University holds the IPRs. U.S. Patent No. 5,464,933 (issued Nov. 7,
1995); U.S. Patent No. 6,133,418 (issued Oct. 17,2000).
241. Columbia University holds the IPR. U.S. Patent No. 4,599,353 (issued July 8,
1986); see also Jeff Gerth & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Medicine Merchants: Birth ofa Block-
buster; Drug Makers Reap Profits on Tax-Backed Research, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2000,
at 1-1.
242. For example, Columbia University's co-transformation patent is used to manu-
facture biotech drugs and has made the university nearly $100 million annually during
the patent's life. See Bernard Wysocki Jr., College Try: Columbia's Pursuit of Patent
Riches Angers Companies, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 2004, at AI. Florida State University
also holds a key patent on the process to make the cancer drug Taxol. See DHHSINIH,
supra note 236.
243. See, e.g., Lawrence Berkeley Nat'l Lab., supra note 226.
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tion, measuring the expected net present value of exclusivity against the
cost of obtaining and defending a patent, and without factoring in non-
economic considerations, such as access to medicines for LMI country
residents.244 While there is no comprehensive data and no easy way to de-
termine patent status in the majority of LMI countries,245 universities re-
port that few of their inventions are patented in LMI countries because the
benefits of exclusivity rarely justify the cost of securing patents.246 How-
ever, the more likely a technology is to have application in a developing
country, the more likely it is the economics will weigh in favor of patent-
ing. The calculus shifts further in favor of patenting if a private sector li-
censee is willing to bear the associated costs. In that case, universities
typically permit licensees to decide where to patent-although most uni-
versities retain the patents in their own name.247
If the innovation is intended as a pharmaceutical or diagnostic end
product, it will typically be licensed under a worldwide exclusive li-
cense,248 often to a small start-up company,249 which will usually develop
the product further before sublicensing it to larger firms.25o In exchange
for exclusivity, the university will typically receive royalty payments
244. See WORKSHOP REpORT, supra note 232, at 4.
245. Few LMI countries have online patent databases, making it difficult to obtain
reliable information on such patents except by directly asking those who may hold them
or by consulting local patent offices.
246. See WORKSHOP REpORT, supra note 232, at 4; cf Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public
Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-
Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REv. 1663, 1666 (1996) ("If anyone sees money to be
made through patenting a government-sponsored research discovery, chances are it will
be patented . .. [, but] resource constraints prohibit patenting many discoveries that
emerge from government-sponsored research.").
247. See Lita Nelsen, The Role of University Technology Transfer Operations in As-
suring Access to Medicines and Vaccines in Developing Countries, 3 YALE J. HEALTH
PoL'Y L. & ETHICS 301,304 (2003).
248. See, e.g., OFFICE OF COOPERATIVE RESEARCH, YALE UNIV., FROM BENCH TO
BEDSIDE: 1996-1998, at 5 (1999), available at http://www.yale.edu/ocr/images/docs/ocr
_reporC96-98.pdf; Jeannette Colyvas et aI., How Do University Inventions Get Into
Practice?, 48 MGMT. SCI. 61, 67 (2002) (finding, in an empirical study of university
technology transfer, that "the ability to issue exclusive licenses is most important in the
context of embryonic inventions," such as early-stage potential drug compounds);
Nelsen, supra note 247, at 303.
249. Two-thirds of university licensing agreements are made with "newly formed or
existing small companies." ASS'N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, AUTM LiCENSING SUR-
VEY: FY 2000, Executive Summary, at 1 (2001) [hereinafter 2000 AUTM SURVEY]; see
2002 AUTM SURVEY, supra note 222, at 1.
250. Cf Big Troublefor Big Pharma, ECONOMIST (London), Dec. 4, 2003.
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and/or equity in the licensee.251 Due diligence clauses are also common-
place, to ensure that the university technology does not lay fallow. These
clauses oblige the licensee to develop the compound-to conduct clinical
trials and other developments necessary to market the product-or face
revocation of the license.252
Because universities license their technologies in order to secure the
investment and expertise necessary to further develop and market the
technologies, the university's licensed patent will frequently be a key
component, but not the entirety, of the rights necessary to generate the end
product. The licensee may acquire secondary or improvement ~atents on
subsequent developments such as dosages or delivery systems. 53 The li-
censee will also generate the safety and efficacy data needed to market the
drug, and will be able to exercise exclusive rights over this data.254 .
B. Institutional Principles and the Internal Political Economy of
Universities
1. Open Science and the Goals ofTechnology Transfer
Universities' core institutional principles include the production and
dissemination of knowledge, as well as a related mid more general dedica-
251. E.g., Bruce Berman, From Tech Transfer to Joint Ventures-Part I, PATENT-
CAFE, Mar. 6, 2002, http://2xfr.patentcafe.com/article.asp?id=555; see also Maryann
Feldman et al., Equity and the Technology Transfer Strategies of American Research
Universities, 48 MGMT. SCI. 105 (2002) (describing the growth of university equity hold-
ings).
252. E.g., Indiana Univ. Research & Tech. Corp., Inventors & Creators-What
IURTC Negotiates for in Licensing Agreements, http://iurtc.iu.edu/tCmarketing-terms.
html#diligence (last visited Mar. 31, 2005).
253. See WORKSHOP REpORT, supra note 232, at 3; Nelsen, supra note 247, at 305.
While it is not clear how often such improvement patents are filed in LMI countries, they
sometimes are. For example, in Thailand, BMS obtained a patent on the pill form of ddI
combined with an antacid buffer, although the underlying compound was not under pat-
ent in Thailand. See Tina Rosenberg, Look at Brazil, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 28, 2001, § 6
(Magazine), at 26. It also seems that such patents will be frequently sought by companies
in important source countries like India. There are reportedly over 7000 pharmaceutical
patents in India's "mailbox." See KG Narendranath, Patent Mailbox Opens, Pfizer Is Top
Applicant, FIN. EXPRESS (India), Mar. 21,2005 (noting that the vast majority of the patent
applications in India's mailbox belong to foreign filers), at http://www.financialexpress.
com/fe_full_story.php?contenUd=85782. These applications almost certainly include
thousands of patents on combinations, formulations, dosages, and other minor improve-
ments. (According to TRIPS, member countries that did not offer patent protection for
pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical patents on the date that the Agreement entered
into force had to provide patent holders with a means to file such applications, commonly
referred to as a "mailbox." TRIPS Agreement, supra note 47, art. 60.8(i).)
254. See, e.g., supra note 46.
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tion to improving human welfare. The centuries-old academic tradition of
open scientific practice255 faces increasing pressure from universities' pat-
enting and commercialization activities. As a result, these policies, and the
TTOs that administer them, have come under attack?56 Because a TTO's
performance is generally measured by licensing revenue,257 TTO profes-
sionals have incentives to aggressively seek patents and high licensing
fees, which the research community as a whole might rather forego.258
There is, however, nothing inherent in the existence of university pat-
ents or of TTOs that requires that this be the case. TTO incentives would
change if contributions to health, particularly global health, were made a
part of the calculus. As access concerns have come to the forefront, lead-
ing members of the. technology transfer community have shown signs of
supporting steps to address health concerns of the developing world.259
Universities, after all, are different kinds of organizations than pharmaceu-
tical firms: they have different revenue structures, different R&D invest-
255. See Nannerl O. Keohane, The Mission of the Research University, DAEDALUS,
Fall 1993, at 101, 122 ("Proprietary knowledge ... is in principle antithetical to the open-
ness in sharing knowledge that is at the heart of the university's mission."); cf ROBERT
KING MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL INVESTIGA-
TIONS (1973) (describing the "normative structure of science" and finding that one of the
institutional mores is collaboration).
256. Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 147, at 305.
257. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 246, at 1710 (discussing universities' view of
royalties as a measure ofTTO success); Thursby et al., supra note 214, at 65-66 (report-
ing that surveyed TTOs list generating royalties and license fees as the most important
measure of TTO success, followed by the number of licenses or options signed).
258. See Eisenberg, supra note 246, at 1710, 1714-15.
259. Both individual TTO directors and their national organization have demon-
strated interest in these issues. For example, the Director of MIT's Office of Technology
Licensing has authored an article encouraging the technology transfer community to learn
about its power to promote access to medicines in developing countries and outlining
possible strategies in this area. Nelsen, supra note 247, at 303-04; see Jon Soderstrom,
Managing Director Office of Cooperative Research Yale University, The Future of Uni-
versity Technology Transfer: Where Do We Go from Here, Presentation to the Gordon
Research Conference on Global Aspects of Technology Transfer (Sept. 21, 2003) (en-
couraging universities to promote technology transfer to benefit developing countries). In
December 2003, the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM) formed a
group to examine global health issues. New AUTM Special Interest Group Announced:
Technology Transfer Professionals for Global Health, AUTM NEWSLETTER (Ass'n of
Univ. Tech. Managers, Northbrook, 111.), Nov.lDee. 2003, at 9. The 2003 and 2004
AUTM annual meetings included several global-health-related poster presentations and
workshops. See ASS'N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, AUTM 2004 ANNUAL MEETING
[hereinafter AUTM 2004 MEETING], http://www.autm.netJevents/eventFiles/AUTM04
FP.pdf; Nelsen, supra note 247, at 303.
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ment motivations, and different cultural self-perceptions.26o To the extent
universities have managed their patent portfolios as though the universities
were for-profit firms, it is a result of a failure to properly define the uni-
versities' interests and power as holders of significant patent stakes. A nar-
row focus on maximizing the amount of revenue generated by university
discoveries is difficult to reconcile with the spirit of university patent and
licensing policies, which typically declare that the ultimate purpose of
technology includes the advancement ofthe public goOd.261
As Yale's experience with stavudine demonstrates, the conflict be-
tween a university's ethos and its patenting practices can erupt into public
protests from both students and faculty: students organized to support
MSF's request for a patent concession, and one of the scientists who had
discovered that stavudine could be used to treat HIV voiced his disap-
proval of the university's practices in the New York Times.262 A student-
led group, Universities Allied for Essential Medicines (UAEM) continues
to challenge closed licensing practices at universities,263 while the aca-
demic community is giving increased attention to the access and R&D
gaps. The campaign for divestiture from South Africa, and the more recent
anti-sweatshop movement targeted at university apparel,264 demonstrate
that student-driven protests can produce changes in university policy. For
institutions dependent on philanthropy and government funding, the
goodwill gained by acting to alleviate the access gap is potentially signifi-
260. Cf Goldie Blumenstyk, A Contrarian Approach to Technology Transfer,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 12,2004, at 27. But cf DEREK BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN THE
MARKETPLACE: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION (2003) (lamenting the
increasing commercialization of universities).
261. See, e.g., Office of Tech. Licensing, Stanford Univ., OTL and the Inventor:
Roles in Technology Transfer, at http://otl.stanford.eduJinventors/resources/otlandinvent
.html (last updated Aug. 8, 2003) ("OTL is responsible for managing the intellectual
property assets of the University for the public good."); Office of Tech. Transfer, Univ.
of Cal., University of California Patent Policy, http://www.ucop.eduJott/patentpolicy/pat
entpo.html#pol (Oct. 1, 1997) ("The following University of California Patent Policy is
adopted to encourage the practical application of University research for the broad public
benefit .. , ."); Tech. Licensing Office, MIT, Mission Statement, http://web.mit.edu
/tlo/www/mission.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2005) ("[Our] mission ... is to benefit the
public by moving results of M.LT. research into societal use via technology licensing
....").
262. Donald G. McNeil Jr., Yale Pressed To Help Cut Drug Costs in Africa, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 12,2001, at A3.
263. Univs. Allied for Essential Meds., at http://www.essentialmedicine.org (last
visited Apr. 1, 2005).
264. See, e.g., Peter Dreier & Richard Appelbaum, The Campus Anti-Sweatshop
Movement, AM. PROSPECT, Sept.-Oct. 1999, at 71, http://www.prospect.orgiprint/VlO/46
Idreier-p.html.
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cant, while the negative publicity from exposure of internal fissures over
this issue may be damaging. In addition, to the extent the behavior of their
TTOs deviates from the public interest, universities may face other, poten-
tially less-expected risks.265
Finally, it is worth noting that the NIH will unlikely step in to resolve
these tensions. Although the Bayh-Dole Act gives the agency the authority
to "march in" on patents to ensure that federally-funded inventions are ac-
cessible to the public,266 the NIH has so far rejected evefl request that it
use these powers to make medicines more accessible.26 The NIH also
"has no authority under the Bayh-Dole Act to issue broadly applicable
substantive regulations concerning the licensing of inventions (as distin-
guished from making specific determinations regarding march-in rights in
the context of particular grants).,,268 This substantially limits the NIH's
ability to deal with barriers caused by patents on federally-funded research
265. See, e.g., Peter D. Blumberg, Comment, From "Publish or Perish" to "Profit or
Perish": Revenues from University Technology Transfer and the 501 (c)(3) Tax Exemp-
tion, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 89 (1996) (arguing that university income from technology
transfer should be subject to the unrelated business income tax to the extent TTO prac-
tices stray from universities' educational and scientific mission, such as when TTOs li-
cense a technology exclusively). The result in the Madey decision also turned in part on
the perception that universities are fundamentally analogous to businesses, although for-
mally they are structured as nonprofits. See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed.
Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003).
266. Bayh-Dole reserves for the government a nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevo-
cable, paid-up license to practice federally-funded inventions, 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4)
(2000), and the right to force patentees to license government-funded patented inventions
to third parties on reasonable terms to ensure the invention's public availability, id. § 203.
The government may require compulsory licensing if there is inappropriate delay in
achieving practical application of the invention, id. § 203(l)(a), which includes making
the invention available to the public on reasonable terms, id. § 201(f), or if licensing is
necessary to alleviate health or safety needs, id. § 203(1)(b). The NIH also seems to con-
strue these provisions to apply to patents held in other countries. See generally Letter
from Harold Varmus, Director, NIH, to Ralph Nader, James Love, and Robert Weissman
(Oct. 19, 1999) (discussing but declining to exercise the federal government's power to
license patent rights, including foreign patent rights, to the WHO), available at http://
www.cptech.orgiip/health/saivarmusletteroctI9.html.
267. See Barbara M. McGarey & Annette C. Levey, Patents, Products, and Public
Health: An Analysis of the CellPro March-In Petition, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1095
(1999); Nat'l Insts. of Health, Office of the Director, Opinion in the Case of Norvir (Jui.
29, 2004), available at http://ott.od.nih.gov/Reports/March-In-Norvir.pdf; Nat'l Insts. of
Health, Office of the Director, Opinion in the Case ofXalatan (Sept. 17,2004), available
at http://ott.od.nih.gov/Reports/March-In-Xalatan.pdf. Scholars have criticized the NIH's
inaction and recommended substantial reforms to the Bayh-Dole regime. See McGarey &
Levey, supra; Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 147, at 303-04,310-13.
268. Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 147, at 308.
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tools.269 In other words, if change in university practice is to occur, it will
likely have to be initiated by universities themselves.
2. The Economics ofTechnology Transfer and the Access Gap
Fortunately, adopting the proposals made in this Article is financially
viable for universities. To begin, universities do not rely substantially on
technology transfer revenues. Although TTOs have managed to obtain
tens of thousands of patents, they tend to remain money-losing endeav-
ors.270 The number of schools that make money from technology transfer
is small, and those that r,rofit tend to do so from a limited number of
highly successful patents. 71 Licensing revenues are typically equivalent to
just four percent of a university's research funds, and this figure decreases
significantly when the costs of patent and license management, as well as
the inventors' share of royalty income, are subtracted.272 When patent roy-
alties are compared to total university revenue, they appear quite small,
constituting only 0.5 to 2% of revenues, even for the subset of universities
that are patent-productive.273
Most significantly for our purposes, the proportion of revenue that a
university would obtain from developing countries, even on a blockbuster
drug, will be vanishingly small--only a few percent of those few ~ercent
of total revenues that PhRMA companies make in LMI countries.2 4 Yale
reported no lost revenue as a result of the stavudine patent concession in
269. /d. at 309.
270. William Brody, President of Johns Hopkins University, has observed, "[t]he
dirty secret is that for many universities-perhaps most-they are not breaking even,
much less making money on the proposition." William R. Brody, From Minds to Mine-
fields: Negotiating the Demilitarized Zone Between Industry and Academia, Remarks at
Biomedical Engineering Lecture Series (Apr. 6, 1999), available at http://www.jhu.edu/
--president/speech/biomlec.html; see also Bhaven N. Sampat, The Effects of Bayh-Dole
on Technology Transfer and the Academic Enterprise: A Survey of the Empirical Litera-
ture 12-13 (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors), http://www.vannevar.
gatech.edu/papers/bdsurvey.pdf.
271. See 2002 AUTM SURVEY, supra note 222, at 19 fig.25 (showing the distribution
of total licensing income received by U.S. universities in 2002); Sampat, supra note 270,
at 11-12 (observing that a small fraction of universities realize significant income from
licensing, with the only a few schools owning truly lucrative patents).
272. See Nelsen, supra note 247, at 302 (giving figures of two percent to four per-
cent) (citing 2002 AUTM SURVEY, supra note 222)).
273. See Benkler, supra note 36, at 1110.
274. See Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, University Licensing Under Bayh-
Dole: What Are the Issues and Evidence? 4 (May 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with authors) ("For all university technologies, an average royalty rate of2% is common.
For pharmaceuticals the maximum rate one typically encounters for university technolo-
gies is 5%; however, the rates are usually closer to 1.5%.").
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South Africa, and Yale's Dean of Public Health Michael Merson stated
that "[t]his change was made at Yale without any negative consequences
to the University-financial or otherwise.',275 Universities could even fi-
nancially benefit from adopting the policies we propose, if at the margins
it helped them to attract scientists, students, or funding for research.
Because of the small size of the LMI market, patent-based pharmaceu-
tical firms can promote access at minimal cost, and without sacrificing
profits to any substantial degree, simply by allowing generics to enter LMI
markets. The same is true of efforts to free up research on neglected dis-
eases or developing country indications for existing medicines; because
such companies do not currently seek revenues from such research, allow-
ing others to do it will not affect their profits.
The pharmaceutical industry's increasing dependence on external re-
search, including university research, to fill its R&D pipelines and provide
it with research tools276 further suggests that universities can promote re-
search and access without material risk of losing deals, reducing income,
or jeopardizing the viability of technology transfer operations. This is par-
ticularly true if universities act collectively and in a standardized fashion
rather than trying to promote access on a deal-by-deal basis. While phar-
maceutical and biotechnology companies will likely resist any changes to
the status quo, if major research institutions act together to implement new
practices-and thereby redefine the norms-pharmaceutical and biotech-
275. Michael Merson, Preface to WORKSHOP REpORT, supra note 232, at v. It should
be noted, however, that universities often prize even limited income from technology
transfer because these funds can in large part be used for any purpose, as opposed to re-
search grants and even donations, which typically may only be used for predefined pur-
poses. See, e.g., Thomas A. Massaro, Innovation, Technology Transfer, and Patent Pol-
icy: The University Contribution, 82 VA. L. REv. 1729, 1735 (1996). Furthermore, a por-
tion of technology transfer monies flow to inventors (typically thirty to forty percent), see
35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(7)(B) (2000) (mandating revenue sharing under Bayh-Dole); Robert
L. Barchi, IP and Technology Transfer from the Academic Perspective 19, http://www7.
nationalacademies.org/step/Barchi_ppt.ppt (last visited Mar. 31, 2005); Office of Coop-
erative Research, Yale Univ., Yale Univ. Patent Policy § 4(d) (Feb. 1998), http://
www.yale.edu/ocr/invenCpolicies/patents.html, which provides direct incentives for uni-
versity researchers. But given the highly uncertain returns on research, the expected value
of patent royalties is small, and the loss of royalties from LMI country sales particularly
insignificant, even to those who value unrestrained funds and personal financial incen-
tives the most.
276. Cf Big Trouble for Big Pharma, supra note 250 ("Many big drug firms have
begun to license more of their technology and products from outside companies, espe-
cially biotechnology start-ups."); Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, Who Is Selling
the Ivory Tower? Sources of Growth in University Licensing, 48 MGMT. SCI. 90, 90
(2002) (noting pharmaceutical companies' "increased business reliance on external
R&D").
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nology companies will have little choice. While an individual university
may be dispensable to the pharmaceutical industry, universities in aggre-
gate are not.277
V. WHAT UNIVERSITIES CAN DO
If universities are to harness the potential of their technologies to close
the access and R&D gaps, they must formulate a strategy that will help
them achieve these goals. This strategy must be easy to use, to allow even
those universities with the fewest resources to implement it. It must also
be highly standardized, to capitalize on universities' collective influence
and bargaining power. Below, we elaborate two commons-based ap-
proaches that meet these criteria and are configured to serve the needs of
people living in developing countries.
A. Addressing the Access Gap: Equitable Access Licensing
Part II demonstrated that the price differential between exclusivity-
based pricing and marginal-cost pricing can constitute a serious barrier to
access to medicines for people living in the developing world. Here we
describe an approach called Equitable Access ("EA") licensing as a means
of removing that differential. This mode of licensing, like the licensing
practices that govern free software, uses proprietary rights to secure free-
dom for an open class of potential users, rather than to secure exclusivity
for a closed class of licensees. Like the GPL, it uses IPRs not to exclude
and monopolize, but rather to ensure the right of third parties to access and
distribute the innovation and its derivative products. Finally, the EA li-
cense is commons-based because it seeks to use the university's rights to
create a self-binding commons-a universe of information resources nec-
essary to produce the end product-that is open for all to use. This free-
277. We expect that successful collective action by universities is likely if the domi-
nant players in the technology transfer field take the lead. More than 3000 institutions
received NIH funding in FY 2003; twenty-three of the top twenty-five recipients were
universities, and they alone garnered thirty-four percent of the total funding awarded in
the United States. See Office of Extramural Res., Nat'l Insts. of Health, Award Trends,
Rankings: All Institutions, FY 2003; By State, FY 2003, at http://grants.nih.gov/grants/
award/awardtr.htm#c (last visited Apr. 5, 2005). Of the 112 medical schools earning NIH
funding, the top twenty-five received fifty-six percent of the monies. See Office of Ex-
tramural Res., Nat'l Insts. of Health, Award Trends, Rankings: Medical Schools, FY
2003, at http://grants.nih.gov/grants/award/awardtr.htm#c (last visited Apr. 5, 2005).
Successful technology transfer deals are similarly concentrated among a small group of
elite universities. See 2002 AUTM SURVEY, supra note 222, at 20 (showing that less than
one percent of active licenses generated more than one million dollars in 2002, and that
three institutions reported granting ten or more of such licenses).
HeinOnline -- 20 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1091 2005
2005] OPEN LICENSING FOR UNIVERSITY INNOVATIONS 1091
dom, we predict, will entice other actors to provide the end product at a
competitive price.
Simply stated, an Equitable Access License is one that seeks: (1) to
ensure freedom to operate for any party that manufactures and distributes
the licensed technology and any derivative products in LMI countries, and
(2) to minimize administrative overhead and political contingency by ini-
tiating a self-enforcing open licensing regime.
1. The Choice and Definition ojthe "Freedom To Operate"
Approach
Theoretically, if a university developed a drug, vaccine, or diagnostic
tool from its lab bench to the pharmacy shelf without any partners, it could
eliminate supra-marginal cost pricing in developing countries by simply
not patenting or seeking other exclusive rights in these territories, and al-
lowing anyone to export the university's development. 278 However, this is
not generally how R&D happens. Universities operate in a universe where
they are not the only holders of IPRs, and they frequently contribute only
at one stage in the value chain. Non-patenting alone will not, therefore,
ensure that generics will be available in LMI countries, just as releasing
copyrighted works into the public domain will not ensure that derivative
works will remain open for anyone to use, modify, and distribute. To re-
solve this problem, EA clauses must adopt the strategy used by the GPL-
they must leverage the exclusive rights associated with a patent to ensure
accessibility of derivative products.
An initial choice faces any innovator who wishes to do this: whether to
adopt a fair pricing approach or implement a freedom to operate strategy.
Under the first option, the licensor would oblige its licensee to distribute
the end product in the selected territories quickly, in sufficient quantities,
and at the marginal cost of manufacture. Under the second option, what
we call the "freedom to operate" approach, the innovator uses open licens-
ing to achieve the goal of marginal cost pricing. Ensuring freedom to op-
erate here means guaranteeing third parties the right to compete in a mar-
ket without being blocked by patents or other forms of exclusive rights. It
does not mean guaranteeing third parties the active transfer of materials or
know-how to assist their production of a generic alternative-or what we
term "enablement." The choice between these options is essentially a
choice between heightened regulation of the licensee's behavior and con-
tractual deregulation of the end-product market.
278. Even if possible, this approach would have disadvantages. Patents can be useful
for defensive purposes, for example, because they can give the university a bargaining
chip in cross-licensing negotiations. Cf supra note 41.
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The fair pricing approach might appear, at first blush, to be the most
direct and efficient means of achieving marginal cost pricing. After all, the
licensee need not incur the cost of reverse engineering, will have existing
production capacity, and may also be able to take advantage of economies
of scale. Some licensees may also prefer this option, as it offers them more
control than does the freedom to operate approach. But a strategy that re-
lies on freedom to operate will generally produce better results for both
patients in LMI countries and for universities, for several reasons.
To begin, the freedom to operate approach is preferable for universi-
ties because it does not require them to take an active role in monitoring or
enforcement. This approach avoids placing any ongoing demands on uni-
versities or their licensees by introducing a third set of players-typically
generic companies-with market incentives to narrow the access gap by
offering low-priced, but still profitable, products. A university that signs a
fair pricing clause, on the other hand, must be willing to monitor the
clause's implementation and make a credible threat to bring legal action
against a defaulting licensee, or to deem the licensee in breach and revoke
the overall license itself.
In principle, the empirical challenges of the monitoring role can be
overcome.279 But monitoring all of these issues would require universities
to devote substantial resources to the task, and enforcement would consti-
tute an even more costly endeavor.28o Universities are not all equally able
to invest in monitoring or enforcement of licenses, and even the best-
situated universities will have limited resources to devote to such activi-
ties. Moreover, the fact that universities are repeat players in a game
279. There are well-established accounting standards to define marginal cost of
manufacture, and the university could reserve for itself the right to audit a licensee's
books. This would be necessary because patent-based companies have proven generally
unwilling to reveal cost in a transparent fashion. See, e.g., Outterson, supra note 72, at
222, 253 n.255 ("Given the endemic opacity of all PhRMA data on costs, perhaps the
best way to calculate marginal cost is through compulsory licensure.... Absent the pat-
ent monopoly, generic companies in a competitive environment will certainly price much
closer to marginal cost than PhRMA companies."). In addition, it would be relatively
easy to monitor whether a company was meeting its deadline for drug registration in par-
ticular countries, so long as these deadlines are clearly established. Determining whether
a company is meeting all existing market need would be more difficult, possibly requir-
ing an investigation into in-country conditions, but may nonetheless be manageable.
280. A reasonable pricing effort would presumably be plagued with the same kinds of
delays and inefficiencies that have adversely affected existing donation and discount pro-
grams.
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where reputations often travel quickly is likely to discourage aggressive
.. d fi 281momtormg an en orcement.
Second, the freedom to operate approach can be expected to provide
patients in LMI countries with cheaper medicines than the fair pricing ap-
proach would. Experience indicates that generic companies will almost
always be able to undercut the "at cost" prices of proprietary firms. It is
not clear whether proprietary products have higher marginal costs,
whether companies calculate marginal cost in different ways, or whether
proprietary companies are simply being dishonest when they claim to be
selling at cost. Regardless of the reason, it is clear from available evidence
that competition has been more reliable as a method of lowering prices
than voluntary "at cost" pricing. Again, because patients and even gov-
ernments in LMI countries are extremely sensitive to even small differen-
tials in price, the freedom to operate approach has a substantial advantage
here.
The prevailing legal environment gives the freedom to operate model a
third advantage over the fair pricing strategy: it can reduce the risk of both
physical and price arbitrage. Differentially priced products sold by the
originator company may be susceptible to parallel trade.282 The freedom to
operate approach sidesteps this issue by relying upon generic provisioning
to reach marginal cost pricing. Due to patent barriers, generic versions are
not susceptible to parallel trade in the same way as originator products
may be. Licensees may also express concerns about the generic products
illegally finding their way into high-income countries. There is no empiri-
cal evidence of any substantial flows of medicines from LMI to rich coun-
tries;283 but insofar as this is a concern, an EA clause can address it in the
281. Universities are, in this regard, differently situated from the single-issue public-
private partnerships (PPPs). This fact, and the lack of an articulated alternative, may ex-
plain why such PPPs have relied heavily upon reasonable pricing requirements to address
access concerns.
282. Parallel trade is a form of arbitrage that puts pressure on companies that seek to
price discriminate. See generally Outterson, supra note 72. While TRIPS allows parallel
trade of originator products, many countries (such as the United States) prohibit it-
either as a matter of patent exhaustion law or as a result of regulatory barriers. See id. at
209-15.
283. See id. at 257-60 (discussing two alleged instances of dysfunctional arbitrage
and determining that the claims were inappropriate or unsubstantiated); id. at 262 ("As of
April 2002, both the European Commission and the pharmaceutical companies acknowl-
edged that pharmaceutical arbitrage from poor countries into the high income was 'still
largely theoretical.'" (citing DG TRADE, EUROPEAN UNION, TIERED PRICING FOR MEDI-
CINES EXPORTED TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, MEASURES To PREVENT THEIR RE-
IMPORTATION INTO THE EC MARKET AND TARIFFS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES § 3.3 (EU
Working Document, 2002»). For detailed responses to pharmaceutical industry concerns
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same manner that the WTO has treated the issue-by requiring use of dif-
ferent packaging, pill color, and pill shape to facilitate identification of
illegal importations where this is feasible and does not significantly in-
crease the price of the product.284 In theory, generic provisioning also
ought to assuage some of the licensee's concerns-whether justified or
not-about what we might call "politically mediated arbitrage," where
discounted prices in one country fuel public demand for lower prices in
another.285
Finally, the freedom to operate approach is preferable because it will
tend to generate a more sustainable and appropriate supply of low cost
medications in LMI countries. This approach puts a thumb on the scale of
technology transfer by presenting a small-but, for generic companies,
meaningful-market to attract the investment necessary to reverse engi-
neer and scale-up production. The long-term health of the generics indus-
try requires a diffusion of technical knowledge and markets sufficient to
sustain what is widely acknowledged to be a very low margin business.
Encouraging competitive provisioning in LMI countries will foster and
sustain the development of diverse nodes of technological capability nec-
essary to reverse engineer and manufacture medicines.
2. Transactional Flow
In order to achieve freedom to operate and to minimize administrative
overhead, we propose adapting commons-based approaches to create a
self-enforcing open licensing regime for biomedical R&D. Under this ap-
proach, when a university licenses a health-related technology to a firm,
the university obtains all of the necessary rights to ensure freedom to op-
erate in LMI countries for any resulting products. This requires that any
rights in an end product which belong to the licensee must be transferred
to the university via a grant-back and cross-licensing structure.286 The
about diversion, see SANJAY BASU, PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCT DIVERSION: DIVERTING
ATTENTION AWAY FROM THE REAL PROBLEM? (Oxfam Briefing Paper No. 35, forthcom-
ing 2005) (manuscript at 3-4, on file with authors) (reporting that "the scope of product
diversion and the difficulty of controlling it have been exaggerated by the pharmaceutical
industry," and noting that generic drugs have been produced in India for decades without
undennining Western markets).
284. See WTO, Paragraph 6, supra note 141, § 2(b)(ii) (requiring product differen-
tiation); see also BASU, supra note 283 (manuscript at 7-8).
285. Pharmaceutical companies may be particularly concerned about the effects of
differential pricing on their negotiations with high-income markets where prices are set
by national regulators. See, e.g., Lanjouw, supra note 118, at 2 (describing international
pricing externalities).
286. "A grant-back clause in a patent license requires the licensee to grant back to the
licensor patent rights which the licensee may develop or acquire." 6 DONALD S. CHISUM,
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transferred rights only allow the university to grant licenses to third parties
who wish to supply the end product in LMI countries. To take advantage
of these licensing terms, the third party licensee must simply notify the
university and the university's licensee of its intent to operate under the
protection of the EA clause.
a) Identifying Appropriate Technologies and Beneficiaries
i) Target Technologies
The first step of EA licensing is to identify an appropriate technology.
Generally speaking, EA licenses will be most appropriate and feasible
where the value of a technology is clear and the university controls a good
deal of it. The EA approach will be more difficult to apply to technologies
that are inchoate or where technologies clearly have small potential com-
mercial value. Much depends, in other words, on a university's bargaining
power-which, as noted above, can be substantially increased if universi-
ties adopt a standardized, collective approach.
Because the EA approach seeks to share aspects of an innovation that
have little commercial value, it should be possible to use the approach
when licensing a wide variety of technologies. The most obvious candi-
dates are potential pharmaceutical products, both "small molecule" drugs
(for example, aspirin, cisplatin, and stavudine) and "biologic" therapies
(for example, insulin, Epogen, and Herceptin).287 Small molecule com-
pounds are readily reverse engineered, and thus are ideal candidates for
EA licensing. Biologics-which include a wide array of therapeutic pro-
tein products, from vaccines to monoclonal antibodies-present a poten-
tially more complicated situation. This is due to the increased complexity
associated with the production of biologics?88 While there is no reason to
CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.04[3][j] (2003). Technically, an EA license would utilize both
a grant-back (for newly developed or acquired rights) and a cross-licensing mechanism
(for any existing licensee rights that could be used to block production of the end prod-
uct).
287. Biologics are referred to by a variety of names-including biologicals, macro-
molecules, and biopharmaceuticals. For an assessment of the biologic medicines and ge-
nomic technologies most likely to be of use in developing countries, see Abdallah S. Daar
et al., Top Ten Biotechnologies for Improving Health in Developing Countries, 32 NA-
TURE GENETICS 229, 229-30 (2002).
288. Biologics are structurally more complex and difficult to characterize than small
molecules. Correspondingly, the manufacturing processes are both more complicated and
challenging to reproduce-biologics are typically derived from living cells, rather than
synthesized through chemical processes. See Shawn Glidden, The Generic Industry Go-
ing Biologic, 20 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REp. 172 (2001); Michael Kleinberg & Kristen Wil-
kinson Mosdell, Current and Future Considerations for the New Classes ofBiologicals,
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categorically exclude biologics from EA licenses, ensuring freedom to op-
erate in this context may require additional steps.
Although often neglected in discussions focused around access to
medicines, diagnostic technologies-for example, those that may help
more accurately diagnose cervical cancer or determine whether people
with HIV have tuberculosis-should not be ignored. They are essential to
the doctor's arsenal, and may be highly amenable to an EA approach.
There is no reason why universities could not also assert EA require-
ments when licensing manufacturing technologies or even upstream re-
search tools like gene targets. In the past, some universities have at-
tempted to obtain reach-through royalties on upstream innovations such as
cell lines or drug screening tools.289 It should therefore be possible for
universities to seek access provisions with a similar reach-through struc-
ture.
61 AM. 1. HEALTH-SYS. PHARMACY 695, 695-97, 701-02 (2004) (including a description
of the added costs associated with the manufacture of biologics). Although biologic
therapies are mostly under patent because they are relatively new, it is estimated that
roughly $10 billion worth of these products will be off patent by the end of 2006. Arman
H. Nadershahi & Joseph M. Reisman, Generic Biotech Products: Provisions in Patent
and Drug Development Law, BIOPROCESS Im'L, Oct. 2003, at 26. Several companies
now focus on producing generic biologics, and a number of products have been devel-
oped or are in development. See, e.g., Enrico T. Polastro, The Future of Biogenerics:
When Will We See Legal Generics of Top Biopharmaceuticals?, CONTRACT PHARMA,
Oct. 2001 (describing development taking place outside of the principal high-income
markets), http://www.contractpharma.com/Oct013.htm. However, to date, none have
been approved in the United States or Europe. In fact, there is not yet an established regu-
latory framework in the United States to assess and approve generic biologics. See
Kleinberg & Mosdell, supra, at 702-03. This regulatory uncertainty stems from the ongo-
ing debate about whether an abbreviated regulatory process-as we have for small mole-
cule generics-is scientifically viable for biologics. See Glidden, supra, at 176-77 (com-
paring and contrasting the FDA regulatory challenges ofbiogenerics with two other simi-
lar situations); Selena Class, Biogenerics: Waiting for the Green Light, IMS HEALTH,
Oct. 28, 2004 (focusing on arguments by makers of biogenerics), at http://www.ims-
global.com/insight/news_story/04l0/news_story_04l027a.htm; FDA Looks at Biogeneric
Issue, But Action Unlikely in the Near Term, SPECIALTY PHARMACY NEWS, Nov. 10,
2004 (hereinafter FDA Looks at Biogeneric Issue] (summarizing the debate and describ-
ing the European Union's framework for case by case assessment ofbiosimilar compara-
bility), http://www.aishealth.com/DrugCosts/specialty/SPNFDABiogeneric.html. The
FDA has said that it will issue regulatory guidance this year, but regardless of the out-
come, generic biologics may be found in other markets. Mike Faden, Biogenerics Hang
at the Starting Gate, PHARM. Bus. STRATEGIES, Mar. 2005, http://www.pbsmag.com/
Article.cfm?ID=169; see also FDA Looks at Biogeneric Issue, supra (noting that Austra-
lia has approved one biogeneric and that various biogenerics are being sold in Asian and
South American markets with relatively lax regulatory systems).
289. See NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, supra note 103.
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Finally, a technology appropriate for EA licensing ought to be health-
related.29o As long as this standard is met, an EA clause should be applied,
regardless of the type of health condition the product addresses. Universi-
ties should resist the pervasive tendency to presume that access concerns
in developing countries are limited to drugs for diseases such as
HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria. This tendency is encouraged by pharmaceu-
tical companies, and fuelled by the dangerous misconception that chronic,
noncommunicable diseases do not affect developing countries, only affect
the elderly, or cannot be effectively treated and prevented.291
The majority of the global burden of chronic, noncommunicable dis-
eases such as diabetes, cancer, cardiovascular disease, and chronic respira-
tory disease-life-threatening conditions for which a significant and grow-
ing array of medicines is available in high-income countries-is borne by
those living in developing countries.292 As their prevalence increases, such
diseases become an even more pressing public health concern. 293 Cardio-
vascular diseases, malignant neoplasms, and chronic respiratory diseases
each cause more deaths in developing countries than does HIV/AIDS.294
These conditions are not only common in developing countries, their im-
plications are also more severe. Individuals in developing countries tend to
die sooner and at a higher rate from chronic diseases than do individuals in
290. Note that there is no legal or moral reason that universities should limit EA li-
censing to technologies that come from their pharmacology departments, medical
schools, and molecular biology programs. Innovations in fields such as engineering or
agriculture can also have a vital health impact, and we expect that universities will be
concerned about LMI country access with regard to any technology that has a health-
related-or more broadly, a human welfare-benefit. Our focus, however, is in biomedi-
cal technologies. We leave an assessment of the value of EA licensing to these other
fields for those who are expert in them. By "health-related," we mean any technology
with a demonstrated medical benefit. Weare less concerned with EA licensing for so-
called "lifestyle" drugs.
291. Derek Yach et aI., The Global Burden of Chronic Diseases, 291 JAMA 2616,
2620 (2004); see also id. (noting that cardiovascular disease accounts for as many deaths
in young and middle-aged adults as HIV/AIDS in developing countries).
292. Id. at 2616. This is of course partly due to the fact that eighty percent of the
world's population resides in less developed regions-as do ninety-five percent of new
persons added to the world each year. See UNITED NATIONS SECRETARlAT, THE WORLD
AT SIX BILLION 3 (1999), ESA/PIWP.l54 (citing the U.N. Population Division), http://
www.un.org/esa/population/publications/sixbillion/sixbilpartI.pdf.
293. See Yach et aI., supra note 291, at 2616 (noting, for example, that approximately
298 million people in developing countries are expected to suffer from diabetes by 2030).
294. Id. at 2618 fig.2. Consider also that "[i]n South Africa, infectious diseases ac-
count for 28% ofyears of lives lost, while chronic diseases account for 25%." Id. at 2617.
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high-income countries.295 Although the treatment of communicable dis-
eases generates a distinct set of positive externalities,296 from both a health
and human standpoint, there is no reason to distinguish between types of
diseases or medicines.
Universities should therefore apply EA licensing to technologies rele-
vant to all diseases, including medications for cancer and heart disease,
interventions related to diabetes, and so forth. Indeed, EA licensing may
be more effective to alleviate the disease burden of "global diseases" like
cancer and diabetes than it will be for neglected diseases. Where a univer-
sity technology only has an application in developing countries, the inno-
vation is unlikely to be developed without a partner, such as the Drugs for
Neglected Diseases Initiative. Such partners will themselves be both moti-
vated and well-suited to address access concerns, meaning that it may ei-
ther be unnecessary or superfluous to insert EA terms into these licenses.
ii) Identifying Beneficiary Countries and Sectors
An EA license must also identify beneficiary countries and beneficiary
sectors within these countries. We contend that, in order to meet the health
needs of patients in developing countries, EA provisions must include
middle-income countries, as well as the right to supply the private sector
in LMI countries. Excluding these markets would substantially undermine
the university's attempt to address the access gap.
It is true that some middle-income countries have rapidly growing
economies, and may come to represent a larger percentage of the pharma-
ceutical market over the years. Of course, those that grow sufficiently to
be recognized as high-income countries will no longer be beneficiaries of
the license. In the meantime, middle-income countries are characterized
by highly unequal income distributions?97 Although some residents in
295. See DEREK YACH & CORINNA HAWKES, TOWARDS A WHO LONG-TERM STRAT-
EGY FOR PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF LEADING CHRONIC DISEASES 11 (2004) (noting
that "72% of deaths from all chronic diseases occur in low- and middle-income countries,
and death rates are higher among all age groups").
296. Cf WAGSTAFF & CLAESON, supra note 63, at 118-19.
297. The Gini index is the most popular measure of income or resource inequality. A
score of 100 on the Gini index would represent absolute inequality (where one person
held all the wealth of a society), and a score of zero would represent absolute equality.
See Statistics Div.-Advisory Carom. on Indicators, United Nations, at http://unstats.un.
org/unsd/indicatorfoc/indsearchpage.asp?cid=87 (last visited Apr. 5, 2005). Many of the
middle-income countries that companies might most like to exclude from an EA provi-
sion are very high on the Gini index. See UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT REpORT 188-91 (2004). For example, Brazil, Mexico, and South Africa all
have Gini index values of more than fifty. In Brazil, the richest ten percent consume
46.7% of the country's income, while the richest ten percent in South Africa consumes
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middle-income countries are wealthy, a large portion of them are desti-
tute?98 And, they, along with the poor in low-income countries, typically
must obtain their own care in the private sector.299 If EA licenses limit
low-cost generics to the public sector in LMI countries, or exclusively to
low-income countries, they will leave out many individuals who universi-
. . b fi 300tIes aIm to ene It.
Additionally, excluding middle-income countries threatens the poten-
tial effect of EA provisions in the place they might otherwise work best.
EA provisions are most likely to be applied to medicines that will be de-
veloped for wealthy country markets, such as those addressing chronic,
noncommunicable diseases. As between low-income and middle-income
countries, it is in fact middle-income countries that are in more acute need
of such medicines.301
Moreover, both middle-income countries and the private sector gener-
ally are critical to ensure that there are sufficient incentives to sustain the
generic companies providing the medicines in question. As profit-seeking
enterprises, they must evaluate whether the available markets justify their
investment in reverse engineering and scaling-up production; these rela-
tively larger markets figure prominently in this detennination.
Finally, any line dividing markets within or between nations is in some
sense arbitrary. In theory, some combination of measures that would more
finely track income, disease prevalence and distribution, and the purchas-
ing power of the public system would likely be more satisfying intellectu-
46.9% of that country's income. China's Gini index value is 44.7, and Thailand's is 43.2.
For comparison purposes, the Gini index value of the United States is 40.8. [d.
298. See UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, supra note 297, at 147-49. In South
Africa, 23.8% of individuals live on less than $2 per day; the comparable numbers for
Thailand and China are 32.5% and 46.7% respectively. [d.
299. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
300. Some might object to the inclusion of middle-income countries on the basis that
international transfers of wealth should not be directed at countries that have a reasonably
high capacity to address access concerns but are failing to do so. However, the only alter-
native, in this case, is to punish individuals for the inaction of their governments. Fur-
thermore, we are not persuaded that the sharing strategies adopted here are best thought
of as "transfers of wealth," since the good being shared is nonrival. Indeed, one might
consider that imposing rules requiring limits on market competition and thus permitting
rent-extraction from economies whose demand pull has no positive incentive effect on
R&D, by firms located in the rich countries and that orient their research towards demand
from rich countries, is a form of regressive tax on access to the international trade system.
301. See YACH & HAWKES, supra note 295, at 12 (noting that "large middle income,
low mortality developing countries"-eountries such as China are exactly the ones that
companies are most likely to seek to exclude-are particularly heavily affected by
chronic diseases).
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ally than a simple geographic/income based division. Universities could
try to set up a process to evaluate the effect upon patients of excluding
particular middle-income countries or the private sector in select LMI
countries, but we suspect that this would not be worth the effort. Because
profits from such countries and sectors are unnecessary to stimulate prod-
uct development, and given the extreme difficulty of defining and imple-
menting distinctions that are more closely tailored to poor patients' ability
to pay, the optimal distinction will likely be the one drawn between high-
income countries and LMI countries.
b) Flow of Rights
EA licensing involves limited cross-licensing between the university
and its licensees, structured to create freedom to operate for third parties
for the benefit of LMI country distribution.302 In exchange for permission
to use the university's exclusive rights in high-income countries, the licen-
see and its sublicensees cross-license exclusive rights they own in the end
product to the university. This cross-license is limited and available only
for the purpose of an automatic sublicense flowing from the university to
any third party who notifies the university and licensee of its intent to sup-
ply an LMI market and fulfills some additional requirements (we refer to
this third party as "the notifier," or, where relevant, as "the improver").
The university need not hold a patent in the LMI countries where the drug
is to be distributed. It is only necessary that the university own technology
that the licensee wishes to use, in exchange for which the licensee agrees
to the limited cross-license. After the initial agreement is reached, to ob-
tain freedom to operate, all the generic manufacturer need do is notify the
university and its licensee. It thereby receives a limited license to all of the
patents that belong to the university or its licensees that are necessary to
produce the ultimate end product for distribution solely in LMI countries.
i) Cross-License and Grant Back
The first transactional element of an EA license is an exchange of li-
censes. The university grants to the licensee rights to a particular technol-
ogy or innovation, and sets the parameters of the license. The license will
likely include, at a minimum, rights to practice the university's technology
in some or all high-income countries. In exchange, the licensee will cross-
license to the university its "associated rights." These rights must include
302. In order to ensure that the EA structure is self-perpetuating, the license should
require that any sublicenses carry the terms of the EA license with them. This is impor-
tant because the initial license may be with a biotech company, which will sublicense the
university technology to a pharmaceutical company only after further development.
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all of the potentially exclusive rights it holds that could prevent a third
party from producing or delivering an eventual end product, including
rights in any patents and data possessed by the licensee during the term of
the license that are necessary to make, use, sell, import, or export the end
product. This right does not reach know-how or any other secret or mate-
rial property possessed by the licensee. It would, however, cover associ-
ated rights that the licensee possessed or developed that do not rely di-
rectly upon the university technology but are nonetheless necessary to the
production or sale of the end product.
In coming years, rights to clinical trial data are likely to become an in-
creasingly important tool of exclusion in developing countries.303 EA
clauses must therefore include such data in the bundle of rights received
from the licensee and openly sublicensed to the notifier. Within the EA
model, the license to use data means only that no exclusive rights will pre-
vent the generic company from relying in its application on publicly avail-
able data generated by the licensee or the fact that the drug has been regis-
tered in another country.304 The license removes the formal right to exclu-
sivity. It does not give a notifier the authority to obtain otherwise nonpub-
lie data from the university's original licensee. The generic producer will,
of course, still have to meet other regulatory requirements related to bio-
equivalence and manufacturing standards, to the extent these requirements
exist in the notified country.
The university obtains these rights for the sole purposes of providing
freedom to operate in LMI countries. Although in some circumstances
grant-back arran~ements for open source projects may implicate the patent
misuse doctrine, 05 this does not appear to be a concern in this case.3°6
Figure 1 illustrates this initial transactional flow.
303. This is due to provisions in Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement and the in-
creasingly stringent data exclusivity provisions in free trade agreements. See Scafidi, su-
pra note 46.
304. National drug regulatory agencies differ widely in the data they require and the
processes they follow. Some allow generic companies to rely on the fact that a drug has
been registered in another country, or on data that was submitted to regulatory agencies
in another country. See FINK & REICHENMILLER, supra note 48, at 2-3.
305. According to a federal district court, for a grant-back license agreement to con-
stitute patent misuse, the licensee generally "must provide specific evidence that the
clause actually stifled innovation." Robin Feldman, The Open Source Biotechnology
Movement: Is It Patent Misuse?, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 117, 155 (2004) (discussing
Transparent-Wrap Machine Co. v. Stokes & Amith Co., 166 F. Supp. 551 (S.D.N.Y.
1958), and other case law). Thus, exclusive grant-backs may raise concerns, as may
agreements that cover products invented using a research tool rather than incorporating a
patented invention, but nonexclusive grant-backs are typically acceptable. /d. at 156-59.
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The second transactional component of an EA license is an automatic
open licensing structure organized around a simple notification procedure.
This component's core attribute places power to act in the hands of a third
party, typically a generic company. Any disputes about the applicability of
the freedom to operate are left to the licensee and the party seeking to en-
ter the market, permitting the university to remain largely out of the pic-
ture. Figure 2 illustrates this transaction.
306. Courts typically use two methods to detennine whether a patentee's actions con-
stitute misuse: the antitrust rule of reason and the patent policy inquiry. See id. at 167. An
antitrust inquiry focuses on whether the licensing agreement has anticompetitive effects
and, if so, whether those effects outweigh the agreement's pro-competitive benefits. A
patent policy inquiry examines whether the agreement is consistent with patent policy.
Cf id. at 163-65.
Because the EA license promotes competition and ultimately seeks to increase
rather than restrict competition, it is difficult to argue that any anticompetitive effects
exist, or that those effects could outweigh pro-competitive effects. See id. at 163-65. In
contrast, one might argue that the EA license conflicts with patent policy because it re-
duces incentives to innovate, forcing competition for LMI-country markets and thereby
reducing licensee profits. But the limited nature of monopoly rents available from LMI
markets suggest instead that an EA clause is highly unlikely to hann the patent-based
pharmaceutical industry's incentives to innovate, and that it might stimulate innovation
by nonprofit and generic pharmaceutical companies. Cf id. at 159-63.
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EA provisions are triggered when a third party notifies the univer-
sity and licensee that it intends to make, use, or sell the end product in, or
import the end product into, an LMI market. The notifier can be any en-
tity, but we anticipate three primary users of the notification procedure: (1)
generic companies that wish to produce or sell in an LMI country; (2) a
government agency such as a ministry of health, or NGO such as MSF,
that wishes to import generics from a third party; or (3) a researcher who
wishes to adapt the end product for developing country use.
In order to foster a competitive environment, the EA model presumes
that multiple entities may notify for a particular market. Although it would
be possible to arbitrarily limit the number of firms that could notify, and
thereby shelter the first notifiers from a fully competitive environment,
this has obvious risks. Over time some form of limited exclusivity might
be required to induce generics to introduce a product to market. But at this
time, there is no clear evidence of this need, and generic manufacturers
have entered LMI markets when patents did not present a barrier without
promise of exclusivity. Should practice indicate that some stronger in-
ducement is necessary, the standard approach could be revised to offer a
limited period of exclusivity for the first notifier that brings a product to
market in a particular country.307
307. Cf 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2000) (authorizing a 180-day period of exclu-
sivity for the first generic to enter the market in the United States).
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Upon notification, the open licensing provisions of the EA license are
engaged. The university's licensed rights, including associated rights from
its licensee, flow to the notifier for the sole purpose of manufacturing for
distribution and distributing in the notified country. Patent, regulatory, and
manufacturing barriers are lifted for the notifying entity by this flow of
rights. This can be achieved by a statement in the EA license that a notifier
shall receive from the university an open license permitting the making,
using, selling, offering to sell, importing, and exporting of the end product
in the notified country. A royalty payment could be required in considera-
tion for the open licenses. FClr low-income countries, the license could
speci~ a rate within the range recommended by UNDP of zero to six per-
cent.3 8 Because middle-income countries can afford more, on avera~e,
sales in these countries could be subject to a slightly higher flat rate. 09
Finally, the license will also have to establish an equitable division of roy-
alties between the university and the licensee.
It is important to note that this model permits production of the end
product in any country (including a high-income country), as long as
manufacture is for the sole purpose of exporting to and supplying the end
products in the notified country. This will increase the likelihood of find-
ing a generic supplier for more complicated drugs. It will also create
maximal competition in the market to supply LMI countries, which in tum
will drive prices towards marginal cost.
308. See UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REpORT 108
(2001) (citing a nonnal rate of four percent, and providing for adjustments up and down),
http://www.undp.org/hdr200l/chapterfive.pdf. Other novel approaches to detennining
royalty rates merit consideration: in May 2004, Canada passed legislation to give effect to
the WTO's August 30th decision, which allows Members with manufacturing capacity to
export compulsorily licensed drugs for the benefit of Members without such capacity. See
WTO, Paragraph 6, supra note 141. Subsequently, the Department ofIndustry published
a draft implementing regulation for public comment. The draft regulation sets forth a
novel fonnula for calculating the royalties to be paid by the developing nation licensees
to the patentees. Currently, calculations using the formula produce a potential range of
royalties from .02% to 3.5%. See Use ofPatented Products for International Humanitar-
ian Purposes Regulations: Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement and Draft Regulation,
CANADA GAZETTE, Oct. 2, 2004, http://gazetteducanada.gc.calpartI/2004/20041002/html
/regle9-e.html.
309. If complexity and inequality within middle-income countries were less of a con-
cern, EA licenses could also seek to implement proposed royalty models that better re-
flected a country's ability to pay. See, e.g., William Jack & Jean O. Lanjouw, Financing
Pharmaceutical Innovation: How Much Should Poor Countries Contribute?, 19 WORLD
BANK ECON. REv. (forthcoming 2005), http://www.georgetown.edu/faculty/wgj/jack-
lanjouw-draft.pdf. .
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iii) Notifier Improvements
If the EA license defines the terms "end product" and "open license"
appropriately, it can also operate to permit notifiers in any country to en-
gage in research to improve the end product. This could substantially
benefit patients because it would allow companies and academic research-
ers in those countries to adapt the technology to local circumstances in a
way that a proprietary company might be unwilling or unable to do. For
example, the first three-in-one pill for AIDS patients was developed not in
the United States or Eur0Pce, but in India-and it was created without any
guarantee of exclusivity.3 0 As described in Part II, many products must be
altered in specific ways to meet the needs of patients in developing coun-
tries. Some of these modifications, such as pediatric dosing, require mini-
mal investment and are currently being undertaken by generic compa-
nies.31I These examples suggest that if potential innovators are ensured
freedom to experiment and sell improved versions of products in LMI
countries, we may see not only cheaper products in these countries, but
better ones as well.
To meet these goals, however, any such improvements should be li-
censed back to the university for the sole purpose of sublicensing them
under EA terms to subsequent notifiers in LMI countries. The notifier's
improvements would themselves be subject to the EA terms. The notifier
would be paid royalties for the use of its improvements in LMI country
markets, but the notifiers could not prevent others from exploiting the im-
provements.
Some might advocate allowing the improver to patent its own im-
provements in high-income countries and then to negotiate the necessary
cross-licenses with the university and/or licensee. The opportunity for a
potentially lucrative cross-license might offer the notifier an incentive to
make innovative improvements (although it is not immediately clear how
well these would align with the improvement needs ofLMI markets). The
alternative is to include in the EA license a requirement that the improver
grant the university and/or licensee an option to license any improvement.
The EA license could specify the terms of this option, namely a reasonable
royalty rate for licensing the improvement.
310. See Outterson, supra note 72, at 254.
311. See, e.g., Ranbaxy Phannaceuticals Inc., Ranbaxy Phannaceuticals Announces
Nationwide Availability of DipserMox™ (First-Ever Amoxicillin Tablets for Oral Sus-
pension) in Time for the Respiratory Season (Nov. 3, 2003), http://www.ranbaxyusa.
com/newsroom/03-ll-03.htm.
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We have now described the complete flow of rights associated with an
EA license. Figure 3 illustrates this transactional flow.
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Under an EA license a notifier is automatically deemed to have an
open license; therefore, it may immediately and lawfully begin to sell the
end product in the specified LMI country without infringing upon any
rights held by the licensee or sublicensee.312 An EA license is itself the
legal protection provided to any entity making use of the license's provi-
sions. While structured as a license, it operates at a minimum as a cove-
nant by the university and its licensee not to sue entities that rely on tech-
nology to which they have rights solely for the EA license purposes. There
is some legal risk involved for the entities that seek to rely on the EA li-
cense, because of the potential for variations between jurisdictions with
regard to such third-party reliance on the provisions of a license to which
they were not a party. Nonetheless, because of the relatively widespread
use of covenants not to sue and the small value of the markets covered,
that risk is likely to be manageable. Generics always have the option of
312. Of course, separate from the matter of rights provided by the EA license, the
generic entrant will have to comply with any regulatory requirements in the LMI country
(for example, registration) before it will be able to sell its product.
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also seeking a more direct license. If they do so, the existence of the threat
to operate under the EA license as a fallback is likely to improve the en-
trants' negotiating position.313
If the licensee or the university wishes to contest the applicability of
the license to the product or patents included in the notification, they may
of course do so, by challenging the actions of the notifying party and/or
taking legal action. A notifying party operating inconsistently with the
terms of the EA provisions (for example, by seeking to sell in a high-
income country or seeking to sell products that are not covered by the li-
cense) will infringe the underlying patent rights and will be subject to the
usual remedies for patent infringement.
v) Additional Concerns
EA licensing is appealing because it provides simple, clear freedom to
operate with one stroke of the pen-the signing of the original license be-
tween the university and its licensee. Of course, additional provisions
could be added to an EA license to meet specific concerns of the univer-
sity and licensee. For example, universities could ensure that only manu-
facturers with a certain demonstrated capacity to produce quality products
can legally notify, by requiring notifiers to have a certification of Good
Manufacturing Practices (GMPi 14 or other guarantee of quality.315 This
would involve the university in a broader effort to police the actions of
generic companies, creating obstacles where there are no established qual-
ity assessment standards. The same objective might be achieved more eas-
ily through an indemnification and insurance requirement, which universi-
ties may well wish to have in any case.
313. A secondary assurance might also be built into an EA license in the fonn, for
example, of a statement that the acceptance of the notifier's royalty payment represents a
covenant not to sue, guaranteeing additional legal protection from any later claims that
the patents and products notified for are not covered by the underlying license. The utility
of such a mechanism is doubtful, however, given that the rates involved and value of
sales will likely be small. High-income market licensees may choose to reject the royalty
in order to preserve their options and increase uncertainty.
314. For a description ofGMP, see WHO, WORLD MEDICINES SITUATION, supra note
67, at 98 fig.9.1.
315. A license could turn on registration with the WHO's Prequalification Project,
which provides governments and pharmaceutical manufacturers with infonnation about
how to ensure the quality, safety, efficacy, and rational use of phannaceutical products.
The Project focuses on a small number of priority medicines, which are, to date, those
related to TB, HIV/AIDS, and malaria. World Health Org., Essential Medicines and Pol-
icy Dept. (EDM), Prequalification Project, http://mednet3.who.int/prequal/about.htm (last
visited Mar. 15,2005).
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With some technologies, know-how and materials, which cannot be
transferred under the freedom to operate model, may be an essential aspect
of the rights a licensee uses to control production.316 Any attempt to re-
quire affirmative transfer ofmaterials or information from the licensee to a
third party could raise some of the same enforcement challenges that a fair
pricing approach would. There is no reason, in principle, that an EA li-
cense could not seek to bind a licensee to provide enabling know-how and
associated materials reasonably necessary to the production of the end
product. However, if a licensee violated the agreement, concerns over
privity, in particular with respect to claims brought by an open and unde-
fined class, suggest that it would often be left to the university to bring an
enforcement action.317
Rather than providing a stark choice between enablement and litiga-
tion, an EA license might instead specify an intermediate step, requiring
negotiations between all parties if enablement and transfer of materials
were requested. In those cases where a university is concerned that prod-
ucts will only become available if the licensee itself produces them, it may
not be able to avoid becoming involved in enforcement. It could then re-
quire transfers of know-how to third parties or seek to regulate the licen-
see's distribution diligence and pricing directly. This degree of individu-
ally negotiated requirements, monitoring, and enforcement may be beyond
the resources and negotiating power of any individual university. If bio-
logics become a much more important component of the pharmaceutical
market, as some predict/IS and generic companies are unable to readily
reverse engineer them, effective pursuit of an EA strategy may require
creation of a standing inter-university body charged with shepherding the
performance and utilization of EA licenses. Modeled perhaps on PIPRA,
316. See Glidden, supra note 288, at 178-80 (describing the importance of non-
patented trade secrets in the manufacture of biologics); Gil Y. Roth, Biomanufacturing
Report, CONTRACT PHARMA, June 2003 (describing challenges of producing a protein
identical to a branded drug without materials or know-how), http://www.contractpharma
.com/June032.htm.
317. A university could deem a licensee who failed to provide enabling know-how or
materials in breach of the original primary license, and use its own powers of persuasion
to facilitate the enablement. However, a university may be reluctant to travel this road.
Cf supra text accompanying note 281.
318. See Press Release, IMS Health, IMS Health Reports 2004 Global Pharmaceuti-
cal Sales Grew 7 Percent to $550 Billion (Mar. 9, 2005) ("Biotech products accounted for
27 percent of the active research and development pipeline, and 10 percent of global sales
in 2004. IMS expects that over the next five years, innovative products derived from bio-
technology will continue to grow in the double digits and represent an increasing share of
the overall market."), http://www.imshealth.com/ims/portal/front/articleC/0,2777,6599_
3665_71496463,00.html.
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such a body would have to include a staff and collective funding mecha-
nism and would be named specifically as an assignee of the university's
rights under each EA license entered by a member university.
B. Addressing the R&D Gap: Implementing Neglected Disease
Clauses and Innovative Partnerships
The EA licensing approach is designed to harness technologies devel-
oped through university technology transfers to industry. This approach
will do little to address the lack of direct investment into research for ne-
glected disease. Additional changes in the way that universities manage
their IP portfolios can reduce barriers to R&D in these areas.
1. Neglected Disease Exemptions
The first strategy universities can adopt is one we term Neglected Dis-
ease ("ND") licensing. If a university chooses to enter into an exclusive
license for a research tool (a practice that we do not mean to advocate by
making this proposal), it can insert a specially tailored research exemption
into the license. Utilizing the same notification structure as the EA provi-
sion, the ND clauses would grant scientists worldwide the freedom to en-
gage in research to address neglected diseases using the licensed technol-
ogy. Just as importantly, ND exemptions guarantee those who conduct this
research the right to market resulting products in LMI countries. Such an
exemption could be applied to all technologies useful in biomedical re-
search, from research tools to compounds intended for end products. The
ND exemption we propose utilizes an open licensing approach, like the
EA license, and is similarly commons-based.
Our ND proposal draws on the model proposed by the PIPRA initia-
tive319 and adapts it to provide researchers and producers in LMI countries
freedom to operate with biomedical research tools. Unlike the EA provi-
sions, the ND clauses do not necessarily entail obtaining a cross-license
from the licensee. Instead, the ND clauses simply must carve-out of any
exclusivity granted to the university's licensee a set of provisions for free-
dom to operate pertaining to neglected diseases. Such a core clause speci-
fies that, notwithstanding anything else in the agreement, the university
retains the right to license use of its technology for research on neglected
diseases anywhere in the world and for commercial purposes in LMI
countries. In this case, notification provided to the university alone will
result in open licenses to conduct such activities. As with EA clauses, im-
plementing an open licensing structure would minimize transaction costs
319. See Pub. Intellectual Prop. Res. for Agric., Draft Definition of Humanitarian
Use, supra note 208.
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and allow any party to engage in research for a neglected disease after
simple notification. A more robust model, which would more closely mir-
ror the equitable access approach, would also capture all licensee im-
provements on the university's technology in the open licensing poo1.320
Critically, the ND clauses are not limited in geographical scope. Any en-
tity is eligible to conduct research using the university's patented innova-
tion-and if the more robust version is used, any licensee improvements to
it-without paying a royalty, provided that the research targets a neglected
disease.
Two approaches to defming the scope of the ND research exemption
are possible. First, uses could be limited to academic institutions and other
nonprofit entities (such as the Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative) that
have as their primary aim producing products predominantly for patient
populations in developing countries. The second approach would allow
any entity to make use of the exemption, but to carefully establish the uni-
verse of applicable diseases. An ND license could, for example, allow an
open license to any institution, public or private, for research targeting any
disease on a list included in the license.321 A more comprehensive and
flexible approach would be to provide a standard for identifying rare dis-
eases and to grant an open license to any scientist working on any disease
meeting that standard. Current u.s. law defmes a rare condition as one
with an incidence of less than 200,000 persons in the United States or for
which there is no reasonable ex~ectation of recouping the necessary R&D
investment in the U.S. market.3 2 The FDA makes available a cumulative
320. This approach has, in fact, been taken in both the WARF standard licenses and
the BIOS initiative. See supra notes 187, 205 and accompanying text. Like the EA ap-
proach, ND provisions should not conflict with the patent misuse doctrine. See Feldman,
supra note 305.
321. One such list might be derived from the influential Trouiller study. See Trouiller
et al., supra note 81, at 2189. An alternative might include any disease with some set
proportion of its burden in developing countries. Cf Kremer, supra note 58, at 71 tb1.3.
322. 21 U.S.c. §§ 360bb(a)(2), 360ee(b)(2) (2000); 21 C.F.R pt. 316.1 (2004). The
FDA has developed specific criteria for classifying orphan drugs. See FDA, Cumulative
List of Orphan Drug Products Designated and or Approved Through 2005 (Apr. 6, 2005),
at http://www.fda.gov/orphan/designat/alldes.rtf.Toincentivize development of drugs for
rare conditions, companies are rewarded with regulatory-based exclusivity. 21 U.S.C.
§ 360cc. As a result, orphan drugs for serious, chronic diseases with small but steady U.S.
patient populations may yield substantial revenues. For example, Genzyme makes several
hundred million dollars a year on Ceredase, an expensive orphan drug for Gaucher Dis-
ease. See, e.g., James Love, The Other Drug War, AM. PROSPECT, June 1993, at 121,
available at http://www.prospect.orglweb/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewPrint&art
icleld=5121.
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list of all drugs for such diseases,323 including a number for diseases of
particular significance in LMI countries?24 By taking the United States'
approach, universities would be adopting a widely accepted definition of
indications for which markets fail to provide.
As noted above, in practice, the most significant IP barriers to research
may result from potential exclusion from commercializing a resulting in-
vention. Therefore, the most important part of an ND exemption may be
the assurance of freedom to exploit any eventual product in LMI countries.
This can be accomplished by guaranteeing freedom to operate vis-a-vis the
licensed technology in LMI countries.
A researcher acting under the ND exemption we propose would not
have the right to commercialize an end product in a high-income market,
unless she negotiated the necessary cross-licensees). An ND clause might
mandate that the licensee receive an option for a cross-license for all high-
income markets. Such a provision would likely appeal to licensees, and
would ensure that the end product would not be barred from high-income
markets on account of failed cross-licensing negotiations. However, avoid-
ing such a mandate might provide greater incentives for private firms to
engage in the relevant research.
Critics may express concern that the contractual creation of a world-
wide neglected research exemption-both for the underlying university
patent and any licensee or sublicense improvements-will actually lead to
scientists using these technologies in research on non-neglected diseases.
However, such research is not authorized by an ND clause, and would
constitute actionable infringement. The pertinent question is whether ND
uses can readily be distinguished from other uses in an infringement con-
text. We argue that ND uses can be distinguished in the ways that matter
most, and that where they cannot, little harm is done. When a drug is reg-
istered with a regulatory agency, any misuse of the ND research exemp-
tion would likely become apparent. Of course, even with researchers act-
ing in good faith, early-stage research may produce results applicable to a
variety of indications, including non-neglected diseases. The ND exemp-
tion does not prevent a researcher from negotiating cross-licenses in order
to exploit such an innovation. Where, on the other hand, the attempt to li-
323. See, FDA, Cumulative List of Orphan Drug Products Designated and or Ap-
proved Through 2005, supra note 322.
324. Id. (including dengue fever, Chagas disease, leishmaniasis, malaria, and TB).
The FDA has approved orphan drug status for products intended to treat subsets of dis-
ease populations; a drug indicated to treat a particular stage or strain of a disease, or a
particular category of patients (for example, AIDS patients with symptomatic HIV infec-
tion and CD4 count below 200/mm3), may qualify for orphan drug designation. /d.
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cense or patent an innovation does not reveal the infringement, the in-
fringement is likely of the class that is difficult to detect, and thus com-
monplace even in an environment without ND licensing.
2. Promoting Partnerships
The second component of universities' neglected disease agenda
would be a more proactive approach to out-licensing of research tools.
Universities need not wait until they exclusively license a technology to
ensure that the technology is available to researchers working on neglected
diseases. Universities can affirmatively grant scientists royalty-free li-
censes to use their tools for commercial and noncommercial research. This
might be facilitated by the creation of simple, ready-to-sign agreements
that could be posted on a TTO's website.
Universities can also seek out opportunities to license to public-private
partnerships, and try to bring foundations into the agreement to provide
support for the development of the technology.325 Again, such initiatives
should not be limited to attempts to produce medicines, but should also
include diagnostics?26 Finally, universities should explore the option of
licensing early-stage inventions directly to entities in LMI countries that
have the ability and desire to commercialize products for both neglected
and non-neglected diseases.327 Such agreements might sometimes offer
limited forms of geographical exclusivity or co-exclusivity,328 or leverage
public or foundation financing to support the development of the technol-
ogy. Such partnerships have many potential benefits. For example, they
could help meet goals of development and technology transfer, and make
use of the relatively low cost of research in LMI countries. 329
325. One model here could be the agreement between the University of California at
Berkeley, OneWorld Health, Amyris Biotechnologies, and the Gates Foundation to se-
cure both research freedom and funding to develop a steady, affordable supply of the
antimalarial drug artemisinin. Press Release, University of California at Berkeley, $43
Million Grant from Gates Foundation Brings Together Unique Collaboration for Antima-
larial Drug (Dec. 13, 2004), http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2004/12/13_
gates.shtml.
326. See Rayasam, supra note 86 (describing an effort at the University of Texas to
develop an inexpensive, rapid technology to count CD4 cells, an important component of
care for individuals with HIV/AIDS).
327. The NIH Office of Technology Transfer has begun to adopt this approach, and
has licensed or is in the process of licensing technologies to institutions in Mexico, Bra-
zil, India, Chile, Argentina, China, Korea, Egypt, Indonesia, South Africa, and other sub-
Saharan African countries. Salicrup et al., supra note 189, at 6.
328. The NIH has offered exclusive, partially exclusive, and nonexclusive licenses
covering both patents and biological materials. See id. at 10 tb1.2.
329. Id. at 9.
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C. Intersections Between EA Clauses, ND Clauses, and
Partnerships
These approaches can, of course, be combined. EA and ND clauses
can be implemented together to ensure freedom for suppliers of an even-
tual end product in LMI countries as well as freedom for researchers in
high-income countries who seek to develop the compound for use against
a neglected disease.33o Similarly, EA clauses can be inserted into ND li-
censes to ensure that any resulting products must be licensed under terms
that guarantee generic companies freedom to operate in LMI countries.
Finally, when licensing to a nonprofit entity such as OneWorld Health,
universities could adopt either EA or ND clauses.331 Exactly how and
when to supplement one approach with another will likely depend on the
particular technologies and partners in question.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have highlighted a series of institutional innovations that could
constitute the backbone of a new agenda for access to biomedical innova-
tions and research on treatments for neglected diseases. One strong advan-
tage of our approach is that it can be undertaken in the absence of any
changes to national or international IP regimes. By collectively adopting
such an agenda, as well as clear and binding policies governing the use of
these approaches, universities can maximize their joint potential to close
the R&D and access gaps and improve the lives of people living in LMI
countries. No one-not pharmaceutical companies, not patients in devel-
oped nations, and not universities-benefits from letting people in poor
countries die from conditions that could be prevented or treated.
330. For a model license that aims to integrate the EA and ND provisions in this way,
see Model Provisions for an Equitable Access License, at http://www.essentialmedicine.
orglEAL.pdf. We are grateful to all those who participated in the interdisciplinary work-
ing group, based at Yale University and organized by Universities Allied for Essential
Medicines, to develop this document.
331. However, such clauses may be unnecessary or inappropriate when dealing with
nonprofits of this sort, whose ethos and mission are already closely aligned with those of
universities. Because these nonprofits are generally expert in their particular areas of re-
search, they may be better positioned than universities to determine the best strategy to
ensure access for researchers and patients. In the artemisinin deal between Berkeley and
OneWorld Health, for example, Berkeley granted OneWorld Health an exclusive right to
the University's relevant patent rights. See E-mail from Carol Mimura, Director, Office
of Technology Licensing, to Yochai Benkler, Professor of Law, Yale Law School (May
6,2005) (on file with authors).
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We must find ways around the many myopic and technical stumbling
blocks that contribute to millions of preventable deaths each year. In the
best case scenario, this voluntary solution will pave the way for IPR dis-
armament among a wide range of actors both in the United States and
elsewhere-including universities, scientists, federal legislators, federal
agencies, nonprofit drug development companies, and the pharmaceutical
industry itself. On the other hend, there may be no spillover effects beyond
providing access to universit){-generated medicines and research tools.
Perhaps only a small percentage of research on neglected diseases is redi-
rected, abandoned, or delayed' because of problems accessing research
tools. Perhaps patent-based costs account for only a few percent of pre-
ventable deaths from diseases in low- and middle-income countries. Per-
haps open access to university-based technologies would only avert a frac-
tion of these deaths and free up a fraction of the research tools relevant to
neglected diseases. But preventing even a fraction of one percent of deaths
in low- and middle-income countries would translate into saving tens of
thousands of lives every year. The opportunity to prevent these deaths is a
worthy goal for the community of scientists and universities to pursue, and
to pursue together.
